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Indigenous Peoples and Self Determination:
Challenging State Sovereignty*
Catherine J. Iorns**
INTRODUCTION
Indigenous peoples1 and their cultures have been attacked since their
* Copryright @ 1993 by Catherine J. Iorns
** B.A., L.L.B. (Hons.) Victoria University of Wellington; L.L.M. Yale. Ms. Iorns currently
teaches Public International Law and Aboriginal Legal Rights at Murdoch University, Perth,
Australia.
This paper was made possible by the Schell Center for Human Rights at Yale Law School
during the author's tenure as the Schell Research Fellow in International Human Rights, and by a
Ford Foundation Fellowship in International Law. The Ford Foundation fellowship enabled her to
attend the ninth session of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in Geneva in July 1991. This
paper was completed in April of 1992. Developments since then are not reflected.
For helpful comments on an earlier draft I thank James Anaya, Lea Brilmayer, Roger Clark,
Hurst Hannum, Paul Joffe, Maivn Lm, Matthew Palmer, Michael Reisman, Dalee Sambo and Alex
Wendt.
I While the adjective "indigenous" is commonly used to denote that the subject is simply native
to a place, or prior to other inhabitants of the place, its use in referring to indigenous peoples in the
international human rights context is narrower. While there is no fixed definition of "indigenous
peoples," the definition that has been proposed, and is generally used as a working definition for the
purposes of international action, is the following:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical con-
tinuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, con-
sider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territo-
ries, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in ac-
cordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems ....
On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to those indigenous popu-
lations through self-identification as indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized
and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the group).
Jos6 R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,
paras. 379-381, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add. 4 [hereinafter Cobo Report].
The Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, while not adopting any particular definition,
agreed that the Cobo Report's definition "could be a useful working definition." Report of the Work-
ing Group on Indigenous Populations on its Second Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/22 (1983)
[hereinafter Second Report of the WGIP]. On the name of the Working Group, see infra note 15 and
accompanying text. A definition proposed in a Conference Room Paper and agreed with by at least
one government and by some indigenous organizations, while worded slightly differently, stresses
substantially the same elements. Second Report of the WGIP, supra at 23. For an alternative defini-
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"discovery" and colonization.2 The treatment of indigenous peoples
has been so severe that it has been referred to as "genocide" and as a
"holocaust." 3 While the particular histories of different indigenous peo-
ples differ, they have in common a history of conquest by another group
and subordination within their present states, even where they may not
numerically be in a minority. Further, the tragedy of the treatment of
indigenous peoples is not merely historical; it continues today.'
The present situations of different indigenous peoples covers a wide
spectrum, ranging from the isolation of South American forest-dwellers
to the relative integration of the Maori people of Aotearoa/New Zea-
tion, see the proposal in Recommendations of the International Indian Treaty Council, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/NGO/2 (1984).
Note Robert Williams' comment that "efforts at a formal definition have not been generally
accepted by indigenous peoples and their advocates who participate in the international human
rights standard-setting process. Generally, indigenous peoples have insisted on the right to define
themselves." Robert A. Williams Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights
Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 663
n.4 (1990) (defining indigenous peoples as "those groups colonized by Western and other settler
states and who have lost their sovereignty while maintaining a distinct cultural identity. Indigenous
peoples usually seek to sustain their distinct cultural identity in intimate relation with their tradition-
ally-occupied territories. The best evidence of this distinct cultural identity results from indigenous
peoples identifying themselves as such"). For further discussion of the definition of "indigenous
peoples," see, e.g., RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN, THE ETHNIC QUESTION: CONFLICTS, DEVELOP-
MENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 96-100 (1990).
For the purposes of this paper, the important point to note is that an indigenous people is not
merely one that lived in a place before others arrived, which distinguishes indigenous peoples from
other types of minorities, but that they are also a self-identified, culturally distinct, non-dominant
group within a larger state. This stresses their oppression and their need for protection and excludes,
for the purposes of devising measures for the protection of indigenous peoples, those who are presently
dominant in their 'own' state. This paper is concerned with such indigenous peoples.
2 See, e.g., Cobo Report, supra note 1; JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE
STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1987); SECRETARIAT OF THE INDEPENDENT COM-
MISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A GLOBAL QUEST
FOR JUSTICE (1987) (describing generally the plight of indigenous peoples). See also Dean E. Cycon,
When Worlds Collide: Law, Development and Indigenous People, 25 NEW ENG. L.REv. 761 (1991)
(discussing the negative effects of resource development on indigenous peoples). See also the discus-
sion under the agenda item, Review of Developments, in all of the Reports of the sessions of the U.N.
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, infra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the views
of indigenous peoples and governments on the developments in the situations of indigenous peoples
in their countries). Robert Williams comments that "indigenous peoples have convincingly demon-
strated to the Working Group that the present, dominant conceptions of their rights and status in
international law have failed to protect their human rights to survival." Williams, supra note 1, at
704.
3 See, e.g., Maureen Davies' comment that the "[i]nvasion of Indigenous territories [has] been
characterized by an enduring holocaust of unparalleled proportions." Maureen Davies, Indigenous
Rights, in SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 45 (W.J. Allan MaCartney ed., 1988).
For a description of the treatment of indigenous peoples as genocide, see STAVENHAGEN, supra note
1, at 105, 118.
4 See authorities cited supra note 2.
5 Id.
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land.6 Their common problems, however, are political and economic op-
pression as well as the loss of their lands, their cultural and ethnic
traditions, and often their lives. These problems can be said to stem from
the basic attitude of non-indigenous peoples that indigenous ways of life
are backward and inferior and not appropriate for a "civilized" society.7
This attitude has manifested itself particularly in the readiness of non-
indigenous peoples to attempt to assimilate indigenous peoples into the
larger state without providing substantive protection for their so-called
inferior, "primitive" cultures.'
Because of their position, referred to increasingly as the "Fourth
World,"9 indigenous peoples have made repeated calls for the protection
6 "Aotearoa" is the Maori name for the land that is called New Zealand. For a comment on
the political use of these names see ANDREW SHARP, JUSTICE AND THE MAORI: MAORI CLAIMS IN
NEW ZEALAND POLrICAL ARGUMENT IN THE 1980s 12-13 (1990).
7 Robert Williams describes how the adoption of this distinction between civilized and uncivi-
lized peoples formed a large part of the justification given by the various European powers for not
according the "discovered" uncivilized indigenous peoples any rights of sovereignty accorded to
other civilized nations. This denial of sovereignty included the non-recognition of indigenous rights
to land, and in turn justified efforts in "civilizing" indigenous peoples through assimilation. See
ROBERT WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1990).
8 Id. A more contemporary illustration of the goal of assimilation is provided by the Conven-
tion Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries, I.L.O., 40th Sess., No. 107, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (1959) [herein-
after I.L.O. Convention No. 107]. This Convention explicitly provided the aim to assimilate indige-
nous populations into states on an equal basis with other inhabitants. Id. For discussion of I.L.O.
Convention No. 107 see Russel L. Barsh, Revision of the LL.O. Convention No. 107, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 756 (1987) [hereinafter Revision]; Gordon I. Bennet, ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal
Populations - the Resolution of a Problem of Vires, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 382 (1972-73); Lee
Swepston & Roger Plant, International Standards and the Protection of the Land Rights of Indige-
nous and Tribal Populations, 124 INT'L LAB. REV. 91 (1985); PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 334-368 (1991). In response to claims that it was
out of date (particularly with respect to its stated goal of assimilation) and did not address the needs
of indigenous peoples, the International Labor Organization has recently revised I.L.O. Convention
No. 107. The revised convention is Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
of Independent Countries (1989). For a discussion of Convention No. 169 see Russell L. Barsh, An
Advocate's Guide to the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
209 (1990) [hereinafter An Advocate's Guide]; Douglas Sanders, L. 0. Convention 169 - Concern-
ing Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 1989 CAN. NATIVE L. REP. 49; Lee
Swepston, A New Step in the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: The .L.O. Con-
vention 169 of 1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 677 (1990); Sharon Venne, The New Language of
Assimilation: A BriefAnalysis of ILO Convention 169, in WITHOUT PREJUDICE 53 (1990). Howard
Berman provides a commentary on the proposed revised convention, before the process was com-
plete. Howard R. Berman, The International Labour Organization and Indigenous Peoples: Revision
of LL0. Convention 107 at the 75th Session of the LLO. Conference, 1988, 41 INT'L COMM'N
JURISTS REV. 48.
9 The term "the Fourth World" was coined by George Manuel, in GEORGE MANUEL &
MICHAEL POSLUNS, THE FOURTH WORLD: AN INDIAN REALITY (1974). It is now used to refer to
aboriginal peoples who are in an inferior position to the dominant society with respect to culture,
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of their lives, their cultures, their lands, and, ultimately, for the recogni-
tion of their right to self-determination.' ° While the plight and claims of
indigenous peoples around the world have increasingly received interna-
tional attention, particularly over the last ten years, '1 many of the claims
of indigenous peoples have, to date, been rejected and denied. 2 The
most prominent of these rejected claims has been the claim by indigenous
peoples to self-determination.
Present, positive' 3 international law does not recognize a general
right of indigenous peoples situated within states to full self-determina-
tion.' 4  However, the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous
Peoples,' 5 which is currently drafting a declaration on the rights of indig-
politics, and economics. Shih-Chung Hsieh, A New Voice of Self-Determination, in THE TERRrrO-
RIAL RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND PEOPLES 143 n.1 (John R. Jacobson ed., 1989).
10 For a description of these claims, see infra Part IA.
11 Most of this attention has been reflected in and attracted by the Working Group on Indige-
nous Peoples, which was established by the Economic and Social Council in 1982. E.S.C. Res.
1982/34, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82 (1982). Part I of this paper
describes the establishment and role of the Working Group. Attention has also been reflected in and
attracted by the International Labour Organization's revision of I.L.O. Convention No. 107. See
supra note 8. There has been a corresponding growth in academic comment on the rights of indige-
nous peoples. See, e.g., Bernadette Kelly Roy & Gudmundur Alfredsson, Indigenous Rights The
Literature Explosion, 13 TRANSNAT'L PERSPECTIVES 19 (1987). See also Williams, supra note 1, at
664 n.4 (commenting on the "scholarly renaissance" in indigenous rights). Further articles, in addi-
tion to those cited in this paper, include: Russel L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of
International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369 (1986); Russel L. Barsh, United Nations Seminar on
Indigenous Peoples and States, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 599 (1989); Douglas Sanders, Another Step: The
U.N. Seminar on Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States, 4 CANADIAN NATIVE L. REP.
49, 37 (1989); Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: An Emerging International
Norm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127 (1991). Further, the American Society of International Law has
had three panel discussions concerning indigenous peoples: Are Indigenous Populations entitled to
international juridical personality?, in AM. SOC'Y INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 79TH ANNUAL
MEETING 189 (1985); International Human Rights Standards-setting: The Case for Indigenous Peo-
ples, in AM. SOC'Y INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 81ST ANNUAL MEETING 277 (1987); The Role
of Indigenous Non-government Organizations in Developing Human Rights Standards Applicable to
Indigenous Peoples, in AM. SOC'Y INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 81ST ANNUAL MEETING 282
(1987). These general writings are in addition to the many concerning specific peoples.
12 Some of the claims made by the indigenous peoples have not met with much resistance -
claims such as the right to the protection of their cultures and traditions. Others, however, have met
outright rejection by most, if not all, states. See infra Part III.
13 1 use the term "positive" to refer to state-recognized law as opposed to natural law. I in-
clude both textual and customary law in this category.
14 See authorities cited infra Part III. I occasionally use "full self-determination" or "seces-
sionist self-determination" in this paper to make it clear that I am referring to self-determination as
including independence or secession.
is The formal name of the Working Group is that of Indigenous Populations rather than Indig-
enous Peoples. This use of "populations" instead of "peoples" was a choice made for political rea-
sons, namely that states did not want to imply, by the use of "peoples," any right to self-
determination for indigenous peoples. See, e.g., infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. See also
the disscussion of the use of "peoples" in the drafting of I.L.O. Convention No. 169, infra notes 305-
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enous peoples, appears to be considering the inclusion of such a right.
Apart from any effects on indigenous peoples, such a recognition could
entail a fundamental change in international law, in international rela-
tions, and in the basis of the present world system of states.
The primary aim of this paper is to expose the barriers to the legal
recognition of the right of self-determination for indigenous peoples so
that they can be directly addressed and thus, hopefully, overcome. I ar-
gue that it is the concept of sovereignty, as presently understood and
applied by states, that poses the ultimate barrier - that no right of self-
determination is recognized in international law where it clashes with the
world system of state sovereignty.16 Because the principle of state sover-
eignty forms the basis of state identity in the present international legal
and political system, and because states are desperately concerned with
preserving their identity, state sovereignty is given priority over other,
competing claims, even when those claims are matters of fundamental
human rights. These claims cannot be met within a paradigm that as-
sumes the present conception of state sovereignty as a given. Ultimately,
we need a theory that allows for justification and argument based on the
actual interests involved. Only such an approach can fairly balance the
relevant interests and allow the claims to fundamental human rights -
such as those made by indigenous peoples - to be as seriously consid-
ered as claims to political organization and state identity.' 7 Only then
316. Since the establishment of the Working Group, the Sub-Commission on Human Rights has
agreed to refer to the agenda item using "peoples" rather than "populations," but the formal name
of the Working Group has never been changed. As the indigenous peoples themselves are offended
by being referred to as 'mere' populations and use the term "peoples" themselves, and as they satisfy
the ordinary meaning of "peoples" (see infra, Part III, section entitled "Peoples"), I use "Working
Group on Indigenous Peoples."
16 That is, self-determination, particularly where it involves any measure of international per-
sonality, is thought to violate territorial integrity; international consideration of human rights
claims is thought to violate the principle of non-intervention; if the right to self-determination in-
volves some right to assistance from other states as well as self-help, this is an even bigger violation
of the principle of non-intervention; and all of these, as violations of the practices of sovereignty,
amount to a violation of the principle of state sovereignty. See discussion infra Part II.
17 A challenge to state sovereignty on this basis could also be applicable to minorities in gen-
eral. That is, if indigenous peoples' rights cannot be protected within the present paradigm, and if
the fault is with the paradigm rather than indigenous peoples in particular, then that presumably
also applies to other ethnic minorities within states. For example, my argument that sovereignty
needs to be contested so as to enable competing interests to be assessed is a general argument that
should therefore be able to be applied to interests besides those of specifically indigenous peoples.
However, the arguments that I make in this paper for the extension of the right of self-determination
to indigenous peoples, and why this is needed in order to protect the basic rights of indigenous
peoples, are based specifically on the situation of indigenous peoples. I cannot make any claim that
the situations of non-indigenous minorities have the same features or that their oppression requires
the same remedies. Indeed, I suspect that there may be some differences that would alter my conclu-
sions if I were to generalize. Minorities that are clearly identified with a territorial space presumably
have more in common with indigenous peoples and thus with their claims and oppression. Others
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will the human rights and interests of indigenous peoples be realized.
Part I of this paper addresses the claims made by indigenous peoples
to self-determination. Part II describes the international legal principles
of sovereignty and self-determination and identifies the barriers to the
recognition of a legal right to self-determination for indigenous peoples.
Part III comments on the law of self-determination and of sovereignty,
including the principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
states and territorial integrity. This final section outlines some of the
ways other scholars have approached the relevant issues and suggests
how the situation and claims of indigenous peoples may compel one ap-
proach to be taken over another. This section finally considers possible
implications for the concept of sovereignty and for international law in
general.
I. THE CLAIMS
This Part begins by describing the role of the Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter referred to as the Working Group) and
the discussion, primarily in the Working Group's meetings, of the claims
made by indigenous peoples, including the states' responses. This de-
scription identifies the recent developments in the discussion and demon-
strates why it appears likely that some statement of the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination will be included in the draft
Declaration.
Following this description of the debate, I consider what indigenous
peoples are attempting to do by referring to self-determination and why
(and how) the states are resisting, focusing particularly on what states
believe they are protecting by objecting to indigenous peoples' claims.
Finally, I identify strategies open to indigenous peoples in respect to the
draft Declaration and outline the advantages and disadvantages of each.
A. The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Peoples
1. Description of the Working Group
The Working Group on Indigenous Peoples was established as a re-
sponse to increased attention being focused on the plight of indigenous
peoples throughout the world and recognition of the need for special
measures for their protection.18 The primary source of this increased
that are not so identified and are more integrated throughout a state may not; the political solutions
to their oppression may not challenge sovereignty or the nation-state. This paper does not address
these issues.
18 Although described neutrally, this increasing attention was the result of concerted pressure
by indigenous peoples themselves, rather than any generous, unilateral undertaking on the part of
states. Robert Williams describes the attention as being due to "storytelling" by indigenous peoples.
Williams, supra note 1, at 662.
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attention was a report on the situations of indigenous peoples throughout
the world which was commissioned in 1970 by the U.N. Sub-Commis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (the
Cobo Report). 19 This extensive report described the various forms of
oppression that indigenous peoples around the world face and made rec-
ommendations for measures to end such oppression.2" In 1981, before
the report had been finalized, it was clear that the report was going to
call for more United Nations action on the issue of the protection of
indigenous peoples.21
The other main sources of increased world awareness of the
problems faced by indigenous peoples were two conferences, in 1977 and
1981, dedicated to examining discrimination against indigenous
peoples.22
In 1982, in anticipation of the final part of the Cobo Report, the
U.N. Economic and Social Council established the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations (referred to here as the Working Group on In-
19 Cobo Report, supra note 1. This document is the final volume of the reprints of the series of
five reports written by Special Rapporteur Jose R. Martinez Cobo from 1981 to 1983. This volume
is the most widely available and most widely cited, particularly as it summarizes the conclusions of
the earlier volumes. The suggestion that the problem of indigenous peoples be given special atten-
tion was made by Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti in his Study on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1
(1979).
20 It has since provided a valuable resource for those discussing what is needed in the area of
indigenous peoples rights.
21 The Sub-Commission examined progress reports between 1973 and 1980. In 1981, the final
chapters of the report began to be produced. See supra note 19. Douglas Sanders, a Canadian legal
scholar, comments that that the Working Group was established before the Report was finalized as it
was clear that that was going to be "a major recommendation of the study" and because various
people were "frustrated with the long delay" in producing the final report. Douglas Sanders, The
U.N. Working Group in Indigenous Populations, 11 HUM. RTs. Q. 406, 408 (1989).
22 The 1977 conference was officially entitled "The International N.G.O. Conference on Dis-
crimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas," and was held in Geneva on Septem-
ber 20-24, 1977. This Conference adopted a "Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the
Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere." The 1981 conference entitled "Indig-
enous Peoples and the Land," was a follow-up to the 1977 conference; it subsequently also adopted
the 1977 Declaration contained in the Statement and Final Documents (1978). For a brief descrip-
tion of this Declaration, see Russel L. Barsh, Indigenous North America and Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 62 OR. L. REV. 73, 99-100 (1983) [hereinafter Indigenous North America]. Another
conference that helped to raise world awareness of indigenous peoples, even though it was not dedi-
cated solely to that task, was the 1978 "World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimi-
nation," which endorsed some of the rights claimed by indigenous peoples. Report of the World
Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.92/40 (1979). A
further conference held by indigenous peoples, but which did not gain the same publicity, is the
"Eighth Inter-American Indian Conference," held in Merida, Mexico in 1980. See also, HuRST
HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS 81-83 (1990) [hereinafter AUTONOMY] (describing developments focusing in-
ternational attention on the situation of indigenous peoples).
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digenous Peoples)23 under the supervision of the Sub-Commission.24 The
Working Group was given a two-fold mandate: (1) to review develop-
ments in the human rights of indigenous peoples, and (2) to develop stan-
dards to protect those rights.25 While both of these aspects have been
addressed at each session of the Working Group,2 6 the major current
task of the Working Group is the drafting of a declaration on the rights
of indigenous peoples to be adopted by the General Assembly.
The Working Group consists of five independent experts selected
from the membership of the Sub-Commission.2" While the Group itself
may be small, the meetings of the Group are open to any states, interna-
tional organizations (both inter-governmental and non-governmental),
indigenous peoples' groups, and even interested individuals, all of whom
participate as observers.2" Rights to speak at meetings have been granted
to states, inter-governmental organizations, accredited non-governmental
organizations and indigenous persons or their representatives. In addi-
tion, various individuals typically offer their opinion on legal aspects of
the drafting exercise. As a result, the Working Group has become "a
significant international forum"29 for the discussion of the plight of in-
digenous peoples and of possible responses, both national and interna-
tional, to help remedy their situations. The Working Group thus
provides a forum for both the airing of grievances of indigenous peoples
(although, because the role of Working Group does not include the hear-
ing and judging of complaints, not all states have accepted that griev-
ances should be heard)3° and for the setting of standards.31
23 See supra note 15 (regarding reference to the Working Group as the Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples).
24 E.S.C. Res. 34, supra note 11, at 26.
25 Id.
26 The Working Group has one session each year, either one or two weeks long. Each session
is divided into meetings.
27 Accordingly, each represents one of the five regions recognized by the United Nations.
These regions are Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and "Western Europe and Others",
or W.E.O. The category of "Others" includes the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
28 In practice, the numbers attending the meetings have grown, reaching approximately 500 in
1991. See Closing Statement of Ms. Erica-Irene Daes, Chairperson/Rapporteur of the WGIP, in
Report of the Working Group Indigenous Populations on its Ninth Session, at 51, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/40/Rev.1 (1991) [hereinafter Ninth Report of the WGIP]. In 1991 attendance
consisted of representatives from 30 states, 3 inter-governmental organizations, the Holy See, the
Greenland Home Rule Government, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission of Aus-
tralia, 86 indigenous nations and non-governmental organizations (10 having consultative status to
ECOSOC), 57 other non-governmental organizations and groups (21 with ECOSOC consultative
status); plus 117 individual scholars, experts, activists and other observers. Id. paras. 5-13, at 2-4.
29 Sanders, supra note 21, at 408.
30 See id. at 408-409.
31 For a description of how the discussion in the Working Group is structured see Williams,
supra note 1, at 677-680. See generally, AUTONOMY, supra note 22, at 84; Hurst Hannum, New
Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 649, 661 (1988) [hereinafter New Develop-
Vol. 24:199
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF DETERMINATION
The Working Group began the standard-setting exercise in 1985 at
its fourth session.32 At this session, the Working Group approved seven
principles for inclusion in the proposed draft declaration.33 After discus-
sion and comment on these principles, both before34 and during the fifth
session (1987)11, the seven preliminary draft principles were expanded to
fourteen.36 Following the discussion of these fourteen principles, the
Chairperson/Rapporteur, 37 Ms. Erica-Irene A. Daes, prepared a draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to be discussed at the
sixth session in 1988.38 After comment and detailed discussion of this
draft in 1988, a revised draft was prepared for the 1989 session.39 This
ments]; Gudmundur Alfredsson, Fourth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 55
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 22 (1986); Indigenous North America, supra note 22, at 100-102.
32 Report of the Working Group On Indigenous Populations on its Fourth Session, at para. 57,
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/22 (1985) [hereinafter Fourth Report of the WGIP].
33 Id. Annex II.
34 Requests for comments from interested parties are made after each session of the Working
Group. These requests are made formally by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities. For example, the request after the fourth session was made in its
Resolution 1985/22 (August 28, 1985). The comments received are compiled in U.N documents
before the next session. See, eg., compilations of comments referred to infra note 40.
35 The fifth session was held in 1987 as the 1986 meeting was cancelled due to the U.N. budget-
ary crisis at the time. Instead, a workshop was held in order to make progress on the discussion of
the preliminary draft principles. The workshop was co-sponsored by the Anti-Slavery Society for
the Protection of Human Rights and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. It was held in
Geneva on September 6 and 7, 1986. The Report of the Workshop is contained in Review of
Developments: Standard-Setting Activities - Material Received From Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions in Consultative Status With the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/WP.4/Add.1 (1987). The workshop was attended by two members of the
Working Group (including the Chairperson/Rapporteur), two members of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, representatives from six states (Argen-
tina, Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand, and the U.S.A.), from the United Nations, from non-
governmental organizations, from indigenous organizations and peoples, and a number of individual
experts. The specific topics discussed were: "health, medical care, other social services, and ade-
quate housing; and the right and responsibility of indigenous peoples, as of all others, to respect
universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms." Id. at para. 12.
36 Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fifth Session, Annex II, at 23-
24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/22 (1987) [hereinafter Fifth Report of the WGIP].
37 The Working Group elects its Chairperson/Rapporteur at the beginning of each session.
Mr. Asbjorn Eide was elected for the Working Group's first two sessions; Ms. Erica-Irene A. Daes
has been elected for each session since.
38 The Working Group recommended to the Sub-Commission that Ms. Daes prepare such a
draft. Fifth Report ofthe WGIP, supra note 36, Annex I at 22. This recommendation was approved
by the Sub-Commission (Resolution 1987/16), by the Commission on Human Rights (Resolution
1988/49) and by the Economic and Social Council (Resolution 1988/36).
39 Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Seventh Session, Annex II, at
31-35, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36 (1989) [hereinafter Seventh Report of WGIP]. The draft
declaration consists of 13 preambular paragraphs and 30 articles, these articles being divided into
seven parts. The first part, Articles 1 and 2, affirm the rights already recognized in existing human
rights instruments. Part 2, Articles 3-11, primarily protects rights of survival, both of the individual
and the group. To this latter end it protects rights related to cultural identity. Part 3, Articles 12-
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was discussed at both the seventh (1989) and eighth (1990) sessions.4'
At the eighth session, three separate drafting groups were estab-
lished to consider different provisions of the draft, each of which made
suggestions for changes.41 From these suggestions and comments on
them, the Chairperson/Rapporteur proposed a further revised draft.42
Some of this draft was discussed during its first reading at the ninth ses-
sion of the Working Group in July 1991.11 As a result of the discussion
at the ninth session, the Working Group submitted a revised preamble
17, concerns rights to land and natural resources. Part 4, Articles 18-20, concerns economic rights
such as rights to traditional means of subsistence, rights to State measures for the improvement of
the social and economic conditions of indigenous peoples, and rights to determine and implement
the social and economic programs that will affect them. Part 5, Articles 21-27, concerns political
rights, including rights of equal participation in national political processes, rights of autonomy in
relation to their local affairs, rights to local government, and the right to claim that States honor
treaties and agreements made with indigenous peoples. Part 6 consists of one article concerning the
right to fair and prompt conflict resolution procedures. Articles 29 and 30, which constitute Part 7,
are general articles providing that the rights described are the minimum necessary for the survival
and well-being of indigenous peoples and that none of them imply any right to destroy any of the
other rights.
40 Id. at 16-27; Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eighth Session,
at 14-26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42 (1990) [hereinafter Eighth Report of the WGIP]. Note
also that this discussion was facilitated by the submission of written comments by various partici-
pants before the sessions. These comments made before the seventh session are described in Discrim-
ination Against Indigenous Peoples: Analytical Compilation of Observations and Comments Received
Pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1988/18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33/Add.1 (1989)
[hereinafter Analytical Compilation of Observations and Comments] (written comments were re-
ceived by fourteen governments, four U.N. agencies, four indigenous organizations, and three non-
governmental organizations). Comments received prior to the eighth session are contained in Stan-
dard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Peoples - Infor-
mation Received From Governments, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/1 &
Add. 1-3 (1990) [hereinafter Standard-Setting Activities: Information Received from Governments
1990]; Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples - Information Received From UN. Organs, Specialized Agencies, and Intergovernmental Orga-
nizations, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/2 & Add.l (1990) [herinafter Stan-
dard-Setting Activities: Information Received From Intergovernmental Organizations 1990]; Stan-
dard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Peoples -
Information Received From Non-Governmental Organizations, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Commission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/3 & Add. 1-2 (1990) [hereinafter Standard-Setting Activities: Information
Received From Non-Governmental Organizations 1990].
41 The reports of these three drafting groups are contained in Eighth Report of the WGIP,
supra note 40, Annex III-V respectively, at 40-54.
42 Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/36
(1991).
43 For a summary of this discussion, see Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, paras. 32-
57, at 8-11. For a detailed discussion see infra notes 105-118 and acompanying text.
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and a revision of what were operative paragraphs 1-17. 4 It is expected
that the first reading of the revised draft will be completed at the tenth
(1992) session and the second reading begun. 5 Whether a second read-
ing will also be able to be completed is unclear, but it is the hope of at
least a number of participants that a completed draft declaration will be
able to be submitted for adoption by the U.N. bodies above the Working
Group,46 including the General Assembly, in 1993, the International
Year for the World's Indigenous Peoples.47
2. History of Discussion of Self-Determination in the Working
Group
From the first session, the position of the indigenous peoples' repre-
sentatives at the Working Group has been that a full legal right of indige-
nous peoples to self-determination must be included in any standards
that the Working Group devises under its mandate.48 The indigenous
representatives have consistently maintained that a right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination is the most important right that any stan-
dards could recognize and should thus be included as a fundamental ele-
ment of any document. 9 The reasons given for this emphasis on the
right of self-determination are twofold. First, it is argued that it is essen-
tial for their survival and development as peoples50 and thus "the key to
the implementation of solutions for [their] problems."51 Second, it is ar-
44 See Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, Annex II, at 29-34. Operative paragraphs 18-
30 were not discussed due to insufficient time.
45 Id. Annex I, para. 3, at 24.
46 These bodies are the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, the Commission of Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the
General Assembly.
47 Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, para. 56, at 11. The Chairperson/Rapporteur
also expressed this hope in her Closing Statement at the ninth session (August 2, 1991). Id. Annex
IV, at 51.
48 See, eg., Report of the Working Group Indigenous Peoples on its First Session, para. 82,
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33 (1982) [hereinafter First Report of the WGIP]; Fifth Report of
the WGIP, supra note 36, paras. 52 & 53, at 14; Seventh Report of the WGIP, supra note 39, paras.
33 & 56, at 11 & 17-18. See also the various comments made by indigenous and non-governmental
organizations in Standard-Setting Activitier Information Received From Non-Governmental Organi-
zations 1990, supra note 40 (e.g., the comments of the Indian Law Resource Center, para. 10, at 3).
49 See, e.g., Report of the Working Group Indigenous Populations on its Sixth Session, U.N.
ESCOR, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 6th Sess.,
Agenda Item 12, at 21-22, para. 80, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24 (1988) [hereinafter Sixth
Report of the WGIP]; Analytical Compilation of Observations and Comments, supra note 40, at 33
(comments of the Indian Law Resource Center).
50 First Report of the WGIP, supra note 48, para. 70.
51 Id. para 72. This was because "[s]elf-determination would allow those groups to freely de-
cide how to solve their own problems and how to develop their own culture, their own resources and
their own way of life." Id. See also Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm. on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
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gued that self-determination is an inherent right of peoples (including
indigenous peoples); this right entails inherent sovereignty that cannot
be denied.52
In line with this position, the indigenous representatives have pro-
posed various draft principles for inclusion in a draft declaration on the
rights of indigenous peoples recognizing a legal right to self-determina-
tion. 3 They have stressed that the content of this right, while including
ties, 3rd Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 13, para. 68, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/20 (1984) [herein-
after The Study of Discrimination] ("the lack of self-determination was the cause of a tragic gap
between the economic, social and cultural situation of the other sectors of the population and that of
the indigenous populations who lived within the territory of those countries."); Review of Develop-
ments: Review of Developments - Consideration of the Evolution of Standards - Information Received
From Non-Governmental Organizations, at 11, U.N. Do. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1988/5 (1988)
[hereinafter Review of Developments] (the Inuit Circumpolar Conference noting that the Cobo Report
finds that "self-determination is a prerequisite and a pre-condition for the implementation and pres-
ervation of all other human rights and fundamental freedoms" and arguing that, if only for this
reason (being a means to an end), the right to self-determination must be included in any declara-
tion); Seventh Report of the WGIP, supra note 39, para. 28, at 10 ("self-determination was of great
importance to indigenous peoples because it was the denial of this right which had led to their
present living conditions.").
52 See, e.g., Fourth Report of the WGIP, supra note 32, para. 79 (the Inuit Circumpolar Con-
ference arguing that "the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples are inherent in nature" and
therefore "limit the sovereignty of national Governments" over indigenous peoples; these limits must
also be recognized in any declaration). In addition, at the ninth session (1991), the Grand Council of
the Crees argued that self-determination was a "fundamental, inalienable" right of indigenous peo-
ples and could thus "not be negotiated or bargained away." Quote recorded by author at the meet-
ing. See Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, para. 42, at 29, for a summary of the statement
by the Grand Council of the Crees. See also Delia Opekokew, International Law, International
Institutions, and Indigenous Issues, in THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS ON SELF-DETERMINATION (Ruth Thompson ed., 1987).
53 See, e.g., the draft paragraph submitted by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and
six indigenous peoples' organizations: "All indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of this right they may freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social, religious and cultural development." Fourth Report of the WGIP, supra note 32,
Annex III (Declaration of principles adopted at the Fourth General Assembly of the World Council
of Indigenous Peoples in Panama, September 1984). The draft declaration of principles provided by
the various indigenous peoples' organizations similarly provides:
All indigenous nations and peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of which
they have the right to whatever degree of autonomy or self-government they choose. This
includes the right to freely determine their political status, freely pursue their own eco-
nomic, social, religious and cultural development, and determine their own membership
and/or citizenship, without external interference.
Id. Annex IV (Draft declaration of principles proposed by the Indian Law Resource Center, Four
Directions Council, National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service, National Indian Youth Coun-
cil, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, and the International Indian Treaty Council). See also Fifth
Report of the WGIP, supra note 36, Annex V, at 30 (declaration of 22 principles concerning the
rights of indigenous peoples adopted by indigenous peoples' representatives at a preparatory meeting
to the fifth session in Geneva on 27-31 July, 1987. The right to self-determination, as expressed in
the draft principles devised by the six indigenous peoples' organizations before the fourth session,
was adopted, as were other principles expanding on this right) id. See also the draft Covenant on the
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the option of full self-determination where appropriate, is flexible and
does not necessarily imply separatism or secession. 4 However, it does
imply that indigenous peoples themselves have the right to determine
their form and extent of self-government, including the right to choose
independence. 5
The government representatives do not share the enthusiasm for
legal recognition of a right to self-determination for indigenous peoples.
While most government representatives have agreed that indigenous peo-
ples should be allowed "an increased degree of self-determination...in
their relations with the respective Governments,"56 they have also made
rights of Indigenous Peoples provided by the World Group on Indigenous Peoples in 1984, in Con-
sideration of the Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1983/5/Add.2 (1983). This Covenant provides a strong declaration that in-
digenous peoples have the right to self-determination and that each indigenous people "has the right
to determine the form, structure and authority of its institutions of [internal] self-determination." Id.
at 15.
54 For example, the indigenous peoples' representatives have "emphasized that self-determina-
tion did not necessarily equate to separatism." First Report of the WGIP, supra note 48, para. 72.
Instead, the right to self-determination was the right "to possess in their territories whatever degree
of self-government they wished to choose." Id. para. 82. It was commented that the implementa-
tion of self-determination would vary in different situations and could include "mere participation in
decisions concerning their status in the country in which the indigenous peoples lived," "different
forms of autonomy within the State," and "the establishment of an independent State." Id. See also
Second Report of the WGIP, supra note 1, para. 97 ("the meaning of the right to autonomy or self-
determination varied from one indigenous people to another and did not always mean sovereignty or
statehood and that indigenous people should themselves be allowed to decide on the degree of auton-
omy or self-determination they should have"); Analytical Compilation of Observations and Com-
ments, supra note 40, at 13-15 (comments of the National Indian Youth Council).
James Anaya comments that indigenous peoples "in virtually all instances deny aspirations to
independent statehood." S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law
in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, 1989 HARV. INDIAN L. SYMP. 191, at 219 (1990). In
support of this comment he cites a statement made at the 75th session of the International Labour
Conference. Id. n.121.
55 In addition to the authorities cited supra note 54, see, eg., The Study of Discrimination,
supra note 51; Fifth Report of the WGIP, supra note 36, para. 52, at 14 ("self-determination should
mean the freedom of indigenous peoples to determine the form of institutions, their composition and
their functions, also in self-governance relationships with states" and "the right to self-determination
ought to encompass the possibility of choosing full independence"); Consideration of the Evolution of
Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Populations - Information Received From Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1983/5/Add. 2 (1983). See also
infra note 130.
56 Consideration of the Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Populations,
supra note 55 para. 63. Such an increased degree of self-determination could include the establish-
ment of new institutions with the participation of the indigenous peoples and/or "the assumption by
the indigenous communities of responsibility for self-government and self-management of certain
affairs." Id para. 64. See also Fifth Report of the WGIP, supra note 36, para. 56, at 15-16 (describ-
ing a commitment to greater levels of autonomy with existing states); Consideration of the Evolution
of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Populations, at 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1983/2/Add. 2 (1983) (Australia thought that "indigenous aspirations and
identity" as well as "autonomy" should also be discussed).
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it clear that any standards must not imply any right of secession of indig-
enous peoples from existing independent states. 57 The government rep-
resentatives have accordingly rejected any recognition of a full right of
self-determination for indigenous peoples.5" They maintain, instead, that
once a state has gained independence, the appropriate concern becomes
one of minority protection within that state.5 9 The government repre-
sentatives have consistently maintained that indigenous peoples are not
entitled to self-determination under international law as the legal right of
self-determination is only appropriate to the process of decolonization
and liberation from foreign occupation and that, under the relevant legal
criteria, indigenous peoples are not colonized nor under foreign occupa-
tion.' Government representatives have accordingly rejected the use of
the term "peoples" and instead referred to indigenous "populations" so
as to avoid any implication that indigenous peoples are thereby entitled
to the right of "all peoples"61 to self-determination. 2 Further, govern-
57 See, e.g., Consideration of the Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous
Populations, supra note 56, at 3. (Australia argued that "the [Working] Group should avoid any
suggestion that separate development or secession is at issue"). See also Standard-Setting Activities:
Information Received From Governments 1990, supra note 40, Add. 1, at 9. The International Labor
Organization, presumably on behalf of its member states, has also argued that the declaration should
clarify that "these rights may in no event justify segregationist policies." Standard-Setting Activities:
Information Received From Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 40, at 11. See also infra
note 135 and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., the states' comments contained in Analytical Compilation of Observations and
Comments, supra note 40.
59 See, e.g., Sixth Report of the WGIP, supra note 49, at 12, para. 44.
60 Id. para. 99. It was also asserted that, under the international law of self-determination,
where a group has been "given the opportunity to participate in forming the life of a State" then that
group "could not be said to have been denied the right to self-determination." Id. See also id para.
65; The Study of Discrimination supra note 51, para. 74 (while "forms of self-government with the
framework of the State" were possible, self-determination "did not apply in international law to
enclave populations within non-colonial states"); Fifth Report of the WGIP, supra note 36, para. 56,
at 15 ("Government observers pointed out that, as of today, the United Nations had applied the
principle of self-determination within the context of colonial or foreign occupation. The principle
should not be utilized to support secessionist or separatist moves within democratic and independent
states.") Sixth Report of the WPIG, supra note 49, para. 44 ("the right to self-determination was
only applicable to colonial situations or foreign occupation").
61 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. I, para.
1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. I,
para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 [hereinafter International Covenants] (both providing that "[a]ll peo-
ples have the right of self-determination").
62 See, e.g., Analytical Compilation of Observations and Comments, supra note 40, at 3. (Aus-
tralia stating that the declaration must specify that the references to "peoples" and to "autonomous
institutions" do not imply either the full right to self-determination "as understood in international
law" or the identification of a unique set of rights for a separate group within the state); Id. at 4
(Canada stating that the declaration should use "populations" instead of "peoples" because the
meaning of "peoples" in international law is unclear and it "may relate to the right to self-determina-
tion, which would not be acceptable to many States"); Id. at 9 (Sweden stating that, if "peoples" is
used, the declaration must clarify that it does not imply the right to self-determination); Fifth Report
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ment representatives have stressed that any declaration of the rights of
indigenous peoples should operate within existing human rights instru-
ments and not confer new, additional rights on indigenous peoples;63 nor
should any such declaration "infringe upon the sovereignty and indepen-
dence of the Member States of the United Nations."'
Because of this apparent polarization of views, the discussion of self-
determination in the Working Group has been slow. 65 Yet, despite the
differences in views, there has been progress toward agreement on
enough aspects that the Working Group has felt able to include some
references to self-determination in the draft declaration.
The inclusion of self-determination in standards to be devised by the
Working Group was first considered substantively in the fourth session.66
At the fourth session, the participants, including indigenous peoples and
government representatives, agreed that existing international instru-
ments were not sufficient to address and remedy the underlying problems
of indigenous peoples; instead, new standards were needed.67 However,
they disagreed on whether a legal right to self-determination should be
included. The Working Group accordingly decided to proceed to a draft
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples and, to this end, adopted
seven preliminary draft principles. These principles, however, did not
mention any right of self-determination.68
At the fifth session, the Chairperson/Rapporteur agreed with the
governments' position that any standards should be consistent with ex-
isting human rights law.69 Further, at least one member of the Working
of the WGIP, supra note 36, para. 56, at 15; Standard-Setting Activities: Information Received from
Governments, supra note 40, Add. 3, at 2 (acknowledging that any use of the term "peoples" must be
accompanied by a qualification denying implication of a right to self-determination); Seventh Report
of the WGIP, supra note 39, para. 55.
63 See, eg., Australia's comment that the declaration should "clarify" that the various rights
are to be "effective within the framework of (i.e. subject to) State law and are not to be interpreted as
implying separate development or statehood for indigenous peoples, or extra citizenship rights."
Standard Setting Activitie" Information Received from Governments, supra note 40, Add. 3, at 3.
64 Observation of the Union of Myanmar in Analytical Compilation of Observations and Com-
ments, supra note 40, at 4.
65 The Working Group has consistently stated that it would proceed on the basis of the opin-
ions expressed by both governments and indigenous organizations. See, eg., Fourth Report of the
WGIP, supra note 32, Annex I.
66 At the second session the Chairperson/Rapporteur expressed caution in relation to the wide
disagreement on this issue and thus the possibility of holding up the deliberations of the Group; he
thus recommended not making self-determination the primary issue. Second Report of the WGIP,
supra note 1, para. 100. In relation to the plan of future action, the Working Group recommended
that the third session be devoted to the discussion of land and the definition of "indigenous peoples"
but that self-determination should be a high priority for discussion at the subsequent sessions. Id.
Annex I.
67 Fourth Report of the WGIP, supra note 32, paras. 59-61.
68 Id. Annex II.
69 The Chairperson/Rapporteur drew to the meeting's attention General Assembly Resolution
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Group shared the view that international law did not extend the right of
self-determination to indigenous peoples within states as the concern of
international law had been "decolonization and other political issues,
such as foreign occupation."70 Members of the Working Group thus
suggested that the declaration should focus on rights of autonomy for
indigenous peoples within states;7' self-determination in this sense would
be reflected in national constitutions.7 2 Accordingly, the fourteen draft
principles proposed by the Working Group at the end of the fifth session
did not recognize any right of self-determination.73 Instead, some of the
principles recognized rights of group identity, such as the right to have
the group's specific character reflected in the legal system and political
institutions of its country.7 4
After receiving comments on the draft principles, 75  the Chairper-
son/Rapporteur drafted a declaration for discussion at the sixth ses-
41/120 (4 December, 1986) entitled Setting International Standards in the Field of Human Rights.
This resolution required, inter alia, consistency of new standards with existing human rights laws.
Fifth Report of the WGIP, supra note 36, para. 42, at 12. Another Group member commented that
"none of the group rights could be construed in such a way as to justify any violation of the univer-
sally recognized rights of individuals." Id. para. 49, at 13. An alternative point of view was taken
by another member of the Working Group. The Report notes that this member stated that not all
aspects of existing human rights instruments would be relevant to indigenous peoples as,
they had been drafted without their participation and contained certain concepts which
were designed for different situations. He gave as examples of such concepts the right to
life and personal security which indigenous peoples tied to the right to land, and the right
to private property which was perhaps different from what indigenous peoples meant or
wanted when referring to the right to land.
Id. para. 50, at 14. This view, however, does not appear to have prevailed.
70 Id. para. 49, at 13.
71 Id. para. 54 & 55, at 15.
72 Id. para. 54.
73 Id. Annex II, at 23-24.
74 See, e.g., id. Principle 6.
75 The government representatives maintained the rejection of the application of the full inter-
national right of self-determination to indigenous peoples. These comments are reproduced in Re-
view of Developments Pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms oflndigenous Populations, at 2, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2 & Add. 1 (1988). The
states that commented are Canada, the Byelorussia Soviet Socialist Republic, People's Republic of
the Congo, Finland, Japan and the U.S.S.R. The reaction to the suggested compromise right of
autonomy was varied. For example, Canada did not object to "the establishment of special political
institutions for indigenous groups" but "would be unlikely to support a principle that went beyond
this and required that national political institutions and legal systems be redesigned to reflect the
character of indigenous populations." Id. at 5. Note that the stated reason that Canada did not
object to the establishment of separate political institutions was that it already had "policies for the
development of self-government by aboriginal communities and related institutions." Id. On the
other hand, the U.S.S.R. argued that the existence of indigenous peoples within a state should not
always give rise to the creation of special political institutions. It also argued that the exercise of the
rights contained in the declaration "should not be prejudicial to the interests of society and the
State." Id. at 9. More generally, the Byelorussia Soviet Socialist Republic argued that the declara-
tion should state that "the right to the full and effective enjoyment of fundamental rights and free-
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sion.7 6 This draft declaration was significant in that, while there was still
no declaration of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, it
used the term "peoples" instead of "populations" when referring to in-
digenous peoples." Further, the principles concerning political rights in-
cluded: "the collective right to autonomy in matters relating to their
own internal and local affairs, including education, information, culture,
religion, health, housing, social welfare, traditional and other economic
activities, land and resources administration and the environment, as
well as internal taxation for financing these autonomous functions."78
The Chairperson/Rapporteur took this approach because she considered
that the declaration should effect a compromise between the positions of
states and indigenous peoples by focussing on internal self-determination
or autonomy.
7 9
At the meeting, the individual members of the Working Group took
different views of the draft declaration. In line with the arguments made
by the government representatives, some members argued that the decla-
ration should be "realistic and acceptable to all the parties involved."8
Other members tried to compromise between the different views. For
example, one member agreed that "indigenous peoples were indeed peo-
ples and not minorities or ethnic groups";8 however, because the word
"peoples" implied the right to full self-determination in international
law, it was also suggested that the declaration clarify that its use did not
imply "statehood or independence or any sort of secession." 82 Another
member of the Working Group stressed that "the right to autonomy
should be further emphasized" as it was essential for the development of
doms is of an extremely general nature, and does not have the effect of introducing substantial
changes in the legal status of indigenous populations." Id. at 2.
The representatives from indigenous peoples' organizations, on the other hand, again stressed
and elaborated their commitment to the recognition of the full right to self-determination for indige-
nous peoples. See generally Review of Developments Pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1988/5 (1988).
76 Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights: A Set of Draft Preambular Paragraphs and
Principles, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/25 (1988). It is also reproduced in The Sixth Re-
port of the WGIP, supra note 49, Annex II.
77 Id.
78 Id. Principle 23.
79 For example, she suggested that "States should consider recognizing the right of the Indige-
nous Peoples to internal self-determination or the right to autonomy in matters relating to their own
internal and local affairs, including... education, information, culture, religion, economic activities,
lands, natural resources administration, etc." Statement made by Ms. Daes in The Report United
Nations Seminar on the Effects of Racism and Racial Discrimination on the Social and Economic
Relations between Indigenous Peoples and States, at 74-75, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/22 (1989).
80 Sixth Report of the WGIP, supra note 49, para. 71, at 19. The implication was that it must
not go against the wishes of states.
81 Id. para. 76, at 20.
82 Id.
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indigenous peoples. 83
Despite the statements of some government representatives that in-
digenous peoples should be entitled to an increased degree of self-deter-
mination, even if not a full right of self-determination, the suggested right
of autonomy proposed by the Working Group was rejected by those gov-
ernments that commented in writing on the draft declaration. 4 Com-
ments made by indigenous peoples' organizations were varied. Some
organizations maintained that self-determination was essential and must
be included." Others attempted merely to broaden the rights of auton-
omy proposed by the Chairperson/Rapporteur. 6
83 Id. para. 75. This was impliedly at the expense of a full right of self-determination.
84 These comments are described in Analytical Compilation of Observations and Comments,
supra note 40. For example, Australia did not support the creation of separate political institutions.
Id. at 30. Romania considered that autonomy was not always appropriate in the specific situation of
any particular country, so considered that it could not be included as a general right. Id. at 31.
Along this line, Finland stated that it was not possible to grant the Sami autonomy because they
"live among the rest of the population without constituting a majority in any municipality." Canada
and Sweden considered that the right to autonomy was too broad and imprecise. Id. at 30-31.
85 See, e.g., Article 26 of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples' draft declaration: indige-
nous peoples have "[t]he right to achieve, free from transmigratory influence, self-determination."
Review of Developments Pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms of Indigenous Populations, at 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1989/5 (1989).
See also Report of United Nations Seminar on the Effects of Racism and Racial Discrimination on the
Social and Economic Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/22
(1989). For example:
(e) The principle of self-determination as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and
in article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is essential to the enjoyment of
all human rights by indigenous peoples. Self-determination includes, inter alia, the right
and power of indigenous peoples to negotiate with States on an equal basis the standards
and mechanisms that will govern relationships between them.
Id. at 10. This seminar was held in Geneva on January 16-20, 1989. It was attended by experts
invited from from ten countries and nine indigenous organizations, three professors who prepared
background papers, Ms. Daes, as well as various observers from governments, U.N. agencies, and
non-governmental organizations.
86 For example, the Indian Law Resource Center proposed that the phrase "to the greatest
possible extent" be omitted after the phrase "indigenous peoples should be free to manage their own
affairs" in the ninth preambular paragraph. Analytical Compilation of Observations and Comments,
supra, note 40, at 18. In the part of the draft concerned with political rights, Romania proposed
provisions that were more general and wide-ranging, presumably with the intent of making them
applicable to a wider range of situations. Id. at 9. The Assembly of First Nations attempted to
achieve a compromise between the demands of the states and of the indigenous peoples and proposed
only minor changes to make the proposed right of autonomy more acceptable to the indigenous
peoples. See, e.g., the ninth preambular paragraph, which merely modifies the limiting phrase that
the World Council rejected. The Assembly's proposed paragraph reads: "indigenous peoples are
entitled to free and autonomous determination of their own affairs to the greatest extent under inter-
national standards consistent with this declaration, while enjoying equal rights with other citizens in
the political, economic and social life of States." Id. at 2.
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Upon her next revision of the draft declaration 7 the Chairper-
son/Rapporteur inserted one reference to self-determination, but not
one that seriously addressed the concerns of indigenous peoples."8
Before the eighth session of the Working Group, the Chairper-
son/Rapporteur, Ms. Daes, summarized the comments on the 1989
draft, separating the "provisions on which there is broad agreement"
from those upon which "further consideration is needed."8 9 On self-de-
termination, Ms. Daes observed that "there may be need for further dis-
cussion of the manner and content in which this principle might be
reflected in the draft declaration." 90 On the draft provisions concerning
autonomy and political rights, Ms. Daes noted that the governments ex-
pressed concern that they were too extensive, primarily because they
seemed to conflict with existing political organizations within their coun-
tries and seemed impossible to apply.91 On the other hand, she also
noted that the indigenous peoples were concerned that the draft provi-
sions did not go far enough and that the declaration should specifically
state the right to self-determination. 92 Ms. Daes' own opinion is that the
principle of autonomy "could apply to geographically distinct indigenous
communities," noting that "autonomous regimes exist already in many
countries." 93 However,
As for the applicability of the right to self-determination,... she is of
the view that it involves different considerations .... While some in-
digenous peoples may meet the conventional criteria for enjoyment of
the right to self-determination, others may not, and it might be unnec-
essary as well as inappropriate to reiterate existing standards in this
87 First Revised Text of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Prepared by
the Chairman-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Mrs Erica-Irene Daes,
Pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1988/18, at 3, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33 (1989)
("the small number of replies received from all parties concerned [could not] be considered as reflect-
ing the views and proposals of a sufficient number of Governments and indigenous peoples of the
international community [and] in view of the diversity of opinions [of governments and indigenous
peoples,] in particular on provisions as to land and resource rights, self-government and self-auton-
omy, the Chairman-Rapporteur felt that these. . ., in their substance, should better stand as they are.
This would facilitate later discussion... [and] substantial changes have to be acceptable to all parties
concerned). The Chairperson/Rapporteur commented that the revised draft "constitutes a fair bal-
ance between the aspirations of indigenous peoples and the legitimate concerns of States and, for that
reason, seems to be a realistic approach to the issues." Id.
88 A paragraph was inserted in the preamble: "Bearing in mind that nothing in this declaration
may be used as a justification for denying to any people, which otherwise satisfies the criteria gener-
ally established by human rights instruments and international law, its right to self-determination."
Id. at 5.
89 Analytical Commentary on the Draft Principles Contained in the First Revised Text of the
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/39 (1990).
90 Id. para. 20.
91 Id. paras. 82-84.
92 Id. para. 85.
93 Id. para. 86.
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declaration. It may be preferable simply to ensure that indigenous
peoples are not discriminated against with respect to the implementa-
tion of existing standards. 94
At the eighth session of the Working Group (1990), as well as con-
sidering the draft provisions in plenary, three smaller Informal Drafting
Groups were established, each chaired by a member of the Working
Group.95 Both Informal Drafting Groups I and II recommended major
changes regarding the references to self-determination in the draft decla-
ration. Informal Drafting Group II, under the chair of Danilo Tirk,96
recommended that preambular paragraph 10 should read: "Bearing in
mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used as a justification for
denying to any indigenous peoples their right to self-determination" 97
and that draft operative paragraph 1 explicitly state that "[i]ndigenous
peoples have the right to self-determination."98 Informal Drafting
Group I recommended that preambular paragraph 7 read: "Endorsing
calls for the revitalization, consolidation and strengthening of indigenous
societies and their traditional institutions, cultures and social structures,
through respect for their inalienable right to self-determination.. .99 and
that preambular paragraph 9 read: "Convinced that the right of indige-
nous peoples to self-determination includes their right freely to determine
their present and future relationships with the political, economic and
social life of States . ,,.100
In the plenary discussion, Danilo Tiurk suggested further that,
the time has now come to give fresh thought to the concept of self-
determination. [He] noted that legal concepts undergo a constant pro-
cess of evolution, and that it is the responsibility of the Working
Group to help shape the development of those concepts which are of
relevance to the continued survival and flourishing of the world's in-
94 Id. para. 87.
95 Informal Drafting Group (IDG) I was chaired by Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, IDG II
was chaired by Danilo Tfirk, WGIP and IDG III were chaired by Ms. Erica-Irene A. Daes. Eighth
Report of the WGIP, supra note 40, at ii. Mr. Ribot Hatano, a member of the Working Group,
attended IDG I. Id. at 40. These groups were well-attended by indigenous peoples but there was
limited participation by States. Indeed, concern was expressed that this lack of participation was
contrary to the spirit of the Working Group. Id. at 25.
96 Professor of International Law at Ljubljana University.
97 Eighth Report of the WGIP, supra note 40, at 48. The difference between this and the draft
paragraph 10 is that the draft includes that qualifier concerning 'otherwise satisfying' the accepted
international law criteria. See First Revised Text of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
98 Eighth Report of the WGIP, supra note 40, at 4. The proposed paragraph reads: "Indige-
nous peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of which they may freely determine their
political status, pursue their own economic, social, religious and cultural development, and deter-
mine their own institutions." Id. at 49.
99 Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
100 Id. (emphasis added).
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digenous peoples. 0 1
In June 1991, the Chairperson/Rapporteur produced a Working Pa-
per which listed for each provision various suggestions made for their
revision and her suggested revised text."0 2 Mrs. Daes did not adopt any
of the suggestions made by Informal Drafting Groups I and II concern-
ing the preambular paragraphs. 0 3 Nor did she adopt the suggestion
made for draft operative paragraph 1. 1O In all of her suggested revisions
of these provisions, Ms. Daes appears to have tried to compromise be-
tween the views of the state and indigenous representatives.
At the ninth session of the Working Group (1991), the inclusion in
the draft declaration of a statement on the right of indigenous peoples to
self-determination was again prominent in the discussion. The Report of
the ninth session does not do this discussion justice and glosses over the
positions taken and the developments made;105 I thus discuss it here in
some detail. 10
6
Draft operative paragraph 1 (both the draft proposed by the
Chairperson/Rapporteur and that proposed by Informal Drafting Group
II) was the most intensively discussed provision concerning the inclusion
of a statement on self-determination. The unanimous view of the indige-
nous representatives was that the paragraph suggested by Informal
Drafting Group II, stating the right of indigenous peoples to self-deter-
mination, should be mentioned first as it was the most important. 0 7
101 Id. para. 126. This is clearly the approach that Danilo Tirk took in Informal Drafting
Group II; however, recalling the makeup of the Informal Drafting Groups, that does not mean that
it will be accepted by other than the indigenous peoples. Danilo Tfirk also noted that "the concept
of self-determination would only in rare instances imply the right to independent statehood." Id.
para. 127, citing S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or National-
ity Rights Claims, 13 HuM. RTs. Q. 403 (1991) (statement delivered at the Conference of U.S.S.R.-
U.S.A. Scholars' Dialogue on Human Rights and the Future, held at Moscow, June 19-21, 1990).
Id. para. 127 n.l.
102 Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 42.
103 Id. at 20, 26 & 28.
104 Id. at 38. See supra note 98 and accompanying text for this suggestion.
105 The Report's summary of the discussion consists of the following paragraph:
Several non-governmental representatives stated that the draft declaration should reflect
the unqualified right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. However, some govern-
mental and other non-governmental observers indicated that it may be necessary to qualify
at least the application of the right in order to make the text acceptable to Governments
which would have to implement it. Some Governments expressed opposition to the inclu-
sion of a reference to self-determination.
Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, para. 49. I note that the lack of detail in this paragraph is
not necessarily a reflection on the Working Group but more a matter of the summary nature of a
report such as this.
106 The following description is thus made on the basis of my observations at the ninth session.
The discussion itself is not recorded in minutes; the only public record is that contained in the
official Ninth Report of the WGIP, id.
107 The indigenous representatives argued that the right was inherent to all peoples and could
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Only after this primary group right was stated should the declaration
refer to the other individual rights protected under international law.
The concern of the government representatives was that the territo-
rial integrity of states would be violated by the secession of indigenous
peoples if any general right to self-determination was recognized. While
the government representatives that spoke stated that they did not object
to greater levels of autonomy, or internal self-determination, they wanted
to make sure that the principle would still be subject to the existing inter-
national law regarding the entitlement to external self-determination. It
was this concern that was addressed most directly during the discussion.
The Chairperson/Rapporteur agreed that the issue here was internal
rather than external self-determination. However, two legal scholars
(one of them being Professor Danilo TUrk, a member of the Working
Group 10 8) drew the participants' attention to the fact that there is a dif-
ference between the statement of the principle and its application. The
principle of self-determination is indivisible; however, its application will
differ in different circumstances. Any statement of the principle does not
define the people to whom it applies nor does it say what the result of the
application of self-determination for any people may be. It was thus sug-
gested by both scholars that a statement of the general principle of self-
determination could be included in the declaration without prejudicing
the result of the application of the principle.109 Professor Tiirk com-
mented further that present international law does not guarantee all
states their territorial integrity; it only upholds that right for states that
respect the general principle of self-determination. He suggested that the
safeguards already present in international law were enough to allay the
not be restricted in its statement of principle. As one indigenous representative commented, until it
was taken from them, indigenous peoples enjoyed self-determination; now they are merely asking
that it be reinstated. This comment was made by Dr. Erihapeti Murchie, Human Rights Commis-
sioner, New Zealand Human Rights Commission.
108 The other was Maivn Clech Lm, fellow at the Institute for Legal Studies, University of
Wisconsin - Madison Law School.
109 Maivn Clech Lm proposed that operative paragraph 1 explicitly recognize the difference
between principle and application with the wording:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of which they freely
determine their political status, and freely pursue their own economic, social, and cultural
development.
This right is available, under international law, to peoples without discrimination. At the same
time, the application of the right to self-determination, in an interdependent world, where both order
and justice must be respected, is contextual, and evolutionary. Proposal submitted to the Working
Group, August 2, 1991 (on file with author).
For an elaboration of the suggestion that the application of self-determination is evolutionary,
see Maivan Clech Lm, Indigenous Hawaiians' Options for Self-Determination Under U.S. and Inter-
national Law, 7 L. & ANTHROPOLOGY 60 (1992) (arguing that any law of self-determination should
be on the structuring of opportunities for the ongoing negotiation of relations between peoples and
states rather than the delineation of a supposedly permanent status).
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fears of states about giving the indigenous peoples within their countries
a right of secession that they did not have previously. 1 '
The indigenous representatives supported these comments, stressing
that indigenous peoples are seeking the ability to make decisions on mat-
ters that affect their lives. While some envisaged that this would entail
the division of political power, none argued specifically for the secession
of their people or the break-up of the nation-state.
Professor Tiirk's comments were not challenged by any representa-
tive. While it is hard to gauge what inference should be drawn from
silence on the part of the government representatives, it is interesting that
the standard objections on the basis of territorial integrity were not
made. Although this cannot apply to states that were not represented at
the session, an optimist could be forgiven for thinking that it at least
appeared then that Professor Tirk's remarks gained general acceptance.
The alternative, realist, position is that the states were merely reserving
negative oral comments for negative written ones later.
The discussion of the draft declaration was not the only item on the
agenda for the ninth session. Thus, at the end of the first week of the
session, discussion on the draft provisions stopped, even though discus-
sion had not taken place on draft principles 18-30. The Working Group
itself then met privately to discuss the views that had been expressed and
to produce another draft of the declaration up to principle 17.1
The Working Group appears to have acted upon the suggestions
that the principle of the right to self-determination be recognized in gen-
eral, leaving aside any implications of its application to any particular
people. The Preamble now contains three paragraphs concerning the
right to self-determination:
Believing that indigenous peoples have the right freely to deter-
mine their relationships with the States in which they live, in a spirit of
co-existence with other citizens,
Noting that the International Covenants on Human Rights affirm
the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination, as well
as the right of all human beings to pursue their material, cultural and
spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity,
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used as
110 Professor Tirk also noted that political stability is not achieved by the defence of the status
quo at all costs but by peaceful change to meet changing political circumstances. He thus argued
that the declaration needs to have a legal formulation that will promote change while maintaining
political stability.
111 Preambular Paragraphs to the Draft Declaration as Submitted by the Members of the Work-
ing Group at the First Reading. while these draft provisions were originally contained in the Confer-
ence Room Papers distributed at the meeting, they have been reproduced in Ninth Report of the
WGIP, supra note 28, Annex II, at 30-35.
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an excuse for denying to any people its right to self-determination.' 1 2
Draft operative paragraph 1 then goes further than the Preamble by
providing that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, in ac-
cordance with international law. By virtue of this right, they freely
determine their relationship with the States in which they live, in a
spirit of co-existence with other citizens, and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social, cultural and spiritual development in conditions of free-
dom and dignity.
1 13
The indigenous representatives considered that this paragraph went
substantially further than the previous drafts but also that it could still be
improved. A problem is that it still does not make a statement of the
general right to self-determination; instead, the use of the phrase "States
in which they live"' 14 seems to narrow the right to that of solely internal
self-determination. While not all indigenous peoples necessarily want to
secede from the states in which they currently live, the present formula-
tion seems to assume that it can never be appropriate.1 5 As the repre-
sentative of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference put it, the right of co-
existence with other citizens of the State is only one aspect of self-deter-
mination; they do not want that formulation to preclude the exercise of
any other aspects that the application of the right of self-determination
might entail.
That this right of self-determination is intended to be limited to in-
ternal self-determination is reinforced by Ms. Daes' published views on
this matter. Ms. Daes has expressed the opinion that the right of seces-
sion is specifically excluded from the application of self-determination
"in the cases of indigenous peoples;' 1 6 instead, " 'internal self-determi-
nation' seems to be suited for application in states where indigenous peo-
ples live." '17
The government representatives who commented on the revised pro-
visions agreed that they were an improvement over the previous texts, yet
they also thought that there was room for further clarification of the vari-
ous ambiguities. A primary ambiguity was said to concern the state-
ments on self-determination described above, although no representative
specified precisely how that ambiguity should be resolved. The Chilean
112 Id. at 31.
113 Id. at 32.
114 Id.
115 While it will not pose barriers to any indigenous people that does fulfil the international law
criteria for full internal and external self-determination, the issue raised by the indigenous peoples'
arguments is whether the international legal criteria should even be relevant.
116 Erica-Irene E. Daes, On the Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States, in 2:2 WITH-
OUT PREJUDICE 41, 48 (1990).
117 Id.
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representative came the closest of any to specifying a solution when he
stated that the elaboration of paragraph 1 was required in order to obtain
a "politically viable" document. The implication was that the right to
self-determination in a document such as this had to be narrowed further
in order to be acceptable to states.
With respect to the interpretation of the provisions, including those
on self-determination, it was commented that the declaration will be in-
terpreted in its entirety; that is, the general provisions in the declaration
will also be interpreted by reference to the more specific provisions else-
where.' 8 The provisions on political rights in Part V of the declaration
will affect the interpretation of self-determination given to paragraph 1.
For this reason, it was suggested that it would be premature to propose
wording to clarify paragraph 1, as it may be clarified by the overall con-
text of the declaration.
At that point, the discussion on the revised provisions ended. It is
expected that the discussion on these provisions, as well as on the provi-
sions not yet further revised, will take place at the tenth session of the
Working Group. In the meantime, participants will consider the provi-
sions and make written comments to the Working Group to assist it with
its drafting. It is too early to tell what the reactions will be to the various
suggestions made for the inclusion of some statement of a right to self-
determination. Professor Tiirk's arguments for the inclusion of a general
statement appear to have already been rejected by Ms. Daes as her sug-
gested paragraph includes only a limited statement on this point. If Ms.
Daes is correct in her assessment that this is most likely to be acceptable
to participants - or, more importantly, that Professor Tirk's proposal is
likely to be rejected outright by states - then the outlook for the inclu-
sion of a right of self-determination for indigenous peoples is bleak. On
the other hand, it is impossible to predict how international opinion (and
thus law and practice) on self-determination will be affected by the vari-
ous current struggles for self-determination through secession. If there is
less resistance than might be expected to the proposed formulation, it
may be possible that the more general formulation - on the basis of
Professor Tfirk's arguments - could be adopted in the future.'1 9
118 Both the representative of the Indian Law Resource Center and Professor Danilo Tiirk of
the Working Group made this point.
119 For example, the current Eastern European and Soviet struggles and achievements could
encourage a wider acceptance of the need to recognize claims to self-determination both in principle
(e.g., that self-government is a fundamental moral right of all peoples) and on practical grounds (that
denial will lead to civil strife). It could also lead to a change in the present international law of self-
determination in that requirements relating to who is entitled to exercise the right could be loosened.
On the other hand, it could also encourage the prevailing view that the exercise of self-determination
entails secession; this will discourage the inclusion of any general statement of such a right for indig-
enous peoples. It is not the purpose of this paper to assess how the developments since mid-1991
1992]
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B. Analysis of the Debate
The debate in the Working Group over the claims by indigenous
peoples to self-determination has remained substantially the same
throughout the various sessions. From the beginning, the indigenous
representatives have claimed that, as peoples they have the right to self-
determination because it is an inherent right of peoples, and that this
right must be recognized in the draft declaration, both because it is inher-
ent and because it is essential for the realization of their fundamental
human rights. 120 The state representatives, on the other hand, have con-
sistently denied that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determina-
tion, because international law only accords that right to colonized
states. Further, state representatives deny that indigenous peoples can be
accorded the right, because implementation of the right would violate
other hallowed principles of international law, such as non-intervention
in domestic affairs and territorial integrity. 121 For these reasons, state
representatives have rejected inclusion of a right of self-determination in
the draft declaration. While there are clearly more arguments and subtle
variations than this brief description provides, this is the essence of the
positions taken.
While it is clear that the state representatives are adopting a positiv-
ist view of international law, there are three ways in which one can view
the claim of indigenous peoples that they have a right to self-determina-
tion. One view is that adopted by states: the positive view of interna-
tional law. Under the positive view of international law, states decide
what they want to recognize or incorporate in international law. They
may thus accept or reject the indigenous peoples' claims. Under this
view, indigenous peoples cannot be taken as making a claim that the
right of self-determination for indigenous peoples is currently recognized
in international law. Such claims must instead be seen as a reason to
support their argument that the right should be so recognized (in positive
law) and that the draft declaration should thus include a statement of the
right.
An alternative approach is that provided by the natural law tradi-
tion. 122 This approach focuses on the claim that indigenous peoples have
an inherent right of self-determination and argues that it is a right that
need not be recognized or conferred by states for it to exist. This ap-
proach argues, instead, that natural law takes precedence over the posi-
have affected the international law of self-determination, therefore, I will not speculate its effect on
international law. For further comments see infra notes 324-325 and accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
122 For a concise, clear description of the claims of indigenous peoples as being situated within
the natural law tradition, and its place in legal thought on indigenous peoples, see generally Anaya,
supra, note 54.
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tive law recognized by states and that the dictates of natural law compel
the recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination in
positive law because such recognition is not solely up to the discretion of
states.
A third way of viewing the claims that indigenous peoples have a
right of self-determination is as a reference to present positive interna-
tional law. One argument made by indigenous representatives is that in-
ternational law currently provides for a right of self-determination for
indigenous peoples if the present rules are consistently applied.123 While
the indigenous representatives acknowledge that the rules have not been
applied to indigenous peoples, their argument is couched merely in terms
of consistency in application rather than of recognizing new rules. Even
under positivist terms, this argument is not focusing on what the law
should be but what it is.
Breaking down the different possible approaches of indigenous peo-
ples in this way makes it clear that the states and indigenous peoples are
talking past each other rather than directly addressing the issues in-
volved. The differences in these approaches and their implications need
to be made more explicit in order for the parties - particularly the state
representatives - to realize what it is that the other is saying and address
it directly.
The claim by indigenous peoples for self-determination is a reference
to the idea of freedom from oppressors and the right to determine their
future, their own form of government, as well as the extent of self-gov-
ernment. As one scholar puts it, the claim to the right of self determina-
tion "is an expression, in succinct form, of the aspiration to rule one's self
and not to be ruled by others." '124 Thus, the aspiration is not just to be
"free", but to be "'free from' what they perceive as 'others.' "125 The
content or application of this asserted right to self-determination will
thus vary according to the oppression that the different indigenous peo-
ples suffer and what is needed in order to determine their future. Seen in
this light, any particular claim to self-determination does not necessarily
imply anything about territoriality or the disintegration of the state sys-
tem. It instead implies a system of government where indigenous peo-
ples will be free from oppression by others. This can range from
complete independence and full statehood to autonomy in some areas of
competence within a state system. 126 Whether or not this can be
123 See, eg., Opinion by Professor Ian Brownlie, infra note 471-474 and accompanying text.
See also Indigenous Peoples Preparatory Meeting, Threat of Quebec Secession From Canada, infra
note 524.
124 Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 7 (1979).
125 Id.
126 Hannum gives the examples of full control solely over land and natural resources. HAN-
NUM, supra note 22, at 95.
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achieved within the existing state system is not a function of the nature of
self-government but of what may be necessary to achieve it. This may be
more a matter of political circumstances and the nature of discrimination
and oppression than of the simple ideal of self-government.
The statements made in the various reports of the sessions of the
Working Group show that this is indeed how the issues are perceived. 127
The claims have not explicitly defined "self-determination" and, in addi-
tion to calls for the recognition of a right to secession, have at the same
time called for the recognition of rights to "internal self-government"
and "autonomy." 121 While it is not always clear in a particular context,
it becomes clear when they are taken together that these terms are in-
tended as various ways of referring to the same idea, and are not meant
to be mutually exclusive. In some cases it is made explicit that "self-
determination" is not being used with any pre-conceived ideas as to the
outcome. It is recognized that different outcomes will be appropriate for
different indigenous peoples, although it is also stressed that, should
complete independence be considered appropriate (as judged by indige-
nous peoples, not by states), indigenous peoples should be free to choose
that option.129 What is important is that it be recognized that indigenous
peoples have the right to determine their own political organization and
future. 130
Despite these flexible claims - claims that often emphasize the rem-
edying of a particular situation rather than a blanket demand of secession
or statehood - the reaction of the states to "self-determination" has still
been negative.' As described above, self-determination is rejected on
the basis that positive international law does not presently accord indige-
127 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., The Study of Discrimination, supra note 51, paras. 68 & 70, at 13.
129 See, eg., supra note 54 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 54. Other examples of statements made include:
It was pointed out [by indigenous peoples' representatives] that the meaning of the right to
autonomy or self-determination varied from one indigenous people to another and did not
always mean sovereignty or statehood and that indigenous people should themselves be
allowed to decide on the degree of autonomy or self-determination they should have.
Second Report of the WGIP, supra note 1, para. 52, at 19. Another example:
It was asserted by some speakers that the right to self-determination ought to encompass
the possibility of choosing full independence, but various other forms of the right, such as
autonomy, self-government, self-management, and participation in the political processes
of States, were frequently mentioned. It was maintained that self-determination should
mean the freedom of indigenous peoples to determine the form of institutions, their compo-
sition and their functions, also in self-governance relationships with States. It was under-
lined that the free and informed consent of indigenous peoples constituted an essential
element of any and all self-determination exercises.
Fifth Report of the WGIP, supra note 36, at 14. Another example is provided in Analytical Compila-
tion of Observations and Comments, supra note 40, at 13-15.
131 See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
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nous peoples this right, unless they are being ruled by a colonial or for-
eign power.13 2 This is because such a right would violate other more
hallowed principles of non-intervention in states' domestic affairs, territo-
rial integrity, and thus state sovereignty. When one looks at the rhetoric
employed, it is not entirely clear why these reasons are given for the blan-
ket rejection of the claims since many indigenous peoples do not claim
secession, but merely autonomy or other forms of self-government within
states. The satisfaction of such claims does not appear to violate the as-
pects of state sovereignty that is so complained of. This view, however, is
too simplistic. While a particular people may only specifically claim
measures of autonomy within a state, the rhetoric employed implies
much more than that. Quite apart from the indigenous representatives'
claims that independence should be an available option, the right of self-
determination in international law refers to the option of complete inde-
pendence, even if it is only achieved in graduated stages. Thus, even
where partial independence is initially chosen, total independence contin-
ues to exists as a future option. Accordingly, whether secession is specifi-
cally claimed or not, "governments tend to equate all demands for self-
determination with independence and secession." 133 This is why "nega-
tive government reactions to indigenous demands for self-determination
are not surprising." 1
34
Some states do admit that they would not object to greater measures
of autonomy, but only as long as the principles of sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity are not violated.1 35 However, while some states recognize
that some measures of autonomy short of independence may be appropri-
ate, there are three problems with even this recognition. First, even
states that appear willing to accept measures of autonomy have insisted
that they be phrased narrowly. 36 Second, this will not address the cases
where indigenous people want more independence than mere autonomy
132 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
133 HANNUM, supra note 22, at 672.
134 Id.
135 Perhaps the most direct example is: "One governmental observer made it clear that the
term [self-determination] could be acceptable if it were made clearer that the right to self-determina-
tion did not imply the right to independent statehood." Eighth Report of the WGIP, supra note 40,
at 23. For another example, one government observer, while rejecting the application to indigenous
peoples of the right to self-determination contained in the International Covenants, "said that his
government remained fully committed to the realization of the objective of self-government and
greater levels of autonomy over local affairs for aboriginal peoples .. ". Fifth Report of the WGIP,
supra note 36, para. 56, at 15. Others, while agreeing with the principle of autonomy, "could not
support this principle [draft principle 25] if it could be seen as sanctioning legal pluralism, i.e. as
referring [to] a system of separate laws for indigenous peoples." Seventh Report of the WGIP, supra
note 39, para. 90. See also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. On the rejection of autonomy,
see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
136 See, eg., supra note 75. See also supra notes 55, 56 & 135 and accompanying text.
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within a state.13 7 Third, this denies that self-determination is a right of
peoples to themselves determine their own future. It merely lets them do
that which the states think is appropriate and does not address the indig-
enous peoples' arguments that it is an inherent right.138
So where does this leave the two sides? I suggest that the rhetoric
and the formal legal labels that are being used disguise the real interests
involved on both sides. On the part of the indigenous peoples, their
stated claim to exercise their "right of self-determination" implies that
they are not referring to the right as it is presently understood in positive
international law. Instead, they may be adopting a natural law view of
human rights whereby having a right of self-determination does not de-
pend on whether it has been legally recognized in positive international
law. In the language of the positivist conception of international law -
i.e., that used particularly by states - the proper concern is not what
rights international law presently recognizes, but what rights interna-
tional law should recognize. The rhetoric of indigenous and government
representatives has blurred this distinction, even while they employ it.
On the part of states, their use of the rhetoric of international law ob-
scures the interests and principles that are behind that law, which they
(presumably) feel to be at stake. Instead, "what the law is" is provided
as a reason for denying claims to "what the law should be." This does
not address the justifications for the present law or why it cannot be
changed. For example, issues such as why the principle of territorial
integrity is so important - what it is protecting - are left undebated.
Further, they have thereby completely avoided discussion of natural law
or of the consistency of application of present international law to indige-
nous peoples.
It appears that states are trying to maintain as much as possible of
the legal status quo - to only recognize rights of indigenous peoples
insofar as they do not defeat, or perhaps even diminish, the powers that
states currently enjoy. Whether the lack of discussion of real interests is
a mere oversight or a deliberate obfuscation of the issues is not impor-
tant. What is important is that the underlying issues should be discussed
in the open. Only then can the relative merits of the various interests be
compared - for example, whether and in what circumstances the preser-
vation of territorial integrity is more important than the preservation of
the human rights of indigenous peoples. Only by such assessments can
the real concerns be addressed and resolved.
C. Strategies: Principle v. Pragmatism
The debate over the strategy or approach to drafting the declaration
137 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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has paralleled the debate over the substance of the provisions and has
thus been subject to the same kinds of difficulties. In setting the agenda
in the early sessions, for example, the debate reflected the participants'
views on the importance of self-determination. 13 9 The process for adop-
tion of the declaration has been similarly debated. For example, govern-
ment representatives have often argued that the declaration must obtain
universal support and must be adopted by consensus. 140 This argument
is typically made in tandem with an argument based on General Assem-
bly Resolution 41/120141 that the draft declaration must not go further
than existing international human rights instruments. The conclusion of
these arguments is that the draft declaration must not make any refer-
ences to the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination.142
At the ninth session of the Working Group, the International Labor
Organization's representative offered an alternative view. He suggested
that, while the declaration should be compatible with existing human
rights instruments, it can go further than existing instruments because it
is a declaration rather than a convention, 143 and as such can be an aspira-
tional document.144 The declaration could, therefore, include rights such
as that of self-determination. While it may not yet be possible to imple-
ment such rights, that should not be of concern because that was not the
function of a declaration. 145
Also at the ninth session, the indigenous peoples' representatives
presented a third approach. The Treaty-6 organization (Canada) consid-
ered that there was no need to make this declaration compatible with
existing instruments because such instruments had not been drafted with
the participation of indigenous peoples. The organization stressed that
139 At the second session, for example, it was clear that there were very different views on what
emphasis to place on self-determination in the work of future sessions of the Working Group. One
view was that, "given it's importance, [the right to self-determination] should be put at the top of the
list of priorities." Second Report of the WGIP, supra note 1, para. 27. Another was that "self-
determination should be viewed in the light of the discussion of all other issues and should therefore
be put at the end of the list." Id. The view of the indigenous peoples, however, was that self-
determination underpinned the implementation of all other rights, so "it should be discussed in
connection with all rights." Id.
140 See, eg., Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, para. 39.
141 G.A. Res. 4/120, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987) (adopted 4 De-
cember 1986). The first "guideline in developing international instruments in the field of human
rights" is that "such instruments should... [b]e consistent with the existing body of international
human rights law." The fifth such guideline provides that such instruments should "[a]ttract broad
international support." Id.
142 For a summary of some of these arguments see the Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note
28, para. 37-39 & 46.
143 Id. para. 41
144 Id.
145 This part of the statement is not recorded in the Report. See supra note 105.
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the reason that the declaration is even being drafted is because existing
instruments fail to protect all the human rights of indigenous peoples.
The Grand Council of the Crees criticized the states' argument that
the declaration needs to be the result of consensus and negotiation on the
basis that what is at issue are "fundamental, inalienable rights of indige-
nous peoples."' 146 Indigenous peoples could not give up some rights in
order to obtain others because they are all too important to be bargained
away. 147 The Crees insisted that the right of self-determination is an in-
herent right of all peoples, and that the declaration must state this right
clearly and unequivocally.
148
These different views have made it difficult to get agreement on the
substance of the draft declaration, which has drawn out the drafting pro-
cess. This caused some indigenous peoples' representatives to argue in
earlier sessions that a compromise between the two positions should be
taken - that indigenous peoples should not insist on the inclusion of a
right of self-determination but should instead focus on the inclusion of a
comprehensive right to autonomy within states 149
The choice of strategies and approaches to drafting still faces the
participants and the members of the Working Group. The consequences
of these choices, however, affect the various participants differently.
Under the present positive view of international law it is up to the states
to decide what laws they want to be bound by. Accordingly, states will
ultimately adopt or reject any draft declaration that the Working Group
submits to the Sub-Commission (which it will, in turn, submit to the
U.N. bodies above it).' 5° While there will be numerous political pres-
sures affecting the choice of adoption or rejection of any draft declara-
tion, ultimately, if the states do not want to legally recognize a right of
self-determination for indigenous peoples, they are not likely to do so.
Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, have more to lose if the draft
declaration is rejected, with or without a right of self-determination in-
146 Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, para. 42. Note that the Report only contains a
summary of the statement by the Crees, not the precise language used, which I have recorded.
147 Id. The Cree Regional Youth Council of Quebec stated further that they could not agree
to negotiation with parties that were prejudiced against indigenous peoples merely in order to obtain
a consensus.
148 Id.
149 The Four Directions Council (an indigenous North American organization) proposed that
a right to autonomy within states would be a compromise between the principles of self-determina-
tion and territorial integrity which would be better than the outright rejection of self-determination
as an applicable principle. Written Statement Submitted by the Four Directions Council, A Non-
Governmental Organization in Consultative Status (Category II), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/NGO/9
(1985). The Council argued that the draft declaration must at least recognize that indigenous peo-
ples have a "continuing collective right to a negotiated degree of autonomy in today's world of plural
States." Id. at 3.
150 See infra notes 158-159 and accompanying text for comment on this process.
Vol. 24:199
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF DETERMINATION
eluded.' Indigenous peoples thus have an interest in both getting a dec-
laration adopted and getting recognition of the fights necessary for their
survival and development.
The members of the Working Group similarly have a strong interest
in getting a declaration adopted and, moreover, in getting one that will
best protect the fights of indigenous peoples.' 52 They therefore have the
same range of options for choice of strategy as indigenous peoples do.
That is, a choice between a principled and a pragmatic approach: either
arguing for a declaration that will best recognize the fights of indigenous
peoples (one that recognizes a full fight of self-determination for indige-
nous peoples) or for one that is more likely to be adopted as positive
international law (perhaps by recognizing a fight of autonomy within
states for indigenous peoples rather than a full fight of self-determina-
tion). The Chairperson/Rapporteur, while stressing that the Working
Group is not responsible to states and that its function is to produce a
document that the Group is satisfied with, nevertheless stated in the
ninth session that the Group's task is to produce a declaration that will
be accepted as an international instrument. 53 Taking this in conjunction
with her earlier comments, ' 4 it appears that she has chosen the prag-
matic approach over the principled.
From the indigenous peoples' point of view, there are advantages
and disadvantages to taking both the pragmatic and principled ap-
proaches. An advantage of taking the pragmatic approach is that an
agreement on the draft declaration on the fights of indigenous peoples
might be more forthcoming. While such a declaration would not include
all the fights and principles that indigenous peoples feel are necessary to
ensure their full self-determination, it might include enough to improve
their current situation and thus ensure their survival and possibly even
their development. In addition, over time, as the ideas espoused by the
declaration became more accepted, the declaration might be able to be
extended. Further, it could also be argued that the pragmatic approach
would give more power to indigenous peoples in their daily lives. It
would give them a strong legal, as well as moral, footing to argue with
the states in which they live on ways to improve the internal recognition
and protection of their human rights. The principled approach would
provide them with strong moral grounds for arguing that more funda-
mental changes be undertaken. It would not, however, provide any legal
151 That is, the declaration is designed for the benefit of indigenous peoples and is thus seen to
be against the interest of states.
152 That is, so their efforts will not be to no avail.
153 While this particular statement is unreported, see Ms. Daes' closing statement, in which she
noted her hope that "the Working Group will have a draft declaration which will be a workable,
balanced and consensus text." Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, at 53.
154 See, eg., supra note 87.
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grounds to force the states to make changes.1 55
Disadvantages of taking the pragmatic approach are that such a
slow, gradual improvement in the position of indigenous peoples may not
be enough to ensure respect for their human rights or to end their op-
pression, and that it does not respect the inherent dignity of indigenous
peoples because it denies them their (claimed) inherent right to deter-
mine their future. On the other hand, the disadvantages of insisting on
the inclusion of a full right to self-determination are that, first, it would
be harder to obtain and therefore take longer to conclude the drafting of
the declaration. Second, it may cause the document to be rejected by
states at the various later stages of consideration of the declaration such
that either it would never be adopted by the General Assembly or would
be adopted with amendments. The latter result could defeat the extra
efforts made in gaining inclusion of the principle in the declaration sub-
mitted by the Working Group.
The hard-line positions taken by states on the issue of indigenous
peoples and self-determination shows that the apparent progress recently
made in the drafting of the declaration by the Working Group may not
amount to as much as it presently appears. Indigenous peoples have al-
ready criticized the Working Group's proposed draft operative para-
graph 1 on the ground that it does not go far enough: it does not
recognize a full right of self-determination for indigenous peoples but
limits the right of self-determination to internal autonomy only.156 On
the other hand, while there was much state silence during the discussion
of including such a provision, the past positions of states expressed in the
Working Group meetings suggest that draft operative paragraph 1, even
with its limited scope, will be criticized by state representatives for going
too far and may be rejected altogether. While it is hard to gauge the
effect of the lack of participation by many states (of which the United
States is one), it appears that these states are even less interested in the
rights of indigenous peoples than the participant states.157 They are thus
even more likely to resist extensions of the rights presently accepted in
international law and to reject inclusion of any right of self-determina-
tion for indigenous peoples at the stages of (political) consideration and
approval of the draft declaration by the other U.N. bodies: the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council
155 Although, if nothing were done under either scenario, issues such as the use of force to
further their claims would then arise.
156 See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
157 On the issue of the low level of government involvement, the Chairperson/Rapporteur
commented at the ninth session that the silence was because the governments trust and support the
Working Group and did not feel the need to comment.
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(ECOSOC), and the General Assembly.15 Further, states that have not
yet contributed to the drafting process are likely to want to be substan-
tively involved at the stage of formally adopting any instrument that is
intended to have legal status in international law. As a result, it is very
likely that at least one of these other U.N. bodies will consider redrafting
at least some of the provisions in order to obtain wider agreement,
whatever statement on self-determination is eventually included in the
draft. 1 9 All of these factors indicate that, despite the appearance of pro-
gress in the Working Group, if states maintain their positions of hostility
to legal recognition of a right of self-determination for indigenous peo-
ples, they are unlikely to adopt as an international instrument any draft
declaration that includes such a right.
The obvious strategy for achieving the legal recognition of a right of
self-determination for indigenous peoples is to address the reasons why
states are so hostile to the proposal and attempt to persuade them to
change their minds. However, if that fails, indigenous peoples must still
decide how they want to approach the drafting of the declaration in the
Working Group: should they argue for the pragmatic or the principled
solution?
One way of looking at the draft declaration is not as a likely candi-
date for adoption by the General Assembly but as a statement of what
rights for indigenous peoples positive international law should recognize.
That is, perhaps indigenous peoples should not be too concerned at this
stage about the reactions of states to the proposals, but should instead
attempt to get a comprehensive statement of the rights that would be
necessary and sufficient to ensure their survival and development and/or
reflect the claimed inherent nature of the right to self-determination. At
the various later stages of consideration by states, the indigenous peoples
would thus have the best "weapon" with which to negotiate a legal docu-
158 At all of these stages it is possible that states on the various bodies will attempt to change
the draft declaration submitted by the Working Group. As the Commission on Human Rights is
fairly representative of the wide range of views held in ECOSOC and in the General Assembly, it
may be that this stage will prove to be the hardest to pass. I suggest that most of the battles over the
contents of the draft declaration are likely to be fought here and that the declaration that is approved
by the Commission therefore may not undergo further changes by either ECOSOC or the General
Assembly. Only if there are strong opinions that are not fully represented in the Commission is it
likely that they will be aired in the General Assembly.
An alternative scenario is that a provision such as draft operative paragraph 1 is accepted by
states, but on the understanding that the result of its application will differ in different situations.
That is, states will still fiercely resist its application to the indigenous peoples within their territory
and/or will insist that they are applying it and thereby reject any outside interference or attempts to
oversee the "internal decolonization" process.
159 See supra note 158 for comments on the bodies likely to change the content of a draft
declaration.
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ment 6 Further, this weapon is augmented by the fact that the declara-
tion would be the creation of the independent legal experts of the
Working Group.1 61
An advantage of this approach is that, because indigenous peoples
are unlikely to be directly involved in this process, such an aspirational
document may be the primary way that indigenous peoples get their
views presented in that forum. It seems appropriate that they use their
present power of participation to argue for rights that they consider to be
necessary, rather than to weaken their future position by arguing now for
a declaration which they predict will be acceptable to states. This is re-
lated to the consideration that future goals should not be limited to
merely what is presently considered to be possible. A disadvantage of
not taking an aspirational approach is that limitations imposed by what
is presently practicable will restrict conceptions of a possible future. This
will necessarily restrict what can actually be achieved.1 62
A further advantage of taking the aspirational approach is that it
would, in the language of positivism, more clearly delineate the difference
between what international law is and what it should be. As suggested
above, a problem with the current debates is that the states' rhetoric
takes a concern for what the international law of self-determination is at
present and makes that the basis for arguments against what the interna-
tional law of self-determination in respect to indigenous peoples should
be in the future. Even under their own positivist conception of law, these
two aspects should not be linked when goals are being set. Instead, pres-
ent circumstances should only be relevant to devising a strategy for
achieving already agreed-upon goals. The separation of these aspects
would clarify the states' real positions and interests and thereby en-
courage the kind of detailed debate that is necessary in order to decide
which interests should prevail at either stage.
Perhaps the least obvious advantage of taking the aspirational ap-
proach is related to the content of the other rights in the declaration.
The right of self-determination is a general right and its implementation
160 This point was made by the representative of the Mikmaq Grand Council.
161 The draft declaration can be upheld as an impartial view of what a declaration on the rights
of indigenous peoples should include, rather than as a (partial) creation by those intended to benefit
from its adoption. That this may not be an accurate characterization is not the point; it is an argu-
ment to be used solely in order to make it easier to obtain (by making it harder for states to object to)
adoption of a comprehensive draft declaration. Further, I do not mean to suggest that the expert
members of the Working Group either will or should have the definitive say on what an aspirational
declaration should include, nor to deny the importance of all those that participated in its creation. I
merely suggest that the status of the members of the Working Group can be capitalized on as a
matter of strategy.
162 See, e.g., Richard Falk, The Struggle of Indigenous People and the Promise of Natural
Political Communities, in THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 52, at 59.
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entails the recognition of a wide variety of other, more specific rights.
The effect of including a general statement of a right of self-determina-
tion for indigenous peoples in the draft declaration would be twofold.
First, it is likely to affect what other, specific rights are actually included
in the declaration. Second, by affecting the tenor and purpose of the
document as a whole, it is likely to affect the interpretation of these other
rights. If the right of self-determination were not included, the other
rights in the document may be less comprehensive than if it were in-
cluded; the document as a whole would thus be of less benefit to indige-
nous peoples than might be expected. The inclusion of a right of self-
determination may thus have a wider effect than might at first be
envisaged.
In summary, there are advantages and disadvantages to taking the
various different possible courses of action for indigenous peoples. Over-
all, the principled strategy - that of argument for the legal recognition
of a right of self-determination - may be more than just a matter of
principle; it may, in balance, also be the practical course of action to
take, whether or not such a right is actually recognized in any resulting
international instrument. However, it is clearly the more difficult course
of action to take because arguments must be addressed to the Working
Group as well as to states in order to persuade them to include a right of
self-determination in the draft declaration. This will require the identifi-
cation of all the barriers to the inclusion of such a right. The expressed
view of states is that these barriers lie in the provisions of present interna-
tional law. It will thus be necessary to examine precisely what those
barriers consist of and how they might be overcome. This paper suggests
that the ability of all the parties to the debate to actually address these
issues will be a function of how willing they are to challenge some of the
fundamental, constitutive aspects of our statist world system.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE BARRIERS TO THE CLAIMS
This part describes the international law of sovereignty and of self-
determination and the barriers that the law poses for the legal recogni-
tion of a right of self-determination for indigenous peoples. While the
description of sovereignty is brief, that of self-determination is much
more detailed. In relation to self-determination, the aspects addressed
include the development of the right, with a particular focus on the
"self" that is considered to be entitled to exercise self-determination, and
the exercise of the right. The discussion on the exercise of the right ad-
dresses internal and external substantive aspects of the legitimate aim of
self-determination as well as procedural aspects, including the use of
force. The final aspect considered is the right to freely pursue economic
development. This part shows that the concern in international law with
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the territorial integrity of states and with non-intervention with states'
internal affairs has excluded indigenous peoples (and other minorities
within such states) from entitlement under positive international law to
separate, secessionist self-determination.
A. The Concept of Sovereignty
Sovereignty is the cornerstone of international rhetoric about state in-
dependence and freedom of action, and the most common response to
initiatives which seek to limit a state's action in any way is that such
initiatives constitute an impermissible limitation on that state's
sovereignty. 16
3
There are two primary aspects of sovereignty: external and internal.
External sovereignty is concerned with relationships between interna-
tional personalities. It has been defined as "the rights of the state freely
to determine its relations with other states or other entities without the
restraint or control of another state. This aspect of sovereignty is also
known as independence."'t64 The internal aspect of sovereignty is con-
cerned with internal self-government: the state's right to devise its own
constitutional and political institutions, enact and enforce its own laws,
and to make decisions concerning citizens and residents of the state,
without the interference of another state. Both aspects also entail the
concept of territoriality, which is the ability of a state to govern all mat-
ters within its territory. 16 5 Note that it is traditionally regarded that ex-
ternal sovereignty presupposes internal sovereignty.'
66
The concept of sovereignty provides two types of barriers to claims
by groups to self-determination. These barriers are based on the sub-
stance of the concept of sovereignty as well as the definition of the enti-
ties that international law recognizes as being sovereign. Such barriers
are in addition to those raised with respect to the nature of the right to
self-determination recognized in international law.
1 67
1. Substantive Barrier
Despite repeated appeals to the principles of sovereignty, the con-
163 HANNUM, supra note 22, at 14.
164 Nkambo Mugerwa, Subjects of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 247, 253 (Max Sorenson ed., 1978).
165 Although some writers regard this as a separate aspect of sovereignty. See, e.g., id.
166 See, e.g., id. Note that not every state will appear to have full internal and external sover-
eignty. For example, while the federal United States possesses full external sovereignty and interna-
tional personality, the federal government does not possess full internal sovereignty; the individual
states that make up the federation are still sovereign over the affairs that they have jurisdiction over.
Similar comments can be made in respect of other composite states. However, these internal aspects
do not affect the accordance of full international personality if external sovereignty is asserted. Id.
167 See generally infra Part II(B), The International Law of Self-Determination.
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cept of sovereignty is not clear. 168  This is due largely to its historical
origin in the concept of a sovereign ruler of a state, who theoretically had
absolute power. 169 In international law, however, no state has absolute
power: all states must respect each other's integrity and are considered
legally equal, even if not equal in fact.10 The essential aspect of sover-
eignty, therefore, is "constitutional independence," 171 which implies the
authority of a state to exercise its powers without deference to any
outside authority, and the ability to "determine its relationship with
outside powers." 171
This conception of constitutional independence is recognized most
basically in the Charter of the United Nations. 173 Article 2(4) provides
that states have an obligation to respect the "territorial integrity" and
"political independence" of other states.174 Article 2(7) provides that
"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state" are excluded from United Nations jurisdiction of intervention.1 75
It is clear that international law holds that a state's domestic matters are
generally matters for resolution by that state itself, and not for interfer-
ence by other states.17 6 The only stated exception to that general rule is
intervention for the application of enforcement measures undertaken by
the Security Council under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.1 77
168 Oppenheim comments: "[Tihere exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is
more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the
moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning
which was universally agreed upon." L.F.E. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW (2 vols. 1905,
1906) at 103, quoted in HANNUM, supra note 22, at 14. Crawford comments that "the term 'sover-
eignty' has a long and troubled history, and a variety of meanings." JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREA-
TION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (1979).
169 Such origins include: JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (1576);
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
170 In addition to these factors, international law in fact recognizes many limitations on states'
powers. See, eg., HANNUM, supra note 22, at 19-23 and sources cited therein. See also id. at 15
(commenting that "[flew, if any" experts or theorists would support the view that states possess
absolute sovereignty).
171 Id. at 15 (citing generally ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD (1986)). See also CRAW-
FORD, supra note 168, at 27, 71. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
78 (4th ed. 1990) (stating that "[t]he term sovereignty may be used as a synonym for
independence.").
172 BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 78. The reservation in respect of the many actual restric-
tions on states' powers is also relevant here.
173 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into force on October 24 1945) [hereinafter
U.N. CHARTER].
174 Id. at 1037.
175 Id.
176 See generally infra section entitled Non-Intervention in States' Domestic Affairs.
177 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 173, at 1043-1045. Although it is increasingly the case that the
interpretation of what is necessary for international peace and security - and thus what is held to
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Such conceptions of independence constitute substantive barriers to
many claims to self-determination. That is, a state within whose terri-
tory is located a group that is asserting a right of self-determination will
protest any pressures from other states to accord the group self-determi-
nation. The affected state can first claim that such pressures violate its
rights to govern within its own territory. Second, the state can object to
self-determination of indigenous peoples on the basis that, as self-deter-
mination implies independence and thus the possibility of secession, it
would violate the state's territorial integrity.
2. Definitional Barrier
"[S]overeignty is an attribute of statehood, and... only states can
be sovereign."17 The accepted definition of "state" is: a person of inter-
national law which possesses the following qualifications: (a) a perma-
nent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) the
capacity to enter into relations with other states.179
One way that this definition helps deny claims of self-determination
is by its application to the entity making the claim. If the entity does not
satisfy the above criteria then it cannot be recognized as a state and
therefore cannot be recognized as having any attributes of sovereignty.
Because self-determination constitutes an element of state sovereignty,
any entity not satisfying the criteria cannot be entitled to exercise self-
determination. In this respect, states today typically point to the lack of
the last two elements in order to deny such claims. This, however, is
despite the fact that measures of independence and international person-
ality are granted to other entities besides those accorded full statehood.
For example, international law recognizes limited independence and the
international personality of limited forms of "state", such as associated
states, protected states, vassal states, non-self-governing territories, and
colonial protectorates.18 0 International law also gives some international
status and recognition to entities that are not "states", such as various
warrant intervention by the international community - includes more and more human rights mat-
ters. See infra section on Non-Intervention.
178 HANNUM, supra note 22, at 15.
179 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25.
See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 168, (discussing these criteria as well as other legal and non-
legal factors involved in the recognition of statehood). For a discussion of situations where African
nations have been accorded statehood by the international community even where they arguably do
not possess in substance all of the supposedly required characteristics, see Robert H. Jackson & Carl
Rosberg, Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis, 24 THE J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 1 (1986).
180 See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 168, at 186-214. See also HANNUM, supra note 22, at 16-
18 (summarizing the different types of governmental entities).
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types of autonomous regions.""1 What can additionally hamper the
claims to self-determination made by many indigenous peoples is the lack
of a defined territory, which is often tied to the lack of self-government.
In addition to the application of the definition to individual cases,
the mere creation and use of a definition in order to recognize the sover-
eignty of a particular entity poses a barrier to the recognition of claims of
self-determination by indigenous peoples. The creation of a definition
implies that international law does more than simply recognize sover-
eignty; it implies that it is the role of international law to accord sover-
eignty and that, where it does not do so, there is no such attribute. This
assumes a positivist view of international law and rejects the arguments
made by indigenous peoples that sovereignty is inherent in peoples.18 2
Further, in elevating statehood to the position of the only legitimate ex-
pression of sovereignty, it assumes that statehood is the only legitimate
expression of self-determination. This positivist view of international law
thus poses a barrier to the recognition of sovereignty in indigenous peo-
ples unless those who create international law consider that indigenous
peoples can become states. This works in tandem with the substantive
barriers to the recognition of a right of self-determination for groups
within states, and all of these barriers are part of the international law of
self-determination.
B. The International Law of Self-Determination
1. History of the Right, With a Focus on the "Self"
While different writers stress different aspects about the origins of
the concept of self-determination,' 83 almost all are of the opinion that the
idea of self-determination did not become a political or constitutional
principle until the late 1700's - the time of the American and French
revolutions. 8 4 Both the American and French revolutions were based
on Enlightenment philosophies stressing the freedom of the individual
and their consequent right to self-government and freedom from the tyr-
181 See generally Hurst Hannum & Richard B. Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in Interna-
tional Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L. L. 858 (1980).
182 See generally supra Part I.
183 See, eg., the different theories described in: Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, Self-determination:
Its Evolution and Practice by the United Nations and its Application to the Case of Eritrea 6 Wis.
INT'L L. J. 75, at 78-79; W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 198 n.1 (1977).
184 See, eg., BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 4-5; M.K. Nawaz, The Meaning and Range of the
Principle of Self-Determination, 1965 DUKE L.J. 82 (1965); A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973); RONEN, supra note 124, at 1, 3, & 6; SARAH
WAMBAUGH, PLEBISCITES SINCE THE WORLD WAR 3 (1933); Tesfagiorgis, supra note 183, at 80;
OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 198-99 n.1 (stating that the description of the origin of the
term or concept of self-determination depends on the writer's definition of the term. "Therefore, the
validity of such descriptions depend on the validity of their definitions of self-determination.").
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anny of the state.'8 5 Self-determination in this sense was not a right of
the group or nation but of the individuals themselves. In stressing de-
mocracy the term was primarily concerned with internal self-
determination.186
The suggestion that the right of self-determination resided in the
group emerged in the mid-1800s.1 7 The turning point is generally con-
sidered to be 1848, when the Polish, Italian, Magyar and German peo-
ples claimed self-determination based on the concept of a right of a
people to nationhood.' 8 This was a claim that nations had a right to
sovereign independence - to not be ruled by a foreign power.'8 9 This
sense of self-determination was external, in that it was concerned with
territory and the boundaries of state power.
It was this notion of self-determination - a right to chose one's own
form of government and to not be ruled by a foreign power - that was
used in the First World War. This war was referred to as the war of self-
determination,190 because the stated aim of the allies was the liberation of
185 The philosophical concept espoused was that of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). See, eg.,
Edward M. Morgan, The Imagery and Meaning of Self-Determination, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
355, 357 (1988); RONEN, supra note 124, at 24-25. Kant's concern was not political, but his concept
of the individual as a rational and self-determining being provided a basis for the political goals
related to respect for the freedom and rights of the individual. Similarly, it was the idea that man
had a right to be free that provided the basis for Rousseau's attempt to liberate the nation from the
tyranny of the state. J.J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (M. Cranston trans., Penguin Books
1968)(1762). See, e.g. RONEN, supra note 124, at 24-25. Locke similarly "emphasized that the
individual man, not the national group, was the repository of all rights; popular sovereignty could
be linked to any aggregation of individuals." Id. at 24 (emphasis original). Rigo Sureda comments
that the concept of self-determination "in the context of the French Revolution is a democratic ideal
.. . It is an assertion of the rights of man against the tyranny of the 'ancien r6gime.'" RIGO
SUREDA, supra note 184, at 17.
186 Although clearly the American revolution, while declaring America's independence from
Britain, also rested on a claim to external self-determination.
187 For description and comment on this philosophical transition, see Richard T. De George,
The Myth of the Right of Collective Self-determination, in ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, infra
note 317, at 1, 4-6. Efren Rivera-Ramos, Self-determination and Decolonisation in the Society of the
Modern Colonial Welfare State, in ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, infra note 317, at 115, 123
n.20 and accompanying text.
188 See, e.g., RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 18-19; RONEN, supra note 124, at 2-3 & 9. The
word 'self-determination' is derived from the German selbstbestimmung or selbstbestimmungsrecht
that was used by German philosophers from 1840 (i.e. when Germany was occupied) to argue for
self-rule. UMOZURIKE OJI UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1972). See also OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 21.
189 See authorities cited supra note 188.
190 Umozurike describes President Woodrow Wilson as "championing the cause of the op-
pressed nationalities" in Europe and fighting for their liberation from tyranny. UMOZURIKE, supra
note 188, at 13. Wilson himself stated: "We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the
undictated development of all peoples.... No people must be forced under sovereignty under which
it does not wish to live." Message from President Wilson to Russia, June 9, 1917, cited in ALFRED
COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 104-5 (1970). While Presi-
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all people then governed by the "foreign powers" of the Austro-Hun-
garian, Ottoman and Russian Empires. 191
Before World War I, President Wilson focused on internal self-de-
termination. By equating self-determination with self-government -
"the consent of the governed" - he equated it with democracy. 192 In
the context of the war, "consent of the governed" also came to mean
external self-determination: "the right of every people to 'choose the sov-
ereignty under which they shall live,' to be free of alien masters, and not
to be handed 'about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were prop-
erty.' "193 After the war, however, in the process of applying these prin-
ciples in order to redraw the various boundaries of Europe, the scope of
the principle of self-determination was restricted. This restriction was
caused by the difficulties in applying self-determination to all the differ-
dent Woodrow Wilson is considered to be the architect of this policy, the allies also adopted it.
Ofuatey-Kodjoe notes that "[s]oon after the beginning of the war, allied propaganda started to make
tentative attempts to convince many people that one of the most important reasons why they had
entered the war was to liberate small nations." OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 72. Further,
[t]he dramatic breakthrough in the development of self-determination as the leading princi-
ple of the allied policy came with the collapse of the Russian Empire and the subsequent
institution of a new Russian government avowedly committed to the principle of national
self-determination.... The final catalyst in this development was the entry of the United
States into the war,
whereby President Wilson pressured "the allied powers into an official policy endorsing the principle
of national self-determination." Id. at 73-4. See also UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 11 n.28 (not-
ing that Mr. Asquith referred to the war as the war of self-determination in a speech given on 5
February 1920). See also WAMBAUGH, supra note 184, at 10-12. Cassese states that the principle
of self-determination "was first proclaimed at an international level by the U.S.S.R. in 1917."
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 131 (1986). Cassese further de-
scribes the sense in which it was used by Lenin and how that differed from Wilson's use. Id. at 131-
32.
191 The Allies demanded (inter alia) the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro; the
evacuation of France, Russia, and Roumania; the restitution of territories torn from the Allies by
force; the "liberation of Italians, Slavs, Roumanians, Czechs, and Slovaks from foreign domina-
tion"; the liberation of non-Turks from the Ottoman Empire; and the emancipation of Poland. See
the note from the Allies to President Woodrow Wilson of 10 January 1916, cited in DAVID L.
GEORGE, MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 27-28 (1939); UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 16-
17.
192 See, eg., MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1982);
COBBAN, supra note 190, at 63; OFAUTEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 79.
193 POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 1 (quoting 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON
187, 389, 411 & 414 (Baker & Dodd eds., 1925-1927). See, eg., Wilson's famous comment, made
after the war, that encompassed both aspects: "[N]o peace can last, or ought to last, which does not
recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of
the governed, and that no right exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they
were property." Reprinted in OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 79 (quoting 54 CONG. REC.
1742); On Wilson's concept of self-determination, see generally Michla Pomerance, The United
States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2
(1976); WAMBAUGH, supra note 184, at 5. OFUATEY-KODiOE, supra note 183, at 75-80.
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ent minorities that existed in Europe. 194 Because of these difficulties, in-
stead of creating states out of each minority, the allies and associated
powers that negotiated the peace treaty agreed upon larger states that
invariably encompassed different minorities. 19 As J.L. Kunz has com-
mented, "[i]t was recognized that no matter how frontiers would be
drawn, there will always be groups in Europe who will have to live in a
state the majority of whose inhabitants are ethnically, linguistically, or
religiously different."1 96 Thus, while self-determination was proclaimed
as the principle by which to re-draw national boundaries, the result in-
stead confirmed the sovereignty of the previously-dominated states, with
very few changes in their boundaries. The only limitations imposed on
the constitutional regimes of the various new states were the guarantees
of minority rights agreed to in the various treaties between the associated
and allied powers and the various new states197  _ "the states created in
1919 undertook no specific obligations to ensure a democratic govern-
194 Buchheit comments that, "[o]n the practical side, the task of redrawing the demographic
map of Europe in strict conformity with the principle of self-determination was found to be quite
impossible." LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 64
(1978). The difficulty was that, in solving some minority problems, numerous others were created.
Buchheit further comments that the result was that "[t]he overriding question became how to affirm
something of the underlying premise of self-determination (consent of the governed) without al-
lowing the wholesale dismemberment of independent States into impossibly small parochial enti-
ties." Id. at 6.
195 For a brief list of some of the minorities included within the states created and commentary
on Wilson's "double standard," see POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 4-8. For a more detailed de-
scription of the events and the expressions of attitudes concerning self-determination at the Peace
Conference, see UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 20-26. Umozurike comments that, while self-deter-
mination was proclaimed, there were many cases where it was ignored or misapplied. Id. at 23.
Rigo Sureda comments that, despite the intentions, "the difficulties of applying self-determination,
and the limitations to which such a principle must be subject, became apparent." RIGO SUREDA,
supra note 184, at 21. "Historical claims, economic needs and military and strategic arguments
prevailed." Id. Hannum goes further, commenting that "self-determination ... had little to do with
the demands of the peoples concerned, unless those demands were consistent with the geopolitical
and strategic interests of the Great Powers." HANNUM, supra note 22, at 28. See also OFUATEY-
KoDJOE, supra note 183, at 80-84. Another difficulty in the application is described by international
legal scholar Ofuatey-Kodjoe, who notes that there was no agreed definition of the concept of self-
determination at the time. He describes three different theories that were advanced at the time.
OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 21-38.
196 JOSEF L. KUNZ, The Present Status of International Law for the Protection of Minorities, 48
AM. J. INT'L L. 282 (1954). Also cited in UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 21.
197 These guarantees encompassed basic rights to life, liberty, and religious freedom, rights to
nationality, and rights of racial, religious, or national minorities (such as equality before the law,
employment, and education). Address by President Wilson, U.S. Senate, Jan. 22, 1917, in 54 CONG.
REC. 1741, 1742 (1917). See also OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 84-87.
Kunz comments that the international law for the protection of minorities grew as "a substitute
in cases where the application of the principles of self-determination of nations was.., not possible
or not wanted." Kunz, supra note 196, at 21.
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ment."'' I This illustrates how the concept of self-determination was tied
to territory and to the nationality of the government more than to par-
ticipatory forms of government chosen by the people. It was considered
to apply only to nationalities - to whole (potential) nations - and not
to minorities within "nations". Minorities were not entitled to "self-de-
termination" in their own right.' 99
Therefore, the principle of self-determination that existed after the
end of World War I was no more specific than an aspiration that the
peoples of one country not be ruled by another. Other important aspects
are that the principle of self-determination was no more than a principle;
it had not yet attained the status of a right that any peoples could assert
under international law.2 ° Further, it was assumed to be only applicable
to the European nations that had been liberated by the war and to the
territories that had been colonized by the defeated powers.2° '
The Covenant of the League of Nations" 2 reflected this position.
While the League Covenant did not expressly provide for self-determina-
tion,20 3 the mandate system established in the Covenant was based upon
that concept.204 The mandate system provided that the Allies were to
administer "those colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the
late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which
formerly governed them. ' 20 5 These colonies and territories were to be
helped until they could themselves exercise self-government. However,
while these colonies and territories were considered to be entitled to exer-
cise self-determination, the position of other colonies around the world
and of indigenous peoples remained largely unchanged. Chen, an inter-
national legal scholar, comments that, while "the wishes of the popula-
tions" for self-government and thus self-determination were supposed to
198 HANNUM, supra note 22, at 30.
199 Thornberry, an international legal scholar, comments that "[t]he rights of minorities under
the League system fell far short of self-determination." Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination,
Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 867, 871-
72 (1989). Wambaugh also comments that President Wilson's comments "did not endorse the right
of secession." WAMBAUGH, supra note 184, at 4.
200 See, eg., OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 96; Thornberry, supra note 199, at 871.
See also authorities cited infra note 260 (arguing that self-determination was not considered a right
before 1960).
201 See, eg., RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 96.
202 Covenant of the League of Nations, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 195 [hereinafter Cove-
nant of the League of Nations].
203 President Wilson's suggestion that "the principle of self-determination be recognized in the
Covenant of the League of Nations" was rejected by the other nations. See HANNUM, supra note 22,
at 32; POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 7.
204 See, eg., UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 27.
205 Covenant of the League of Nations, supra note 202, art. 22, at 203. For an extensive dis-
cussion of the mandate system, see DUNCAN HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEE-
SHIP (1948). See also UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 27-43.
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be the primary considerations in choosing the mandated territories, "in
practice, this provision was virtually ignored. 20 6
Despite the reluctance of the larger powers to consider other depen-
dent territories and peoples as candidates for self-determination, nation-
alism and anti-colonialism grew among the dependent territories and was
fueled during World War 11.207 Umozurike comments that, during the
war, nationalists in dependent territories "sought to take advantage of
the war by demanding a promise for political advancement as a condition
for maximizing their war effort."' 2 8 The most significant statement con-
cerning self-determination made during the war was probably the Atlan-
tic Charter agreed upon by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill on August 14, 1941 and accepted in the Declaration of the
United Nations in January 1942.209 This Charter affirmed the right of
peoples to form their own government and the restoration of sovereignty
and self-government to those peoples from whom it had been forcibly
denied. 210 The United States proclaimed that "It]he age of imperialism is
ended" and that "[t]he principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guar-
anteed to the world as a whole - in all oceans and in all countries. 21 1
Churchill, however, maintained that this only applied to the nations oc-
cupied by the Germans and vehemently denied that it was of general
application; for example, that it might apply to the colonies of the British
Empire.212 The other colonial powers supported Britain's objections.213
206 Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND
HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES McDOUGAL 198, 214 (W. Michael Reisman &
Bums H. Weston eds., 1976).
207 UMOZURIKE, supra note 188 at 59.
208 Id. at 60.
209 The full text of the Atlantic Charter is contained in 35 AM. J. INT'L L., Supp. 191.
210 The Atlantic Charter included the following principles:
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Second, they desire to
see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people
concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government
under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government re-
stored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
Id. at 192. Ofuatey-Kodjoe comments that "the cosignatories of the Atlantic Charter consciously
modeled their principle [of self-determination] on the Wilsonian concept of self-determination." OF-
UATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 98.
211 UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 61 (quoting a 1942 statement by undersecretary Welles).
This statement was later watered down so as only to apply the Atlantic Charter principles to peoples
"prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty." Id. For a description of the subse-
quent U.S. proposals for a Draft Declaration concerning self-government for all dependent territo-
ries, see id. at 61-62. See also, OFuATEY-KoDioE, supra note 183, at 99-102. Ofuatey-Kodjoe notes
that the Soviet Union and China were willing to go further than the United States' proposals and
grant immediate independence to colonial peoples, but the colonial powers were resistant to even the
idea of trusteeship. Id. at 101.
212 UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 61.
213 See, e.g., OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 183, at 101.
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The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General
International Organization did not contain any expression of the princi-
ple of self-determination. 214 At the 1945 San Francisco conference, when
the U.N. Charter was drafted and the United Nations regime was estab-
lished, the fate and status of the various colonies or territories that had
been governed by the powers defeated in the war were discussed. The
result of this discussion was similar to that after World War I. A system
to enable these and other non-self-governing territories to achieve self-
government was established, but only limited reference to the general
principle of self-determination was made.215
Articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter both refer to the development
of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples." '2 16 What this principle
might mean, however, is not specified in the Charter. It must therefore
be deduced from the travaux preparatoires, the other provisions of the
Charter, and the practices of states in implementing them.
The travaux preparatoires show that there was severe disagreement
over the meaning of self-determination.21 7 While there seemed to be gen-
eral agreement on the idea that self-determination entailed government
through consent of the people,218 the differences between the various uses
214 The Proposals did not refer in its chapter on principles to the principles expressed in the
Atlantic Charter, such as the right of peoples to choose their form of government, nor to how to
treat the colonies and territories that had been governed by the powers defeated in the war. Dum-
barton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, contained in
DUMBARTON OAKS DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. No. 2257, 5-16 (1945), reprinted in RUTH RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945, at 1019-1028 (1958). For a detailed
description of the discussion leading up to and including the Dumbarton Oaks Conference see id. at
166-476.
215 U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
216 Id. arts. 1 & 55. Article 1 states that this development is one of the purposes of the United
Nations. Id. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 44-46; RUSSELL, supra note 214, at 810-813 for a
history of the discussion of self-determination during the drafting of the U.N. Charter.
217 Russell notes that there were two conflicting views: "(1) that the principle 'correspond
closely to the will and desires of peoples everywhere,' and should therefore be clearly stated in the
Charter; and (2) that it conformed to the purposes of the Charter 'only insofar as it implied the right
of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession.'" RUSSELL, supra note 214, at 811
(citing 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 296).
218 The rapporteur who had headed the drafting committee commented,
.. that the principle of equal rights of people and of self-determination are two component
elements of qne norm.
That the respect of the norm is a basis for the development of friendly relations, and is
in effect, one of the appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace....
That an essential element... is a free and genuine expression of the will of the people;
and thus to avoid cases like those alleged by Germany and Italy. That the principle as one
whole extends ... to a possible amalgamation of nationalities if they so freely chose.
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of "states", "nations" and "peoples" were deliberately left unresolved. 21 9
The use of these different terms was expressly considered during the
drafting process. 22° It was considered that "state" referred to "a definite
political entity," that "'nation' is broad and general enough to include
colonies, mandates, protectorates, and quasi-states as well as states," and
that "'peoples' is used in connexion with the phrase 'self-determination
of peoples'. This phrase is in such common usage that no other word
seems appropriate." '221 In relation to Articles 1(2) and 55, the conclusion
was that " 'nations' is used in the sense of all political entities, states and
non-states, whereas 'peoples' refers to groups of human beings who may,
or may not, comprise states or nations. ' 222  Despite this apparent
breadth in the scope of the definition of "peoples, ' 223 however, many of
the participating states still expressed the view that the right of self-deter-
mination could never be held where its application entailed secession
from an independent state.224 Aureliu Cristescu, the Special Rapporteur
for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, in his study on the right to self-determination, commented
that:
The documents of the San Francisco Conference suggest that the
authors of the Charter conceived of the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as a single norm applicable to States, na-
tions and peoples .... However, the term "peoples" applies not only to
States, but also to other entities such as nations .... Consequently,
States are bound to apply the principle in their relations both with
other States and with peoples which have not yet constituted them-
selves independent States.2 25
Summary Report of the [Drafting] Committee I/1, Doc. I/I/I, 16 May 1945, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs., at
296 cited in UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 46.
Chen comments that the meeting "formally recognized this principle [of self-determination] as
essential to peace and security, as well as to human rights, and upheld its application to all 'peoples,'
regardless of geographical or racial factors." Chen, supra note 206, at 215. Chen does not say,
however, whether the principle would also apply to minorities within states such that they would be
entitled to secede. He also notes that the Soviet Union proposed that the principle of self-determina-
tion of all peoples be included among the purposes of the U.N. Id. at 251 n.66. The Soviet Union's
proposal was subsequently rejected, however.
219 RUSSELL, supra note 214, at 813.
220 The Secretariat was prepared a memorandum listing all the occasions of use of the three
terms and came to conclusions about what they were intended to mean. See, e.g., infra note 221.
221 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 657-658, cited in Aureliu Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination:
Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, para. 262, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1 (1981); RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 99-100.
222 Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 262.
223 Rigo Sureda comments, "The Secretariat's memorandum thus gave the word 'peoples' the
widest meaning." RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 100.
224 See, e.g., Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 17.
225 Id. para. 266.
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While this statement could be interpreted widely, as including peo-
ples within independent states, it can also be interpreted narrowly, as
referring only to peoples that can constitute themselves as independent
states without contravening the prohibition on secession. Other com-
ments of the Special Rapporteur's indicate that he intended the latter.226
That this was probably also intended by the states drafting the Charter is
indicated by the Charter provisions designed to implement the principle
of self-determination.
The implementation of the principle of self-determination is pro-
vided for in the Charter through the system established to promote a
transition to self-government of certain non-self-governing territories.22 7
The negotiating states agreed relatively easily upon the system for man-
aging the territories previously governed by the defeated powers. 228 This
system is provided for in Chapter XII of the Charter, the International
Trusteeship System, and Chapter XIII, the Trusteeship Council.229
However, the discussion on these territories entailed much debate again
over the scope of the principle of self-determination. This debate in-
cluded discussion of other dependent or non-self-governing territories in
the world - i.e., colonies of other Western and European powers. The
argument was made that since the principle of self-determination applied
equally to all such non-self-governing territories, colonies should also be
defined as trust territories. However, this extension of the Trusteeship
system to all colonies was rejected.230 Instead, Chapter XI, the Declara-
tion Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories, was devised as a com-
226 See, eg., id. paras. 275 & 279. See also discussion supra section entitled "Peoples."
227 See, eg., the statement expressed at the San Francisco Conference that:
There is explicitly affirmed - in providing rules of general application for the transition
from a colony to a mandate and from a mandate to a sovereign state - the principle that
the goal which should be sought is that of obtaining the universal application of the princi-
ple of self-determination.
3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 146, cited in Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 24.
228 For a detailed description of the negotiation and emergence of the Trusteeship system and
the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories, see RUSSELL, supra note 214, at 75-91,
330-48, 573-89, & 808-42.
229 Article 77 of the Charter (Chapter XII) specifies that the mandate territories of the previ-
ous League of Nations are to be included as trust territories, as well as those "detached from enemy
states as a result of the Second World War" and others that states voluntarily placed under the
system. U.N. CHARTER art. 76. Article 76 provides that the basic objectives of the trusteeship
system are:
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabit-
ants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or
independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and
its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.
U.N. CHARTER art. 76. The Trusteeship system is discussed in CRAWFORD, supra note 168, at 335-
55; OFUATEY-KoDiOE, supra note 183, at 104-113. For a more detailed discussion, see CHAIRMAN
EDWARDS TOUSSAINT, TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1956).
230 CRAWFORD, supra note 168, at 92-93.
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promise.31 The obligations in respect of these territories were very
similar to those for trust territories, 232 but there was "a much more at-
tenuated form of international accountability" for achieving the aims. 233
The difficulty with the application of this Declaration Regarding
Non-Self-Governing Territories was that there were no criteria in the
Charter for determining what were non-self-governing territories, other
than "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of
self-government ... .,"234 This made it difficult to hold that particular
territories, such as colonies of member states, must become self-gov-
erning. 13  Despite this imprecision about the extent of the territories that
must be listed, however, the debate was clearly limited to discussion of
recognized, geographically separate territories. It was not argued that
the definition of self-governing territory should be extended to include
minorities or indigenous peoples within member states.236
Therefore, while the U.N. Charter clearly upheld self-determination
as a principle to respect, neither it's content nor the "peoples" to which it
applied was defined with any precision, nor did it have the status of a
right under international law.237 Thus began the debate over the defini-
tion of territories entitled under the Charter to exercise self-government
or independence and thereby to achieve self-determination.238
231 Id.
232 Article 73(b) provides that the states are under a duty "to develop self-government, to take
due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive develop-
ment of their free political institutions." U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
233 CRAWFORD, supra note 168, at 92-93.
234 U.N. CHARTER art. 73. Criteria have since been elaborated by the General Assembly. See
infra note 264 and accompanying text.
235 For example, while eight member states initially listed 74 territories, G.A. Res. 66, Dec. 13,
1946 (27-7-13), listing of their colonies was resisted by Spain and Portugal when they joined the
U.N. in 1955. Their objection was that, despite the voluntary practice of the various nations that
had listed non-self-governing territories, the Charter did not require the listing of such territories
other than those 'freed' as a result of the World Wars (i.e., those to be placed under trusteeship).
This argument was based on the ground that these territories were not colonies or separate territories
but an integral part of the relevant state itself. While Spain agreed to comply comparatively quickly,
even upon General Assembly Resolutions designating nine Portugese territories as non-self-gov-
erning, G.A. Res. 1542 (XV), Dec. 15, 1960 (68-6-17), Portugal refused to comply until 1974 (a
change in policy due to a change of government). For details on the Portugese arguments, see
FRANCO NOGUEIRA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PORTUGAL: A STUDY OF ANTICOLONIALISM
(1963).
236 See supra note 217. For a brief discussion of the inclusion of minorities, see CRAWFORD,
supra note 168, at 359-60.
237 See, e.g., HANNUM, supra note 22, at 33 & n.101; RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 26.
For a description of the law and practice concerning Chapter XI, see CRAWFORD, supra note 168, at
356-84.
238 One of the goals of the Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories was the de-
velopment of self-government. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(b). One of the goals of the Trusteeship sys-
tem was "progressive development towards self-government or independence." Id. Achievement of
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During the debate over the drafting of the U.N. Charter various
delegates argued that it should specify and guarantee human rights.239
While this was not done in the Charter itself, the U.N. established a
Commission on Human Rights to draft what was envisaged would be an
international bill of rights.24 This effort culminated in the adoption by
the General Assembly, in 1948, of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.24 As the parties drafting the Declaration could not agree on a
general statement of the right of self-determination, one was not
included.242
The next stage was the development, by the Economic and Social
Council, of legal measures to implement the Declaration. While the
draft Covenant produced in 1950 did not include any mention of a right
of self-determination, the claim was again made that it should. 243 It is
important to note, however, that the states supporting a right of self-
determination still focused on the non-self-governing territories adminis-
tered by other states (i.e., those colonies not addressed by the post-war
agreements). It was not argued that it had any wider application, such as
to minorities or indigenous peoples within states.
The General Assembly resolved in 1952 to include a proposed arti-
these goals amounted to achievement of self-determination. See, eg., Cristescu, supra note 221,
para. 23-25.
239 See, eg., Peter Meyer, The International Bill: A Brief History, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul Williams ed., 1987).
240 Article 68 of the U.N. Charter provides: "the Economic and Social Council shall set up
commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other
commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions." U.N. CHARTER art. 68. The
Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (created on 26 June 1945, the day on which the
U.N. Charter was signed) recommended to the Economic and Social Council that it create a Com-
mission on Human Rights and defined the "[formulation of an international bill of rights" as one of
the functions of the proposed Commission. Report ofthe Preparatory Commission, at 36 U.N. Doe.
P.C./20 (1945). The Economic and Social Council established the Commission on Human Rights in
Resolution 1/5 of 16 February 1946. ECOSOC, OmIFICIAL RECORDS, FIRST SESSION 163. The sub-
mission of "proposals, recommendations and reports to [ECOSOC] regarding... [a]n international
bill of rights" was to be the primary work of the Commission. Id. See also The United Nations and
Human Rights: Competence Organs and Activities, 1947 Y.B. on H.R. 415, 420-23.
241 G.A. Res. 217 (IIIA), U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) (endorsed by 48-0-8).
242 Some states - for example, Russia - argued that the right to self-determination should be
included, but this was rejected. The closest that the Declaration came was the statement that "the
will of the people shall be the basis of authority of government" and that this should be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections, (Article 21) and that "everyone is entitled to a social and interna-
tional order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be realized." (Article
28). For a more detailed discussion of the drafting, see UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 46-48.
243 For example, by the Afro-Asian group of states. See UMOZUIjIKE, supra note 188, at 28
(listing the supporters of this claim and of those states rejecting it). See also Sally Morphet, Article I
of the Human Rights Covenants: Its Development and Significance, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 67 (Dilys Hill ed., 1989) (detailing the history of the
drafting and debate over the inclusion of the general right to self-determination in Article I of the
Covenants). See also Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 44-47.
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le on the right of peoples to self-determination, 244 which it asked the
Commission on Human Rights to prepare.245 In 1955, this proposed ar-
ticle was considered by the Third Committee of the General Assembly.
The Committee, after appointing a Working Group to consider it and to
make recommendations,246 adopted a revised version of the article which
eventually became the general right declared in the present Article 1 of
the Covenants.247 The mere statement that "all peoples have the right to
self-determination," however, did not resolve the debate over the scope
of the application of the right. A large part of the debate now concerned
not only whether other colonial territories (besides the European territo-
ries) should be entitled to self-determination, but also whether it applied
to nations and ethnic groups within states and, even more specifically,
whether it applied to indigenous peoples within states.
Cassese comments that some national and ethnic groups were con-
sidered by various states to be "peoples" and thus entitled to self-deter-
mination, but only where the relevant state consisted of "different
national groups of comparable dimensions" and where that group was
"recognized constitutionally. ' 24 ' Examples given of states that contain
such national groups are the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.2 49 On the other
hand, Cassese also concludes that "[t]he draftsmen, and the participating
states generally, intended to rule out the right of self-determination for
minorities out of a fear that this could disrupt and dismember sovereign
244 G.A. Resolution 545(VI).
245 The Commission's draft article and resolutions for consideration by ECOSOC is contained
in Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 14th Sess. Supp. 4 (E/2256), para. 91. See
The United Nations and Human Rights, 1952 Y.B. ON H.R. 419, 423, also cited in Cristescu, supra
note 221, para. 45.
246 The Working Party was approved by vote at the 655th meeting of the Third Committee on
November 7, 1955. U.N. GAOR, SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS OF THE THIRD COMMIT-
TEE, TENTH SESSION 155-56 (1955). For a description of the Third Committee's debate on the
proposed article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights leading up to the approval of the
Working Party (i.e. because of the large difference in views on the inclusion of self-determination in
the Covenant) see id. at 85-156. The inclusion of self-determination in the Preamble to the Cove-
nant is discussed id. at 63-84.
247 See infra note 271 and accompanying text; Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 46-47 (discuss-
ing the texts considered and adopted).
248 Antonio Cassese, The Self-Determination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 95 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
Apparently, these conditions are based on the rationale that "an 'ethnic group' is entitled to self-
determination only when it achieves the dimension and importance of other components of the state,
both in fact and in constitutional conception." Id.
249 Id. With respect to the U.S.S.R., Cassese notes that during the debate, the U.S.S.R. did not
repudiate the application of the principle of self-determination to the Soviet republics on the basis
that they were part of a sovereign state. Instead, it merely asserted that the republics did then enjoy
self-determination. Id. at 94-95. Further, the U.S.S.R. representative stressed that "he had voted
for the Article 'because it had been clear from the debate that the word 'peoples' included nations
and ethnic groups.' " Id. at 95.
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states. 250
The proposal that self-determination applied to indigenous peoples
within states was known as the "Belgian thesis. 2 51 It was based on the
arguments that, first, the Charter does not refer to colonialism, but to
non-self-governing territories, and second, that the treatment of indige-
nous communities was comparable to the treatment of colonized territo-
ries overseas.252 This thesis, however, encountered vigorous opposition.
The fear expressed by various delegates - particularly the delegates
from Latin American states - was that the Belgian thesis would destroy
territorial integrity and thus state sovereignty.253 Ultimately, the thesis
250 Id. at 96.
251 This is because it was proposed by the Belgian delegates. See infra note 252.
252 For example, a Belgium delegate at the UN stated that,
he had a great deal of documentation to prove that a number of States were administering
within their own borders territories which were not governed by the ordinary law; territo-
ries with well-defined limits, inhabited by homogeneous peoples differing from the rest of
the population in race, language and culture. These populations were disenfranchised;
they took no part in national life; they did not enjoy self-government in any sense of the
word.
RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 103. See also THORNBERRY, supra note 8, at 16-17; Edwards
Toussaint, The Colonial Controversy in the United Nations, in 1956 YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS
177-180 (1956); Josef L. Kunz, Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter in Action, 48 AM. J. INT'L
L. 103, 108-109 (1954).
Note that the Belgian thesis was not necessarily motivated by any altruistic concern for the
welfare and rights of indigenous peoples. Belgium was at the time an industrial, colonial power in
Belgian Congo, and was exploiting Congo's resources (primarily copper from the province of
Katanga) for its own use. Van Langenhove, one of the authors of the thesis, admits that promulga-
tion of the thesis was a Belgian tactic used in response to the criticism by the developing states of the
policies of the colonizer states in relation to the non-self-governing territories; such criticism encom-
passed Belgium's activities in Congo. VAN LANGENHOVE, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES BEFORE
THE UNITED NATIONs: THE BELGIAN THESIS (1954), cited in Thornberry, supra note 199, at 874.
Further, because Congo was a non-self-governing territory under the Charter, it was envisaged that
it would eventually become independent, which it did in 1960. With the hindsight afforded by the
Belgian practice in encouraging Katanga's secession upon Congo's independence, it can be argued
that Belgium argued for the right of self-determination of indigenous peoples at least partly in order
to enable Katanga to secede from Congo so that Belgium could continue to exploit the copper in
Katanga. This conclusion is arguably reinforced by the fact that, during the early discussion on the
inclusion of a statement concerning self-determination in the Charter, Belgium "[led] the attempt to
narrow the application of the principle [of self-determination] to freedom of self-government within
the sovereignty of member states." RUSSELL, supra note 214, at 812. For further information on
Katanga's attempted secession, see infra notes 422-426, authorities cited therein, and accompanying
text.
253 The Latin American states, for example, argued that the problems of the indigenous peo-
ples were economic and not the result of colonialism. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.420, para. 40, cited in
Thornberry, supra note 199, at 873 (delegate of Peru to the Fourth Committee). They argued,
further, that "their" "populations" had been fully integrated politically, so the application of the
Belgian thesis would entail the disintegration of the present states. U.N. GAOR, OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 7th Sess., 4th Comm., at 55. See also GORDON BENNETr,
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1978) (discussing further criticism of the Bel-
gian thesis).
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was rejected.25 4 Indigenous peoples were thereby legally considered no
different from minorities within states. The effect of the application of
self-determination to indigenous peoples and minorities on the states in
which they lived was the same - it violated the territorial integrity of
the states.
It was this debate over the application of the principle of self-deter-
mination, including the debate over the Belgian thesis, that led to at-
tempts by the General Assembly to clarify the application of the
principle of self-determination to non-self-governing territories under the
Charter, and thus to clarify the definition of "non-self-governing terri-
tory".255 In 1953 the General Assembly passed Resolution 742 (VIII),
Factors Which Should be Taken Into Account in Deciding Whether a
Territory is or is not a Territory Whose People Have not Yet Attained a
Full Measure of Self-Government. This resolution provides a list of fac-
tors that are indicative of the attainment of independence, free associa-
tion, or "other separate systems of self-government." The intention of
this resolution was to assist in the carrying out of the duties under Chap-
ter XI of the Charter, whereby governing states were under an obligation
to help their colonial territories toward self-government.25 6 However,
while this Resolution focussed on the duties of states toward the territo-
ries already identified and accepted as non-self-governing, it did not ad-
dress the issue of what other territories should be added to the list of
non-self-governing territories.257
254 Bennett comments that "[v]iews akin to the Belgian thesis had been previously expressed by
Britain, France and the United States, but none were prepared to air them in the face of the vigorous
opposition encountered by the Belgian delegation .. " BENNETr, supra note 253, at 13. Cristescu,
in describing the debate leading to the adoption of the International Covenant, comments that:
The opinion was expressed that the right to self-determination should not be confused with
the rights of minorities, since the authors of the Charter had not intended to give that right
to minorities. The right to self-determination should not be exercised to destroy the unity
of a nation or to impede the creation of that unity, in violation of national sovereignty.
Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 32 (citations omitted).
255 Another factor leading to clarification of the scope of application was the refusal of Portu-
gal to classify its colonies as non-self-governing territories under the Charter. See supra note 235
and accompanying text.
256 See, e.g., Cristescu's comment that the resolution was passed "for the purpose of determin-
ing whether the administering authority should continue or cease to transmit information provided
for in Chapter XI of the Charter." Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 35.
257 In 1957, another resolution was passed on self-determination, but it, too, did not address
the issue of what territories were considered to be non-self-governing. In this resolution states
agreed to "give due respect to the right of self-determination" and "promote the realization and
facilitate the exercise of this right in non-self-governing territories." G.A. Res. 1188 (XII) (11 Dec.
1957, 65-0-13). Similarly, G.A. Resolution 637 (VII), The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-
Determination (16 Dec., 1952) affirmed the application of self-determination to non-self-governing
territories, but was not more specific about its application. This resolution stressed the link between
self-determination and non-self-governing territories under the Charter, recommending that the
wishes of peoples in such territories in relation to political aspirations be ascertained, and that the
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In 1960, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514 (XV), the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples.258  This Declaration was the first international instrument to
formally state that "[a]U peoples have a right to self-determination" '259
and most scholars take it as the point at which the principle of self-deter-
mination became a recognized right in international law.26' Despite this
general statement, however, the Declaration did not expand the scope of
the right of self-determination to include minorities or indigenous peo-
administering states prepare such peoples for self-government or independence. Id. This resolution
did not specify further what territories were to be regarded as non-self-governing; it merely requested
the Commission on Human Rights to continue preparation of recommendations on "steps which
might be taken" by U.N. organs "to develop international respect for the right of peoples to self-
determination." Id.
258 1960 U.N.Y.B. 44-50 [hereinafter Declaration on Colonialism]. The principles of the Dec-
laration read [excluding the Preamble]:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes
a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and security.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never
serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peo-
ples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to
complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in the Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the
peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with
their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or col-
our, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the total or partial disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and the principles of
the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the present Declara-
tion on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and
respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.
Id.
259 Id. art. 2.
260 In 1960, before this resolution was adopted, Schwarzenberger stated that "[t]he principle of
national self-determination is a formative principle of great potency, but not yet part and parcel of
international customary law." GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 59 (6th ed., Professional Books 1976) (1947). After this resolution, many
scholars consider that the principle became recognized as a right. See, e.g., HANNUM supra note 22,
at 33-34 (commenting that the evolution of the principle into the right to self-determination
"culminated in the adoption ... in 1960 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples"). See also Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 95; POMERANCE, supra
note 192, at 1; WILSON, infra note 388, at 69. Significantly, the Declaration was adopted by 89-0-9,
with those who could not subscribe to it merely abstaining rather than voting against it. These states
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ples within states. As the title of the Declaration indicates, its purpose is
to obtain the independence and self-government of colonies.2 6' It adopts
the view of the majority of states which were merely dissatisfied with the
speed and process of decolonization that had been conducted after the
war, despite the Charter provisions. It can also be seen as a compromise
between those states that wanted to restrict the right of self-determina-
tion to the European colonies and those that subscribed to the Belgian
thesis. In taking such a compromise position, it could be considered to
deny the extension of the right of self-determination to indigenous
peoples.
Yet the definition of the peoples having rights to self-determination
as those under "alien subjugation, domination and exploitation"26 is am-
biguous. Either indigenous peoples could fit the definition through being
under subjugation (etc.) by a dominant, alien culture from within their
states, or "alien" could be limited to meaning that the subjugation
originates from outside the state. The subsequent Resolution 1541 sug-
gests that the latter is intended, although the ambiguity is not completely
resolved.263 Resolution 1541 provides that the use of "colonial coun-
tries" in the Declaration refers to non-self-governing territories. The
Resolution defines a "non-self-governing territory" is one which is "geo-
graphically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the
country administering it" and is arbitrarily placed "in a position or status
of subordination" to the administering state.z 4 The crucial element is
were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, U.K., and
U.S.A..
For further discussion of the status of the 'right' to self-determination, see UMOZURIKE, supra
note 188, at 177-180, 189-203. See also POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 63-72 (noting that while it
may be regarded asjus, there is still disagreement over whether it has acquired the status ofjus
cogens). Pomerance argues that, whether we think it should have or not, it has not yet attained this
more fundamental status. Id. Other scholars who argue that the right has attained the status ofju
cogens include: LYNN BERAT & WALVIS BAY: DECOLONIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 146-
150 (1990); BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 513; HECTOR GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, para. 50, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980).
261 In order to encourage compliance with the resolutions concerning the criteria for a non-
self-governing territory, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation
of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was estab-
lished in 1961 to examine the implementation of the Declaration (also referred to as the Committee
of 24, or the Committee on Decolonization). One of the functions of the Committee was the making
of recommendations to the General Assembly on whether a territory was non-self-governing. The
Committee was created under G.A. Res. 1654, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. 17, at 65, U.N. Doc.
A/5100. (It was expanded from 17 to 24 members in 1962, under G.A. Res. 1810(XVII)).
262 Declaration on Colonialism, supra note 258, principle 1.
263 Resolution 1541 was passed the day after Resolution 1514.
264 Principle V of Resolution 1541 states:
Once it has been established that such a prima facie case of geographical and ethnic or
cultural distinctiveness of a territory exists, other elements may be brought into considera-
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the requirement of geographical separateness from the administering
state, but even this can be interpreted in two ways. "Separate" could
mean areas separate from the state in the sense of being completely
outside it, or it could include partitioned lands within international state
borders, such as states within a national federation. The latter interpre-
tation could recognize the right of self-determination for indigenous peo-
ples with recognized reserved lands; for example, those in North
America. Either interpretation would not enable the category of indige-
nous peoples as a (worldwide) whole to be entitled to self-determination
because, while all indigenous peoples are ethnically and/or culturally dis-
tinct from the dominant culture in their state and are in a position of
subordination to the state, 65 not all can be considered to be geographi-
cally separate in either sense. But the wider interpretation would enable
those indigenous peoples that were recognized within their states as sepa-
rate from the rest of the state to be entitled to self-determination in inter-
national law.
Despite this apparent "foot in the door" for indigenous peoples, the
principle of territorial integrity, which is upheld in paragraphs 6 and 7 of
the 1960 Declaration on Colonialism, creates a barrier to the wider inter-
pretation of the scope of the peoples entitled to exercise self-determina-
tion under the Declaration. Paragraph 6 provides: "Any attempt aimed
at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations. 26 6 Paragraph 7 calls on states to
observe the various relevant documents "on the basis of .. .respect for the
tion. These additional elements may be inter alia, of an administrative, political, juridical,
economic or historical nature. If they affect the relationship between the metropolitan
State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a posi-
tion or status of subordination, they support the presumption that there is an obligation to
transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter.
The requirement of geographical separateness is often referred to as the "blue water", or "salt
water" theory, in order to refer to the need to have a sea in between a colonizer and a colonized state
for the latter to be considered non-self-governing. See, eg., RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 102-
11 & 215-16. This term is now both misleading and inaccurate. It is misleading because it suggests
that any body of water will do, whereas coastal islands are not generally considered sufficiently far
away. For example, the Torres Strait Islands, off Australia, are considered to be part of Australia
even though the Torres Strait Islanders are a separate people. See, eg., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ABORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS 80 n.5 (Barbara Hocking ed., 1988). It is inaccurate because it does
not allow for the possibility that solely land may separate the two states, such as in the case of
Pakistan and Bangladesh, nor does it allow for the possibility that the two states may share a com-
mon border, such as in the case of Namibia and South Africa.
More recently it has been suggested that, because of the artificiality of the geographical test,
self-determination should be based on racial difference: "pigmentational self-determination." See
BUCHHErr, supra note 194, at 18 n.28 (referencing the primary proponent and opponent of this
approach).
265 See, eg., authorities cited supra note 2.
266 Declaration on Colonialism, supra note 258, principles 6 & 7.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L Lo
sovereign rights of peoples and their territorial integrity." '26 7 While
neither of these statements stipulate precisely how a clash between the
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity is to be resolved,
they indicate that the borders that states are concerned about are their
present, external borders rather than internal ones. 268 The references to
alien subjugation and to geographical separateness, if they are to be inter-
preted consistently with Paragraphs 6 and 7, can only refer to territories
outside the international boundary of the state in question.269 This takes
the narrow view of both phrases. The Declaration therefore does not
recognize the right of either minorities or indigenous peoples within
states to self-determination because any extension of the right of self-
determination to indigenous peoples within a state would violate the
sanctity of the state's borders, which is prohibited.2 70 The Declaration
can thus be regarded as being a compromise between those states that
wanted to restrict the right of self-determination to the European colo-
nies and those that subscribed to the Belgian thesis.
In 1966, the International Covenants on Human Rights were finally
adopted.27 They, too, recognize the right of "all peoples" to self-deter-
mination. This recognition is contained in the first Article of each Cove-
nant, which provide that: "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their polit-
ical status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural develop-
267 Id. principle 7.
268 See Thomas M. Franck & Paul Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small
Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 331, 370 (1976).
269 Despite arguments of some colonial powers, such as France, this has been interpreted as
not treating colonies as being within the borders of the colonial regime, thus rejecting arguments
that the colonial state as a whole is entitled to territorial integrity. This is made explicit in the sixth
paragraph of the Priniciple of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples of the 1970 Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations (infra note 276) which reads:
The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a
status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such sepa-
rate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-
Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right to self-determination in accordance
with the Charter.
Declaration on Friendly Relations, infra note 276.
270 For example, Cristescu states:
[P]aragraph 6 of the Declaration... makes it clear that the principle of self-determination
is not to be applied to parts of the territory of a sovereign State. Such a provision is needed
in order to prevent the principle from being applied in favour of secessionist movements in
independent States.
Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 174. See also, id. para. 172-73. In addition, the debates in the
General Assembly on the drafting of Resolution 1514 indicate that states envisaged that Paragraph 6
guarded against creation of a right of secession. See also, Franck supra note 268, at 370.
271 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 61.
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ment."2 72 The difficulty with the right as stated in Article 1 is that it
does not give any guidance on the priority of the principle of territorial
integrity as stated, for example, in the 1960 Declaration on Colonialism.
If "all peoples" is to be interpreted as including minorities or indigenous
peoples within states, then it would provoke a direct clash with the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity upheld by the 1960 Declaration on Colonial-
ism.273 Such an interpretation would clearly import a fundamental
change in international law. The difficulty with imputing such a change
by the adoption of the Covenants is that the travauxpreparatoires do not
reveal any intention that international law be changed in this way.274 It
thus appears that, despite the agreement that the right of self-determina-
tion should be seen as the basis for all other rights,275 it was limited to
geographically separate, non-self-governing territories, and excluded mi-
norities or peoples within independent states, whether subjugated or not.
These statements in the Covenants thus did not add anything to the right
of self-determination that did not exist in 1960. The practice of the U.N.
in adopting resolutions to implement the 1960 Declaration in the ensuing
years confirms the emphasis placed on colonialism and alien (often spe-
cifically external276) domination.277
The issues of the definition of "peoples" that the principle applied
272 Id.
273 See discussion infra, section entitled "Peoples".
274 See, e.g., supra notes 246-254 and accompanying text (concerning the discussion in the
Third Committee and the Belgian thesis). See also, Cristescu, supra note 221, paras. 44-47, 27-33.
Nor did the inclusion of provisions on minority rights (such as Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 61). The discussion of the Human Rights Commission on the rights
of minorities reinforces this point. The majority of the Commission held that the reference to minor-
ity rights,
should be understood to cover well-defined and long-established minorities; and that the
rights of persons belonging to minorities should not be interpreted as entitling any group
settled within the territory of a State... to form within that State separate communities
which might impair its national unity or security.
U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 8, U.N. Doe. E/2447 (1953), para. 54, cited in BUCHHEIT supra
note 194, at 85 n.171. The majority thus did not envisage anything that might be construed as
internal or external self-determination being applicable to minorities within states.
275 Note that the U.N. General Assembly declared, in 1952, that "the right of peoples and
nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human
rights." G.A. Res. 637 (VII), passed 40-14-6. Scholars have also argued that this is the case. See,
e.g., UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 58. See infra section entitled "Basis for the Right of Self-
Determination" for more detail on this aspect.
276 See, e.g., Resolution 2734 (XXV) of 24 Oct. 1970, linking "oppressed peoples" with
"colonialism or any other form of external domination."
277 For example, Resolutions 2189 (XXI) of 13 Dec. 1966, 2326 (XXII) of 16 Dec. 1967, 2465
(XXIII) of 20 Dec. 1968, 2548 (XXIV) of 11 Dec. 1969, 2708 (XXV) of 14 Dec. 1970, 2878 (XXVI)
of 20 Dec. 1971, 2908 (XXVII) of 2 Nov. 1972, 3163 (XXVIII) of 14 Dec. 1973, and 3328 (XXIX)
of 16 Dec. 1974, cited in Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 48, n.40. See also the resolutions referred
to, id., para. 104, n.57 & paras. 105-117; Resolution 2627 (XXV) of 24 Oct. 1970; and resolutions
cited in WILSON, infra note 388, at 70 n. 67. Wilson comments that "the reaffirmation of the right
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to, and whether it applied to situations other than geographically sepa-
rate, non-self-governing territories, were addressed in the 1970 Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.27 ' Relevant paragraphs of that Declaration are:
Every State has the duty to promote.., the realization of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples... in order:
(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States;
and
(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to
the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind
that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and ex-
ploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of
fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as author-
izing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign
and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole peo-
ple belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour.
Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any
other State or country.279
This Declaration shows that the principle was still expected to apply
only to colonial situations and to peoples subject to "alien subjuga-
tion.12 0 The explicit concern for the respect of territorial integrity and
national unity confirms that, "[w]here the territorial integrity of the State
is involved, the right to self-determination does not in principle ap-
ply. ' 281 Because of these provisions it has been stated that the intended
to ... self-determination of particular peoples still subject to colonial authority became almost an
annual ritual for the General Assembly." Id. at 70.
278 G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121 (1971) reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
1292 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations] (adopted without a vote).
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 ESPIELL, supra note 260, para. 89 n.72, referring to the declaration of Judge Nagendra
Singh in the Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. at 80. In this case the I.C.J. referred to Paragraph 6
of the 1960 Declaration on Colonialism, supra note 258, supporting the respect for territorial integ-
rity. Id The only exception to the respect for territorial integrity is where the state concerned does
not conduct itself in compliance with "equal rights and self-determination," and thus where it is not
"possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinc-
tion as to race, creed or colour." Unfortunately for minorities within states, in practice, the require-
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application of the principle of self-determination by decolonization, and
thus the definition of "peoples" for its purposes, is limited to "non-Euro-
pean inhabitants of former colonies, without further regard for ethnicity,
language, religion, or other objective characteristics of such colonized
peoples (apart from the fact of colonization itself). Territory, not 'na-
tionhood,' [is] the determining factor."2" 2 The other implication of this
statement is that the other types of "peoples" entitled to self-determina-
tion are also defined territorially; they are the presently independent
states (with representative forms of government) that are entitled to re-
tain their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations does evidence an exten-
sion of the application of the right of self-determination beyond colonial-
ism. Principle 7 of the Declaration (concerning the use of force) refers to
"peoples under colonial or racist regimes or other forms of alien domina-
tion." This extension of the concept of colonialism to racist regimes is
supported by other General Assembly resolutions implementing the 1960
Declaration on Colonialism and the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions.283 For example, G.A. Resolution 3103 (XXVIII), is entitled Basic
Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Co-
lonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes.284 Principle 1 of this
resolution proclaims that: "The struggle of peoples under colonial and
alien domination and racist regimes for the implementation of their right
to self-determination and independence is legitimate and in full accord-
ance with the principles of international law."'28 1
ment of representative government is very easily satisfied. The focus here is on the whole people of
the state, not various distinct peoples. This reference to representative government is thus not avail-
able to argue that indigenous peoples or other minorities that are not "represented" in their govern-
ment are thereby entitled to exercise a right of self-determination. See, e.g., LAURI HANNIKAINEN,
PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRI-
TERIA, PRESENT STATUS 357 (1988). See also Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 459, 468 & n.19 (1971) (discussing the traveauxpreparatoires). Emerson notes that, during the
deliberation of the Declaration both the U.S.A. and U.K. proposed that "representative govern-
ment" should be required to be "effectively functioning as such to all distinct peoples within its
territory." Id. This was rejected, presumably because of the wide scope it gave for interference by
judgment whether a state's system of government met as-yet-unspecified criteria for representative-
ness. In relation to the views of different scholars on this point, see, e.g., Thornberry, supra note
199, at 876-77. The concept of representative government is discussed in more detail infra, notes
343-375 and accompanying text.
282 HANNUM, supra note 22, at 36. See also RIcO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 106-111. In
relation to respecting boundaries, it is interesting to note that, in the case of Africa, the boundaries
that have been respected (by agreement) are those devised by the colonial states themselves. The
only exceptions to the keeping of such boundaries have been where it is absolutely necessary to
preserve the peace and where it is agreed to by all the relevant different groups. Id. at 217-18.
283 Resolution 1514, supra note 258, and Resolution 2625, supra note 278, respectively.
284 Adopted Dec. 12, 1973.
285 Id.
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The use of these options suggests, for example, that a racist regime
within an independent state, where an immigrant people dominate the
original inhabitants by racism, would be enough to trigger the right of
self-determination for the oppressed people, even where it was not "colo-
nial" in the traditional sense of requiring rule and subjugation by an
overseas European power, and whether the oppressed people was a mi-
nority or a majority. However, a difficulty with this interpretation is that
states, in drafting the Declaration on Friendly Relations, deliberately
chose the phrase "whole people" instead of "all distinct peoples" in de-
lineating the unit entitled to self-determination. 2s6  This suggests that,
even though the whole people may have a right of self-determination
under the Declaration, a part of that whole may not have any separate
right.27 Rigo Sureda, an international legal scholar, supports this latter
view in his comment that the alternative use of "foreign domination" was
a synonym for "colonial domination."2 ' The only stretching of the con-
cept of "alien subjugation" has been "to include those countries where
European settlers maintain a dominant position, in spite of their rela-
tively small numbers, based on racial discrimination. ' 2 9  In practice it
has been reserved as a category for severely exclusionary regimes of ra-
cist minority rule, such as those that implement apartheid.29 ° The justifi-
286 Thornberry, supra note 199, at 876.
287 As international legal scholar Patrick Thornberry puts it: "Whether one discusses 'internal'
or 'external' self-determination, the point is that 'whole' territories or peoples are the focus of rights,
rather than ethnic groups." Id. at 877.
288 RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 106. Rigo Sureda further comments that "alien rule"
"depends not on whether the ruler is alien, but on whether in being alien it is also European," and
thus that "self-determination is restricted to mean independence from 'European' colonial rule." Id.
at 237. Cf Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (1971) (suggesting that self-determination
means independence from any administering authorities).
289 RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 106. Patrick Thornberry supports this view in his com-
ment that "only pariah States like South Africa, which oppress its majority on racial grounds, are
likely to be affected." Thornberry, supra note 199, at 877.
290 See, eg., the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Detente,
specifying the determination of Member States: "To ensure the free exercise of the right of self-
determination and to promote majority rule, especially where racial oppression, in particular
apartheid, has deprived peoples from exercising their inalienable rights." Resolution 32/155 of 19
December 1977. States that have been considered to be 'non-self-governing' territories under this
category include South Africa, Rhodesia, and Bangladesh. For a list of the G.A. Resolutions from
1966-1971 relating to South Africa, condemning apartheid and calling for the respect of the South
African people's right of self-determination, see Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 115 n.71. The rele-
vant Security Council Resolutions are 182 (1963) and 191 (1964). The General Assembly Resolu-
tion finding Southern Rhodesia to be a non-self-governing territory is Resolution 1747 (XVI). For a
concise description of treatment by the United Nations of Southern Rhodesia, see RiGO SUREDA,
supra note 184, at 84-92 & 238-243. The General Assembly Resolutions on Palestinian refugees also
treat them as a colonized people, "driven away from their homeland and subject to the alien domina-
tion of Israel." Id. at 107. See also id. at 340-346. For discussion on Bangladesh, see, eg., SUB-
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cation for this is that racial discrimination and apartheid have been
described as being "[1linked with colonial domination. ' 291 In summary,
Cristescu describes the goal of the international law of self-determination
as part of the "fight against the unequal relations and domination deriv-
ing from colonialism and related forms of domination. ' 2 92
Therefore, while the Declaration appears to deny the protection of a
state's territorial integrity in cases where that state denies the self-deter-
mination of the people within it, the narrow reading of the peoples that
are entitled to exercise self-determination has meant that, in practice, the
Declaration has not provided any right of secession for any particular
group within a state. Instead, in situations of severely exclusionary, ra-
cist minority rule, it is the people of the state as a whole who are entitled
to external self-determination rather than any minority within that state.
Oppressed minorities within a state are merely entitled "not to be op-
pressed by a discriminatory government" 293  (i.e. internal self-
determination). 94
RATA R. CHOWDHURY, THE GENESIS OF BANGLADESH (1972); BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 198-
214.
291 Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 683. Cristescu goes further:
Racial discrimination and apartheid, being doctrines of exclusion based on grounds of ra-
cial difference or ethnic or religious inferiority, all or which are scientifically false, morally
reprehensible and socially unjust, constitute an affront to human conscience and dignity, a
total negation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and a
crime against humanity.
Id. par. 249.
292 Id. para. 690 (emphasis added).
293 CASSESE, supra note 190, at 134.
294 For example, even in the two clear cases of internal racism that were held to violate self-
determination, that of Southern Rhodesia and of South Africa, it was never argued that the op-
pressed people (the majority of the people of the state) had a right to secede from the oppressor state.
Instead, it was envisaged that the appropriate remedies were internal: that the respective (then mi-
nority) governments must be made more representative of the whole people of the state. It is there-
fore not any minority of the state that was seen as the self-determination unit as such, but the
majority and thus the people of the state as a whole. This is consistent with the emphasis on internal
protection for minorities within states rather than external independence.
The only case in which it can be argued that a racist regime did entail recognition of a right for
the oppressed part of the state to secede from its oppressors is that of Bangladesh. However, even
those that do argue that that case justifies insistence of the existence of the right of secession, recog-
nize that it is an extreme case. See, eg., Robin C.A. White, Self-Determination: A Time for a Reas-
sessment?, 28 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 147, 160 & 166 (1981). Further, the more common view is that,
because of the unique factors in this case (including the fact that East and West Pakistan were
physically divided into two halves, 1000 miles apart, and had not been historically joined) it can be
considered more as an example of colonialism and less as one of secession. It is for such reasons that
Bangladesh is considered to be the unique exception that proves the rule that international law has
not recognized a right of secession for a part of a metropolitan state. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra
note 168, at 115-18 & 258-66. Bangladesh is considered to have been a non-self-governing territory
under Resolution 1541 and therefore entitled to independence just as other non-self-governing terri-
tories and colonies were; but there is still no right of secession of a part of a metropolitan state.
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A further international instrument that specifically addresses the
right of self-determination is the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, commonly known as the Helsinki Declara-
tion or Helsinki Accord, of August 1975.295 The Helsinki Declaration
includes a declaration of ten principles guiding relations between partici-
pating states, one of which requires states to respect the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of national minorities within the states.296
Another principle requires states to respect the right of peoples to self-
determination, "acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant
norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integ-
rity of States."'2 97 Because of this explicit reference to the priority of
territorial integrity, it appears that these principles were not intended to
expand the category of peoples entitled to self-determination beyond
those already recognized as consistent with the norms of international
law.298 The solution to discrimination and oppression against minorities
and indigenous peoples within states is instead considered to lie in the
respect of traditional human rights and freedoms rather than in the exer-
cise of self-determination.
The 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights299 ac-
cords rights to peoples, including the right of self-determination, but does
not define the term.3°" It does, however, also stress the duty to "preserve
and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity" of
their country.30 1 Thornberry comments that "[t]here is little to suggest
that 'peoples' are other than the 'whole peoples' of the States, and not
ethnic or other groups. ' 30 2 He notes that "[tlhis conclusion is strongly
supported ' 3 3 by comments of the African leaders themselves and by the
Crawford notes that, if a part of a metropolitan state does in fact secede, it may be recognized as a
separate state if it has "a stable and effective government over a reasonably well defined territory, to
the exclusion of the metropolitan State, in such circumstances that independence is either in fact
undisputed, or manifestly indisputable." This, however, does not establish a right of secession, only
a right of recognition after a de facto secession. Id.
295 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M.
1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Declaration]. Harris comments that the Helsinki Declaration is still not
considered binding in international law. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 601 n.15 (4th ed. 1991).
296 Id. at 1295.
297 Id.
298 Thornberry comments that the travaux preparatoires support this interpretation.
Thornberry, supra note 199, at 886.
299 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982).
300 Id. See e.g., art. 20(1) which reads: "All peoples shall have the right to existence. They
shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination." Id. at 62.
301 Id. art. 29, at 63.
302 Thornberry, supra note 199, at 887.
303 Id.
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domestic constitutions of many African states.3°
The most recent consideration of the right of self-determination for
indigenous peoples, in the development of international instruments, has
been in connection with the revision of ILO Convention 107305 which
lead to the adoption of ILO Convention 169.306 During the revision pro-
cess, indigenous peoples argued that the revised convention should refer
to indigenous peoples as "peoples" rather than "populations" and should
include the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. 307 The in-
clusion of a right of self-determination for indigenous peoples was flatly
rejected by the member states revising the convention because they con-
sidered that indigenous peoples were not entitled to that right under in-
ternational law.308 Moreover, the member states rejected the use of the
term "peoples" because it might imply that indigenous peoples were enti-
tled to the right of "all peoples.. .to self-determination" under the Inter-
national Covenants.30 9 The states clearly considered that indigenous
peoples were not legal peoples in international law and did not have the
international legal right of self-determination.
Despite this resistance, however, the indigenous peoples were persis-
tent in their demands that they were peoples and that the word "peoples"
be used in the revised convention.31 0 The states eventually agreed to use
the term "peoples" but under one important condition: that its meaning
in the convention be clarified to exclude any implication of recognizing
the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples. 311 The result is
that ILO Convention 169 refers throughout to indigenous "peoples."
Moreover, it recognizes their aspirations "to exercise control over their
own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain
and develop their identities, languages and religions.1 312 The Conven-
tion also recognizes that "in many parts of the world these peoples are
unable to enjoy their fundamental human rights to the same degree as the
rest of the population of the States within which they live." '313 However,
in order to destroy any implication concerning entitlement to self-deter-
mination, it also provides that "[t]he use of the term 'peoples' in this
Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards
304 Id.
305 Supra note 8.
306 Id
307 See, eg., Anaya, supra note 54, at 218. "Indigenous groups insist on being identified as
'peoples' rather than 'populations' so as not to be reduced to simple aggregations of individuals." Id.
308 Id.
309 Supra note 61, Art. 1. See also, Barsh, supra note 8, at 231; Venne, supra note 8, at 55.
310 See e-g., Anaya, supra note 54, at 218 n.120.
311 Id. See also, Barsh, supra note 8, at 233.
312 I.L.O. Convention No. 169, supra note 8, preambular paragraph 5.
313 Id. preambular paragraph 6.
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the rights which may attach to the term under international law." '314 Be-
cause of the history of the dispute concerning the use of the term "peo-
ples", this is taken as a statement by states that indigenous peoples are
not recognized as having the international legal right of self-determina-
tion.315 The Convention instead considers that the appropriate locus for
achievement of indigenous peoples' aspirations and appropriate remedies
for the abuses of indigenous peoples' human rights are all internal to the
states in which they live.316
The conclusion from the international instruments and the state
practice under them is that the category of peoples entitled to self-deter-
mination under international law (i.e. including a right of secession) is
limited to those subjugated under colonialism and (related) forms of for-
eign or racial domination, where the application of the right will not vio-
late the principle of territorial integrity of present states. This does not
include indigenous peoples within states.317
314 Id. Art. 1(3).
315 See, e.g., Venne, supra note 8, at 56. Despite this negative conclusion, one commentator
has focused on the positive side and noted optimistically that, by not explicitly stating that indige-
nous peoples do not have the right of self-determination, the provision "[leaves] the door open for
the future evolution of international standards." Barsh, supra note 8, at 233.
316 See, e.g., supra note 8, preambular paragraph 5. The aspirations of indigenous peoples are
to control the aspects mentioned solely "within the framework of the States in which they live." The
whole Convention is premised on the inapplicability of the full right of self-determination to indige-
nous peoples. Id.
317 This conclusion is also reached by most scholars who have considered this issue specifically
in respect of indigenous peoples. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1, at 665; HANNUM, supra note 22,
at 48-49; Falk, infra note 458, at 26; Gundmundur Alfredsson, International Law, International
Organizations, and Indigenous Peoples, 36 J. INT'L AFF. 113, 116 (1982); Eyassu Gayim, The United
Nations Law on Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples, 51 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT'L
RET. 53 (1982); Crawford, Self Determination Outside the Colonial Context, in SELF-ExPREssION
AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 1 (A. Macartney ed., 1987); John T.
Paxman, Note, Minority Indigenous Populations and Their Claims for Self-Determination, 21 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 185 (1989). It is also reached by those scholars that have not considered indige-
nous peoples separate from minorities within states and who thus imply that indigenous peoples are
not entitled to self-determination because minorities within sovereign states are not entitled to seces-
sion. See, e.g., Cristescu, supra note 221, paras. 173-74, 209, 279; HANNAKAINEN, supra note 281,
at 373; HARRIS, supra note 295, at 124-25; ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); Anna Michal-
ska, Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination in International Law, in IssuEs OF SELF
DETERMINATION 71, 81 (William Twining ed., 1991); Alexandre Kiss, The Peoples' Right to Self-
Determination, 7 HUM. RTS. J. 165, 173 (1986); Morphet, supra note 243, at 86; Thornberry, supra
note 199, at 874-82.
Note that the opinion that indigenous peoples are not recognized as having a right of secession
and nor, therefore, the international right of self-determination, does not mean that the principle or
right of self-determination is not at all applicable to indigenous peoples. Many of the same commen-
tators have argued that the principle and even the right of self-determination is universally applica-
ble, including to indigenous peoples. Even while there is no right of secession and while its
application differs for different peoples, a (albeit, narrower) right of self-determination nonetheless
exists to protect other specific rights in various situations, including indigenous peoples' human
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The conclusion that indigenous peoples within states are not entitled
to the international right of self-determination is reinforced by the nega-
tive decision of the only international body to explicitly consider whether
an indigenous people had the right to self-determination. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, in respect of the Miskito Indians, decided that:
The present status of international law does recognize observance
of the principle of self-determination of peoples, which it considers to
be the right of a people to independently choose their form of political
organization and to freely establish the means it deems appropriate to
bring about their economic, social, and cultural development. This
does not mean, however, that it recognizes the right to self-determina-
tion of any ethnic group as such.318
The Commission accordingly denied that the Miskito Indians were
entitled to exercise separate self-determination. The primary reason of
the Inter-American Commission for denying a right of self-determination
for other such "peoples" appears to be that it would violate the territorial
integrity of a sovereign state, such territorial integrity clearly taking
priority.319
This conclusion is further reinforced by the rejection of recent argu-
ments in the international sphere that particular minorities within states
or other "generally accepted" and geographically distinct "political
units' 320 are entitled to any self-determination claimed. For example,
while the Kuwaitis invaded by the Iraqis were considered to be entitled
to their right of self-determination, and to assistance from other states to
achieve that end, the minority Kurds, arguably at least as oppressed by
Iraq as the Kuwaitis, 321 were - and still are - considered to be not so
rights. See, eg., Gayim, supra; Kiss, supra; Thornberry, supra note 199, at 874-82. Cf. infra notes
469-474 and accompanying text.
318 Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of
Miskito Origin, OAS Doc., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, Doc. 26, at 78-79 (1984). Although the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (I.A.C.H.R.) is not a legal body, its members are typically
legal experts and its decisions - particularly in this instance - are typically based on international
law.
319 The I.A.C.H.R. instead noted that ethnic groups such as the Miskito are accorded "special
legal protection" for their language, religion, and all other "aspects related to the preservation of
their cultural identity." Id. at 81. An interesting feature of the decision is that the I.A.C.H.R. then
commented that the preservation of these aspects "entails the need to establish an adequate institu-
tional order as part of the structure of the Nicaraguan state." Id. at 82. This indicates that the
Committee recognized that, even if self-determination were not a right accorded them under interna-
tional law, some special protection - presumably some degree of autonomy - was required in practice
if the rights of the Miskito Indians were to be preserved.
320 Rosalyn Higgins has generalized that the right to self-determination is merely "the right of
the majority within a generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power." HIGGINS, supra
note 317, at 104.
321 On the human rights violations by Iraq of the Kurds of Iraq, see, e.g., MIDDLE EAST
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entitled.322 The international focus has instead been on the protection of
their human rights within the states in which they live, with particular
emphasis on Iraq.323
Other recent developments in the international law of self-determi-
nation include the break-up of the U.S.S.R. and of Yugoslavia into their
component parts and the constitutional negotiations presently being un-
dertaken in Canada in response to Quebec's claimed right of secession.
However, it is not the purpose of this section to evaluate developments
since the last meeting of the Working Group in July 1991.324 Further, it
appears that various positions can be taken on their possible implica-
tions,325 the proper discussion of which warrants much more attention
WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ 69-96 (1990); Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. Doc. A/46/647 (1991).
322 See, eg., BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 153-62.
323 See, e.g., the various U.N. resolutions on the protection of the Kurds in Iraq.
324 The purpose of this historical description of the right of self-determination is to identify the
barriers to recognizing a right to self-determination. This is intended to illuminate the discussion
described in Part I that has been undertaken in the context of the Working Group on Indigenous
Peoples. This discussion took place before these recent developments.
325 For example, there are two possible ways that the developments in Eastern Europe may be
viewed. The first way is that suggested in Part I, supra note 119, that the current Eastern European
and Soviet struggles and achievements could encourage a wider acceptance of the need to recognize
claims to self-determination both in principle (e.g., on the basis that self-government is a fundamen-
tal moral right of all peoples) and on practical grounds (that denial will lead to civil strife). It could
also lead to a change in the present international law of self-determination in that requirements
relating to who is entitled to exercise the right could be loosened. This is because, in these cases,
constituent elements of member states were recognized as entitled to independent statehood via se-
cession. This could lead to extension of the right to minorities or indigenous peoples within states or
other political units. For an argument supporting a right of secession, based not on ethical but
political reasons, and which focuses on the case of the Baltic States, see Igor Grazin, The Interna-
tional Recognition of National Rights: The Baltic States' Case, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1385
(1991).
The alternative view is that it will merely reinforce the traditional view that minorities and
indigenous peoples within states are not entitled to secede and therefore not entitled to self-determi-
nation because it necessarily entails secession. This view is supported by the argument that the
Baltic and Yugoslav cases merely reinforce the concern with alien domination. This argument can
be made on three bases. First, even though the right of secession has been generally rejected in
international law, the original conception of the scope of Article 1 of the Covenants was that politi-
cally separate, constitutionally recognized nationalities are entitled to self-determination, including
the right of secession under international law. See supra notes 247-249 and accompanying text.
While it is also arguable that this conception has not been followed with state practice since then,
this lack of state practice could be justified on the basis that the right occasion had not yet arisen.
The principle could then be invoked as a mere continuation of old law, not the creation of any new
right. It is significant that the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia were both considered at that time to be the
paradigm examples of states of which the constituent constitutional elements were entitled to sepa-
rate self-determination, even as minorities within such units were not so entitled. See supra note
249. Second, at least in the case of the Baltic states, they fit the criteria of existing geographical
separation from the 'parent' state and the criteria concerning colonization (they had originally been
forcibly colonized and could still be considered colonized and oppressed). In the case of Yugoslavia,
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than I could give within this paper. I will thus refrain from considering
these developments here.
In conclusion, with respect to the definition of the "self" that is
entitled to self-determination, it appears that people subjugated under a
(generally, geographically separate) colonial, alien, or even racist rule are
entitled to self-determination. However, where a people that comprises a
minority within a state is not under such clear foreign domination, the
traditional view is that the (by definition, non-colonial) state is assumed
to be the relevant "self" and thus must be entitled to its national unity,
territorial integrity, and sovereignty.326 Further, what appears to be the
primary factor in deciding whether a people is under the appropriate de-
gree of foreign domination is whether the application of the right of self-
determination would entail the violation of territorial integrity. Despite
arguments that the right of self-determination and independence, and
thus the right to secession, should apply to indigenous peoples (and/or
minorities) within existing states, it appears that no such right exists in
positive international law. Further, it is clear that the barrier to the rec-
ognition of such a right is the priority given to the principles of territorial
integrity, national unity and sovereignty of present states.
the creation of that state can be viewed merely as due to strategic convenience rather than the joining
of peoples desiring to be unified. Third, in the case of the U.S.S.R., it is important that the 'parent'
state acquiesced in the secession of the various constituent states. See, e.g., HANNIKAINEN, supra
note 281, at 375 (stating, "The prohibition of secession from existing states is not peremptory. A
State may lawfully consent to the secession of a part of its territory."). Therefore, while these
examples might be thought of as expanding the right to self-determination, it is clearly formally
arguable that they do not take it as far as extending it to minorities or other peoples within generally
accepted political units.
Without further study on the validity of either of these approaches, I cannot suggest which one
is more consistent with precedent, nor which one will be taken. I do suggest, however, that if the
latter view is taken, it be closely examined for consistency in its application. It is arguable that
application to these cases but not to the case of indigenous peoples is a distinction based as much on
racism as it is on considerations of sovereignty and fears of disintegration of member states. Such a
racist application does not mean that it will not become positive law, but it does mean that every
attempt should be made to expose the true rationale and to avoid such a result.
The argument relating to consistent application of the law is even more relevant in the case of
Canada and the proposed secession of Quebec. If Quebec is allowed to secede from Canada without
objection from the international community then an argument can be made that consistent applica-
tion demands that at least the indigenous peoples within Canada similarly be entitled to secede. This
argument is stronger than in the Eastern European examples, particularly because of the lack of
history of oppression of Quebec by Canada (it thereby does not fit the existing criteria for colonial or
racist domination) or of imposed union with the other Canadian states, and because of the satisfac-
tion of these criteria by the indigenous peoples.
326 Various scholars use this notion of competing selves. For example, this notion forms the
basis of Pomerance's analysis in her Chapter III. POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 14-23. See also
Gayim, supra note 317.
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2. The Exercise of the Right of Self-Determination
In describing the history of the right of self-determination this paper
has focused primarily on who is regarded as the "self" entitled of "deter-
mination." Another important aspect of the right to self-determination
is the exercise of the right - both the substantive and procedural aspects
of such exercise. This section describes these aspects and the problems
created by their lack of precision. This description shows that, while the
actual result of self-determination is flexible, this imprecision may pro-
vide an additional barrier to according the present right of self-determi-
nation to indigenous peoples.
a. Substance: 327 Internal and External
The substantive aspect of the exercise of self-determination is impor-
tant because it determines both what a legitimate aim of self-determina-
tion is and when a claim of self-determination can be refuted by the
encompassing state, both of which are closely interconnected.
As with sovereignty, there are internal and external elements of the
substantive result of self-determination. The external element is thought
of as the determination of the people's future status vis-a-vis other peo-
ples and states. In relation to non-self-governing territories, this is
thought of as the act of liberation from "alien" rule. The internal ele-
ment is the selection of the form of government within the relevant
territory.3 28
i. External status
In relation to the exercise of self-determination by states, the exter-
nal component is simply the maintenance of the status quo - territorial
integrity and full independence as a state.329
In relation to the exercise of self-determination by non-self-governing
territories, the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples clearly states that the "legitimate" goal of
327 Note that the categories of "substance" and "procedure" are not as neatly divided as I have
made it appear. For example, in this section I also describe the procedure for choosing the
substantive status. In addition, the next section on "procedure" includes reference to the substantive
result of self-determination in determining the legitimacy of the use of force. However, these
categories have been labelled in this way for ease of handling.
328 Pomerance suggests a third element: the substantive nature of the regime selected (for ex-
ample, whether it is democratic or socialist). POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 37. While she con-
siders that all three are distinguishable, she recognizes that, "[i]n practice, they are closely
interconnected." Id. Because of their interconnection, I shall include discussion of this third ele-
ment with the discussion of the other two.
329 Although, of course, a state is free to choose not to keep its territorial integrity. See, eg.,
comment of HANNAKAINEN, supra note 281. The important aspect is that the territorial integrity of
the state not be violated against its wishes.
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self-determination is complete independence. 33 0 Despite this stated goal,
the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions concerning self-determination
clearly envisage that the exercise of self-determination is not limited to
complete independence. Instead, it is recognized that there are a range of
possible courses of action and outcomes, ranging from integration with a
state to independence, and including federalism and various forms of
autonomy.
Principle VI of Resolution 1541331 provides that a non-self-gov-
erning territory can achieve "a full measure of self-government" through
its own sovereign independence, free association with an independent
state, or integration with an independent state. Independence is clearly
the preferred outcome of self-determination, apparently because of a fear
that any other result may not be the free choice of the peoples concerned
or that it could easily be imposed by the independent, administering
state. To guard against this, Principles VII-IX provide detailed require-
ments to ensure that the form of self-government is chosen with complete
freedom. 332
330 See supra note 258, for the text of these paragraphs. Cristescu notes that "[t]he principal
meaning of self-determination is the establishment of a sovereign and independent state-the right to
independence of peoples which aspire to it but do not possess it." Cristescu, supra note 221, para.
307.
331 See supra note 264. It appears that the set of principles in Resolution 1541 supersedes
those in Resolution 742. See, e.g., POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 25 (stating that Resolution 1541
is the "more definitive resolution on the subject").
332 Principle VII:
(a) Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of
the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes. It should
be one which respects the individuality and the cultural characteristics of the territory and
its peoples, and retains for the peoples of the territory which is associated with an in-
dependent State the freedom to modify the status of that territory through the expression
of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes.
(b) The associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution
without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely
expressed wishes of the people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or
necessary under the terms of the free association agreed upon.
Principle VIIl"
Integration with an independent State should be on the basis of complete equality between
the peoples of the erstwhile Non-Self-Governing Territory and those of the independent
country with which it is integrated. The peoples of both territories should have equal
status and rights of citizenship and equal guarantees of fundamental freedoms without
distinction or discrimination; both should have equal rights and opportunities for represen-
tation and effective participation at all levels in the executive, legislative and judicial organs
of government.
Principle IX
Integration should have come about in the following circumstances: (a) The integrating
territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political in-
stitutions, so that its peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through
informed and democratic processes;
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As described above, the general statements in the International Cov-
enants on Human Rights merely provide: "All peoples have the right to
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural de-
velopment." '333 This definition is compatible with a wide conception of
self-determination; for example, simply the right to determine one's own
form of government, the right to independence of colonial territories.
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations334 explicitly goes fur-
ther in allowing for forms of government other than those referred to in
Resolution 1541: "The establishment of a sovereign and independent
State, the free association or integration with an independent state or the
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people
constitute modes of implementing the right to self-determination by that
people., 33 5
This wide range of possible outcomes is reinforced in Part I of the
Helsinki Declaration.336 Principle VIII provides that the principle of
self-determination entails that "all peoples always have the right, in full
freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external
political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish
their political, economic, and social and cultural development. '" 337
In addition to these United Nations resolutions and the Helsinki
Declaration, the international bodies that have considered individual
claims of self-determination have also defined it as being more flexible
than solely the achievement of full independence. For example, the In-
ternational Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the Western Sahara case defined
self-determination as "the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will
of peoples. ' 338 In addition, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, in considering the case of the Miskito Indians, 339 defined "the
principle of self-determination of peoples" as "the right of a people to
independently choose their form of political organization and to freely
establish the means it deems appropriate to bring about their economic,
(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the Territory's
peoples acting with the full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having
been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and
based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deems necessary,
supervise these processes.
333 Supra note 61.
334 Supra note 278. See supra notes 279-280 and accompanying text for the text of this
Declaration.
335 Id. (emphasis added).
336 Supra note 295.
337 Id.
338 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
339 Supra note 318.
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social, and cultural development."" 4
These various statements suggest, first, that self-determination is a
process of choice rather than just a result. Second, the range of forms of
self-government that are acceptable under the international right of self-
determination for non-self-governing territories is extremely wide. This
implies that the right of self-determination, and thus to various forms of
international personality, can be exercised by entities other than those
that aspire to become fully independent states. The corollary of this is
that smaller entities that do not yet aspire to complete independence can
exercise the right of self-determination because they would not be violat-
ing the principles of territorial integrity or sovereignty. If this is the case,
it may be that various indigenous peoples could exercise that right in
order to satisfy some of their demands.
The problem with this conclusion is that, despite arguments that
self-determination is a process rather than a result,341 self-determination
appears to be viewed by states solely in result-oriented terms. The diffi-
culty is that the range of possible outcomes encompassed by self-determi-
nation includes complete independence. As the primary element of the
exercise of self-determination is the exercise of free choice, and there are
no guidelines for the restriction of that free choice, it would not be possi-
ble under the present law of self-determination to guarantee that an in-
digenous people, if they were to exercise the present right of self-
determination, would not choose a result that violated the territorial in-
tegrity of a state. Further, even where an option other than indepen-
dence may be chosen by a people, independence is still seen as an option
that may be chosen in the future. Therefore, despite the flexibility of the
result of self-determination, it is still perceived as a "nation-wrecker" and
as having the ability to violate a state's territorial integrity. Instead of
the nature of the right being modified, its absolute character is main-
tained but the category of peoples that may exercise it is restricted.342 It
is thus vehemently rejected by states as being applicable to indigenous
peoples within states.
ii. Internal Status
The internal aspect of the legitimate aim of self-determination is the
form of government chosen. Its legitimacy is intimately connected with
the process of exercising that choice. The provisions cited on the meth-
340 Id. at 78-79.
341 See eg., Chen, supra note 206, at 237.
342 Pomerance concludes that "self-determination has become, not a continuum of rights, nor a
universal principle applicable to 'all peoples', but an 'all or nothing' proposition: maximal rights,
including independence, to the meritorious 'selves'; no rights at all to those whose claims to self-
determination are rejected as unworthy." POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 74.
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ods of choosing the form of independence make it clear that the methods
must entail (representative) self-government. Where there is no self-gov-
ernment, the presumption is that there has been no valid exercise of self-
determination.
The history of the development of the principle and right of self-
determination shows that the principle traditionally encompassed the (in-
ternal) concept that the legitimacy of government derives from the con-
sent of the governed. This was the impetus for the American and French
revolutions.343 It was expressly continued by President Woodrow Wil-
son,344 and is expressed in varying degrees in the various international
instruments described above. For example, the idea that the legitimacy
of government derives from the consent of the governed is specified in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.345 During the drafting of the
references in the Covenants to the right of self-determination there was in
fact much debate over the scope of its application. 346 This debate, how-
ever, did not focus on the internal aspect;347 all states agreed that self-
determination entailed the right of the people within states to choose
their own democratic institutions.348 Further, while there was considera-
ble debate over what (democratic) electoral rights should be included in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this does not
appear to have been explicitly linked to a satisfaction of self-determina-
tion. Thus, while these provisions constitute political rights standards
343 See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
344 See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
345 See, e.g., note 241 and accompanying text. Article 21 of the Declaration reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
346 See, e.g., supra notes 244-254 and accompanying text.
347 Recall that the disagreement was over whether the right also entailed the ability of minori-
ties within states to choose their own autonomous forms of government or to secede from that state.
Id. See also supra notes 224-236 and accompanying text.
348 The democratic ideal embodied in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 241, is implemented in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Article 25 reads:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors;
(c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. In-
ternational Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 241, art. 25.
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that all states should not deny to their citizens, there is no general agree-
ment that any violation of these individual human rights necessarily en-
tails that a people as a whole has been denied self-determination.349
The most explicit link between self-determination and (internal) re-
quirements of the form of a people's government is in the 1970 Declara-
tion on Friendly Relations. 30 This Declaration provides that the
principle of self-determination of non-self-governing territories shall not
authorize or encourage,
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples ... and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
35 1
This passage continues the idea that legitimate government is de-
rived from the consent of the governed. It goes further than previous
international instruments by defining the self-determination of states as a
continuing right which is realized through representative government.
While it does not define what constitutes "government representing the
people," it at least makes clear that it must not discriminate in its repre-
sentation among the different races, creeds, and colors within the state,
and that it must uphold the principle of equal rights for all.
It is arguable that, particularly once this link was clearly made be-
tween representative government and self-determination, the existing re-
quirements concerning civil and political rights should be included as
requirements for self-determination. For example, Article 25 of the Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights35 2 and Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights353 arguably provide requirements that any
representative government must satisfy. Any violation of these require-
ments could be argued to be a violation of a people's right to internal self-
determination. However, fundamental disagreement among states over
the concept of a democracy and of representative government, and a re-
luctance to interfere with the internal affairs of states, has meant that a
violation of these provisions will not cause the government in question to
be rejected by other states as not representative of the people of its state.
As one scholar comments, the content of the internal aspect of self-deter-
mination is "not stated with precision in internatioanl norms because a
349 See infra notes 370-376 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the emerging right to
democratic governance, see infra notes 363-369 and accompanying text, and infra Part III A(4)
entitled "Internal Self-Government."
350 Supra note 278.
351 Id. (emphasis added).
352 Supra note 61.
3 Supra note 241.
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settlement of this aspect is not feasible and the matter is therefore left to
the domestic law and practice of particular states. 354
In the opinion of some states, there is a very narrow range of legiti-
mate forms of government that can be chosen. For example, President
Wilson could accept that only a Western-style democracy was truly rep-
resentative government. 3 " Pomerance comments that the Western na-
tions thought of democracy as being "a continuing right of self-
determination. '356 President Johnson thought similarly, and held that
the adoption of a communist form of government could not be a valid
exercise of self-determination.357 On the other hand, the Soviet view
was that true self-determination "was only possible in a classless soci-
ety."' 35 8 The exercise of self-determination thus could not result in any-
thing other than a communist form of government, because anything else
must involve the subjection of the masses to the choices of the ruling
minority. 35 9 These Soviet views directly link the internal and external
aspects of legitimacy of self-determination in that, externally, "legitimacy
rests with those seeking freedom from imperialism," whereas, internally,
legitimacy rests with "those striving to vest State sovereignty in the 'peo-
ple' rather than in the exploitative ruling classes."3"° The view of Afri-
can governments is said to be that a representative government need not
be a democratic one.361
Recently it has been argued that a definition and standard of "repre-
sentative government" is emerging in international law.362 This standard
is that of a western-style, liberal democracy,363 the trademarks being
freedom of speech 364 and free and fair elections, 365 with additional im-
plied commitments to liberal individualism and respect for the rule of
law.366 Because even the proponents of this emerging norm do not argue
354 Michalska, supra note 317, at 88.
355 See, e.g., POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 38.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 39.
358 Id. at 40.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Issa G. Shivji, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: An African Perspective, in Is-
SUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 317, 33, at 40.
362 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46 (1992). See also Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 359 (1992).
363 See, e.g., Franck, supra note 362, at 49 (making reference to a "western-style parliamen-
tary, multiparty democratic process"). References to "liberal democracy" are scattered throughout
Franck's article. See, e.g., id. at 88.
364 Id. at 61-63.
365 Id. at 63-77, 80-85.
366 A suggested further element of respect for fundamental human rights is more controversial
and is not as easily implied. Id. at 79-80.
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that it is yet international law,3 67 discussion of the subject will be post-
poned until Part III.36
Therefore, while the requirement of representative government may
appear effective, especially when supplemented by the provisions on elec-
toral rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,36 9 in practice, because of the difference in views, the representa-
tiveness of different governments has not been assessed critically. In-
stead, states' claims to representativeness are often taken at face value in
order to uphold the principle of non-intervention with domestic af-
fairs.370 Dictatorships are still recognized as legitimate governments for
the purposes of representing the people of their state in the international
sphere. Even where particular forms of government are criticized, this is
not considered enough of a reason to justify intervention by other states
in order to uphold the whole people's right to self-determination. 37' The
only real restriction in international law on the internal government of a
state is that the regime established must not be "based on racial discrimi-
nation or feudalism."3 72 This requirement, however, is interpreted very
narrowly to refer solely to situations such as South Africa and Rhodesia,
where a (typically European) minority clearly subjugates a (typically
non-European) majority.3 73  The overall result is that it has been ex-
367 See id. at 46, 50. But see Fox, supra note 362, at 543 (arguing that "the essential elements
of a 'free and fair' election can now be described as a matter of law," and that there is a right to
political participation in international law).
368 I do suggest, however, that the emerging standard does not meet the concerns of indigenous
peoples. See discussion infra Part III(A)(4) entitled "Internal Self-Government."
369 See supra notes 345 & 348.
370 I use "claim" here because states must claim that they are representative in order to achieve
at least formal international legitimacy. These different interpretations have meant that states can
claim to have implemented the provisions even where their laws appear to go against either their
language or intent. Another effect of the vagueness of the provisions is that states have accorded
formal rights in law in order to satisfy the international requirements but not accorded them in
substance. See infra notes 561-65 (Cobo Report findings on this point with respect to indigenous
peoples' electoral participation).
371 For example, the government of Myanmar has been criticized by the United Nations
Human Rights Commission. Paul Lewis, U.N. Group Condemns Burmese on Rights Record, N.Y.
TIMEs, March 7, 1991, at A14. While Franck comments that this condemnation shows that "un-
democratic electoral processes... are now almost universally regarded as... not beyond the pur-
view of the international community," Franck, supra note 362, at 83, there has not been any further
action taken to achieve a democratic electoral process.
372 RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 262.
373 HANNIKAINEN, supra note 281. Hannikainen summarizes the position as:
the international community of States has not really required the realization of internal
self-determination within existing States. There are many States in which the government
is not representative of the people, but rules by dictatorial means. It has been sufficient for
the international community of States to see to it that a people has been able to realize its
external self-determination by establishing an independent State. Only the apartheid sys-
tem of South Africa... has been the object of a resolute condemnation by the international
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tremely difficult to hold that the people of a state have been denied their
self-determination through being denied representative self-govern-
ment.374 Further, even where it has been thought that a people has been
denied representative government, the focus of the achievement of the
people's self-determination has been internal, because it is the people as a
whole that is considered to be the unit of "self" and not any particular
part of the whole people.3 75
While the form of government that may be chosen is imprecise and
clearly depends on political opinion, this in itself does not deny the prin-
ciple of self-determination by indigenous peoples. However, the legiti-
macy of a claim of self-determination is directly linked to the ability of a
state to refute claims to self-determination by a people within its borders.
If the legitimate external aim of self-determination is independence, and
a state has achieved independence, then any other minorities within its
borders 376 are not considered to be legitimately able to exercise any
rights of self-determination.377 Similarly, as the legitimate internal result
of self-determination is representative government, if a state has one form
of government that it considers representative, then it can deny that mi-
nority populations have any right of self-determination.
The lack of agreement on what constitutes representative govern-
ment is hindering the attainment of self-determination for indigenous
peoples in two ways. First, even where the interests of indigenous peo-
ples are not actually represented in the political structure, the relevant
state can object to claims of self-determination by saying that they pro-
vide protection for human rights and that they have a representative gov-
ernment that does not discriminate on the basis of race, creed, or color.
The state may thus easily claim that it has achieved self-determination
for all peoples within the state. The principle of non-interference with
internal affairs of states prevents serious challenges to such choices of
forms of government by other states. The political status of indigenous
peoples (and any other minority) is thus a matter to be resolved inter-
community of States for violation, in an existing State, of the right of internal self-
determination.
Id. at 357-58 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
374 The same conclusion can be drawn for the internal aspect of the right to self-determination
of non-self-governing territories (as opposed to states). That is, the content is not specified; instead,
it is left up to the relevant people to choose. And the legitimacy of the form of representative
government chosen does not depend on an assessment by other states as to its desirability other than
by reference to the principle of non-discrimination and to the process used for arriving at that result.
375 See supra notes 285-294 and accompanying text.
376 This assumes that the state is not acting as an external colonizing power, subjugating alien
peoples, as such peoples are by definition not within the state's borders.
377 Pomerance refers to this as the "inherent non-universalizability of the principle of self-
determination." POMERANCE, supra 192, at 41.
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nally, presumably by recourse to constitutional law.378 Second, because
this concept of representative government is more controversial than that
of the external aspect, and because of the principle of non-interference,
the rhetoric in the international sphere typically falls back on the exter-
nal aspect of the attainment of some form of independence. As we have
seen, this legitimacy depends directly on the perception of who is entitled
to form a state and thus on the principle of territorial integrity of states.
Therefore, instead of providing an opportunity for indigenous peoples to
criticize the non-representativeness of the government of their state, the
internal requirement of the substantive aspect of self-determination pro-
vides a further barrier to their claims.
b. Procedure
As the discussion on the external element of the substance of self-
determination revealed, the process for choosing the external status of an
entity in the exercise of self-determination is intimately connected with
the legitimacy of the aim itself. Therefore, the requirements of such
processes must be part of any assessment of the validity of such an
exercise.
i. Determining the Will of the People
While self-determination may only be effected by the people in the
territory concerned,379 the method of ascertaining the will of the people
has been subject to substantial debate, particularly in the United Nations.
As with the debate over the definition of "representative government,"
various states have argued that the method of achieving self-determina-
tion within their borders, or within those of their non-self-governing ter-
ritories, is a domestic matter and should not be subject to outside
interference. 380 As a result, the General Assembly has appeared to agree
that, in line with the deliberate vagueness of "representative govern-
ment," procedures for achieving it within states should not be devised.
Such arguments, however, were rejected by the majority of the General
Assembly with respect to non-self-governing territories.381 General As-
semby Resolution 637A(VII) provides that "the wishes of the people [be]
ascertained through plebiscites or other recognized democratic
means." 382 Resolution 1541383 is more specific as to the procedural re-
378 Although this is subject to growing reservations made in cases of the abuse of universal
human rights. See infra Part III(C) entitled "Non-intervention in States' Domestic Affairs."
379 According to Article 1(1) of the International Covenant, self-determination involves a peo-
ple freely determining its own political status. Supra note 272 and accompanying text.
380 See, e-g., Chen, supra note 206, at 229.
381 Id.
382 U.N. G.A. Res. 637A(VII), Dec. 16, 1952, passed 40-14-40-14-6.
383 Supra note 263.
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quirements in respect of achieving self-determination for non-self-gov-
erning territories. Principles VII-IX of Resolution 1541 provide that free
association must be achieved through a "free and voluntary choice" and
"through informed and democratic processes. '384 In addition, it must
also be able to be modified unilaterally by the peoples of the territory
concerned. Integration with another state may only be chosen where the
territory has "an advanced stage of self-government with free political
institutions," and if the choice is made with "full knowledge" and
through democratic processes "impartially conducted and based on uni-
versal adult suffrage." '385 While these still appear to be vague, practice
has since shown that the most accepted method of determining the will
of the people has become the referendum, or plebiscite.386 Thus, even
though the United Nations generally relies on the statements of state rep-
resentatives that the people within their state have achieved self-determi-
nation through "representative government", the U.N. does not rely on
the judgements of the state administering a non-self-governing territory
as to what the preferences of the people in that territory are.387
Despite the apparent simplicity of such a procedure, there are diffi-
culties with determining the will of the people. Determining who is enti-
tled to have a say in any plebiscite raises problems where there are
different peoples within the same territory, such as where nationals from
a colonizing state have populated the territory in question. The options
and issues to be voted on are typically controversial, and education about
such options may be incomplete. These difficulties are compounded in
the case of indigenous peoples. The less an indigenous people is territori-
ally defined within the state in which it lives, the harder it is to get agree-
ment on who the relevant people are who should vote on the options for
self-determination. The view of states is that the choice of people is inti-
mately connected with the options being voted on. For example, if it is
suggested that an area become autonomous, either fully or in part, the
people living in that area might be considered entitled to exercise the
right of choice, even where it clashes with the self-determination of the
indigenous peoples themselves. Similarly, the options available, and thus
the appropriate education about the options, would be controversial.
Thus, the present lack of any more specificity in international law about
the consequences of the exercise of the right of self-determination hinders
the recognition of a right of self-determination for indigenous peoples -
384 Id.
385 Id. While there is no mention of this, it appears that, once chosen, integration cannot be
rejected unilaterally.
386 For a detailed description of how and where plebiscites have been used see WAMBAUGH,
supra note 184; Chen, supra note 206, at 229-235. For suggestions for the better future use of
plebiscites, see LAURACE FARLEY, PLEBISCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY (1986).
387 Chen, supra note 206, at 229.
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states assume the worst (apparently, for them, the loss of territory
though secession) and fear the unknown.
ii. The Use of Force
Where accepted methods of choice and exercise of the will of the
people (such as the plebiscite) are not used in good faith by the adminis-
tering power, the issue of resort to other strategies to achieve self-deter-
mination arises. The use of force may be the only such option open to
oppressed peoples. Further, it appears that the right to use force to
achieve self-determination is not limited to use by the oppressed people
themselves; other states may also have a right of intervention by force in
order to assist them.
Before the principle of self-determination achieved the status of a
right, it was seen purely as a right of revolution and thus of self-help,
without other states having the right to assist. 8 Since the principle has
become a right, various scholars suggest that this right to self-determina-
tion has evolved a new "just war" doctrine; that is, the use of force to
achieve a legitimate end is itself legitimized.389
The first linkage of the right to self-determination and the prohibi-
tion on the use of force was in 1966, which held that any "forcible action
... which deprives peoples under foreign domination of their right to
self-determination [external and internal] ... constitutes a violation of
the Charter."390 While there is no mention of the legitimacy of using
force to repel such forcible action, the inference is that force may be used
in self-defence of such action. This suggestion, that the use of force can
be legitimized by its use to achieve a legitimate end, was made more
clearly in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations. 91
In 1973, the legitimacy of using force to achieve self-determination
of a people subject to colonial or alien domination was made explicit; it
388 The most detailed discussion of the various provisions of the international laws of armed
force in the context of struggles for self-determination is provided by HEATHER A. WILSON, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS (1988).
Pomerance also provides a discussion of the use of force. POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 48-62.
Rigo Sureda provides a more detailed discussion than Pomerance, including various illustrations of
state practice. RiGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 324-351.
389 See, eg., WILSON, supra note 388. See also POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 48-62; RIGO
SUREDA, supra note 184, at 324-351.
390 U.N. G.A. Res. 2160 (XXI), Nov. 30, 1966, 98-2-8.
391 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 278. The Declaration provides that:
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples.., of
their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against,
and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-deter-
mination, such peoples are entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter.
Id. para. 5, The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples (emphasis added).
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was expressly approved in G.A. Resolution 3103 (XXVIII), entitled Ba-
sic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against
Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes.3 92 Further, the
Definition of Aggression, adopted by the General Assembly in 1974,193
expressly approves the right of "peoples under colonial and racist re-
gimes or other forms of alien domination.. .to struggle to [achieve "self-
determination, freedom and independence"] and to seek and receive sup-
port, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity
with the [Declaration on Friendly Relations]., 394 This right of struggle
and support is affirmed in Article 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.395 It thus appears from these international
instruments that such armed struggles and their "support" are
legitimate.396
At least the Third World states have interpreted these provisions,
particularly the statements on "support, ' 397 as attributing to states the
right to provide armed force to help those engaged in legitimate struggles
of self-determination. 398 Rigo Sureda comments that, while the First
World states argue against the Third World position, in practice they
have at least acquiesced in such courses of action, even if they have not
actively supported them.399 Pomerance thus argues that a new "just
war" doctrine has emerged in relation to self-determination which "has
entailed a complete negation of both the traditional norms governing
revolution and neutrality, as well as the new U.N. anti-force norms. '
The difficulty with this new just war doctrine is that its use depends
on the entirely subjective opinion of whose cause is deemed to be "just"
- that is, who is attempting to exercise a "legitimate" claim of self-de-
termination. This is not clear, for example, where legitimacy depends on
392 12 Dec. 1973; 82-13-19. This Resolution states that the struggle of such peoples for the
implementation of their right to self-determination is legitimate and has the status in international
law of an international armed conflict "in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions." Id Principle
3. Attempts to suppress such struggles, including the use of mercenaries against national liberation
movements, are illegal and a threat to international peace and security.
393 G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, Annex (1974).
394 Id. Art. 7.
395 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Pro-
tocols I & II were approved in July 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. They entered into force in 1978
and can be found at 16 I.L.M. 1391. The four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War
Victims (Red Cross) are found at 75 U.N.T.S. 3.
396 See generally EsPIELL, supra note 260, paras. 91-105.
397 See e.g., supra notes 392, 395 & 396 and accompanying text.
398 POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 60.
399 RIGO SUREDA, supra note 184, at 348. Buchheit supports this conclusion. BUCHHEIT,
supra note 194, at 34-38.
4W POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 61.
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subjective opinions on forms of self-government. This makes the exercise
of the right of self-determination more, rather than less, problematic be-
cause it involves even clearer violations of a state's sovereignty but on
less clear bases. That is, physical intrusion may be based on political
opinions about the desirability of the form of a country's government.4 '
The right to use force to achieve self-determination thus fuels the
problems created by the lack of agreement on the definition of "represen-
tative government." The hindrance to the self-determination of indige-
nous peoples is thereby exacerbated.
3. Other Substantive Aspects of the Right of Self-Determination
The discussion on achieving self-determination has focused on the
political aspects of the right, both internal and external. In addition to
the right of a people to "freely determine their political status,"4 "z the
right of self-determination entails the right of a people to "freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." 4 3 These aspects are
not typically examined as they are thought to derive from, and thus be
considered after, the free exercise of political self-determination.
The rights of peoples to social development' 4 and to cultural devel-
opment405 do not pose barriers to the achievement of political self-deter-
mination for indigenous peoples in the way that the right to economic
development does. For example, the denial of a right of self-determina-
tion for a people has not been justified on the basis of cultural or social
development, whereas it has been denied on the basis of the right to eco-
nomic development.4"6 For this reason, despite the interdependence of
the various aspects,4"7  this section will focus on economic
development. 4 08
The right to economic development has two aspects: the use of nat-
401 As an illustration, Pomerance comments that a right of revolution is never recognized by
states as valid against themselves; instead, it has been recognized "when directed against others, and
particularly against others with whom one did not especially sympathize or share common values."
Id.
402 International Covenants, supra note 61, art. I(I).
403 Id.
404 The Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542 (XXIV), of 11 Dec.
1969, in Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 81 (stating that the Declaration "is the chief instrument
adopted by the United Nations to promote the right of peoples to social development."). For further
detail, see id. paras. 548-583.
405 The UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, Nov.
4, 1966, UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 14 Sess. 86-89 (1966), and G.A. Resolution
3148 (XXVII) of 14 Dec. 1973, entitled "Preservation and further development of cultural values,"
are the two primary instruments promoting the right to cultural development. For further detail, see
Cristescu, supra note 221, paras. 584-678.
406 See, e-g., discussion infra notes 419-426 and accompanying text.
407 See, eg., Cristescu, supra note 221, paras. 550-55.
408 For a discussion of all the relevant aspects of economic development, see id. paras. 329-547.
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ural resources and economic growth. While they are clearly inter-
twined, it is particularly the first of these that poses a further obstacle to
granting the right of self-determination to indigenous peoples within
states.
The link between the entitlement to the natural resources within
one's territory and the self-determination of the people of that territory
was most clearly made during the the discussion in the 1950s of the in-
clusion of a right to self-determination in the International Covenants.'
This led to the establishment of a Commission on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources to study the status of such sovereignty and to
make recommendations for its strengthening. 4 0 The principle of a peo-
ple's sovereignty over the natural resources within its territory was subse-
quently affirmed in numerous General Assembly resolutions411 and
explicitly included in Article 1 of the International Covenants. 412 While
the Charter provides a general, authoritative statement of this right,
41 3
the two primary international instruments today concerning sovereignty
over natural resources are the U.N. General Assembly Resolution, on
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,, 414  and Resolution
3281 (XXIX), containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
409 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 626 (VII), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.24 (1952) ("the right of peoples freely
to use and exploit their natural resources is inherent in their sovereignty") and G.A. Res. 1314
(XIII) of 12 Dec. 1958 ("the right of peoples and nations to self-determination... includes 'perma-
nent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources' "). These are described briefly in Cris-
tescu, supra note 221, paras. 442-43.
410 G.A. Resolution 1314 (XIII) of 12 Dec. 1958.
411 See, eg., the Preamble to resolution 1514 (XV), The 1960 Declaration on Colonialism,
supra note 258, preamble. The General Assembly recommended "that the sovereign right of every
State to dispose of its wealth and its natural resources should be respected, in conformity with the
rights and duties of States under international law." G.A. Res. 1720 (XVI) of 19 December, 1961;
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.
17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI) of 25 Nov. 1966; G.A. Res. 2386 (XXIII) of 19
Nov. 1968 (the General Assembly considered that the permanent sovereignty of each nation over its
natural wealth and resources as a prerequisite to social progress and development); G.A. Res. 2692
(XXV) (1970), cited in SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 124-34 (1977); G.A. Res.
3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (the exercise of sovereignty
over natural resources included all resources, whether found on or under land or in or under the
sea); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201,
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). See also Security Council Resolution 330
(1973) of 21 March 1973. See also Cristescu, supra note 221, paras. 432-482 (discussing permanent
sovereignty over natural resources), particularly paras. 438-461 (describing the various international
instruments).
412 "All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and re-
sources .... In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." International
Covenants, supra note 61, art. 1(2).
413 Id.
414 G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
See Cristescu, supra note 221, at para. 447 for a summary of the drafting proposals in respect of this
resolution.
Vol. 24:199
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF DETERMINATION
States. 4 15
Resolution 1803 declares, inter alia, that the "[v]iolation of the
rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and hinders the development of international co-opera-
tion and the maintenance of peace. ' 416 Article 2(1) of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States provides that "[e]very State has
permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources and has the
inalienable right fully and freely to dispose of them." 417 Article 1(1) pro-
vides that "[e]very State has and shall freely exercise full and permanent
sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth,
natural resources and economic activities."41
The various resolutions make it clear that sovereignty over resources
is one aspect of the overall sovereignty of a state. The barriers that this
poses to the self-determination of indigenous peoples are of two types.
The first, more general, barrier is the fact that it defines the peoples that
are the relevant unit of self-determination territorially. This has two con-
sequences. One of these is that it encourages the equation of peoples with
existing, territorially-defined political units. Because of the principle of
territorial integrity, this makes it very difficult for indigenous peoples
within such units to be considered as separately entitled to self-determi-
nation. The second of these is that it encourages the assumption that the
only legitimate goal of self-determination can be defined territorially.
When linked with the principle that a people has inherent sovereignty
over the resources in its territory, this implies that the ultimate goal of
self-determination for a people that only comprises part of an existing
state is secession. Thus, for example, even where an indigenous people is
not seeking secession but is seeking more autonomy within an existing
state, because secession is regarded as an option for the future, their
claim to self-determination may still be treated as a claim of ultimate
secession and thereby denied. If it is not treated as a claim of full self-
determination, and some attempt is made to accord more autonomy
within the state, even if the use of some resources may be negotiated,
sovereignty over natural resources is accordingly denied to the part and
retained by the whole.419 The strict interpretation of property rights over
415 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Jan. 15, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 251.
416 Supra note 414.
417 Supra note 415.
418 Id.
419 See, eg., the agreement reached between the Inuit and the Canadian government concern-
ing Nunavut. John F. Bums, Accord to Give the Eskimos Control of a Fifth of Canada, N.Y. TIMES,
December 17, 1991, at Al; Tim Harper, Were Natives Pawns in a Government Experiment?, To-
RONTO STAR, Dec. 22, 1991, at B1; William Claiborne, Canada, Eskimos to Create Vast Arctic
Treaty, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 1991, at Al.
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natural resources thus encourages and is encouraged by the strict territo-
rial interpretation of "peoples" and thus also of the right of self-
determination.
The second barrier that that concept of sovereignty over resources
poses to the self-determination of indigenous peoples is that, because a
(territorially defined) people is entitled to sovereignty over the resources
within its territory, it denies the right of any particular part of the whole
to exercise self-determination. This is because that would entail claiming
part of those resources for its sole benefit, whereas it is the people as a
territorially-defined whole that has the right to the use of the resources of
the territory.4 z" Further, the right of the whole people to not be deprived
of their means of subsistence4 21 means that, where the resources in ques-
tion are necessary for the economic development of the whole people, it
is even clearer that a part of the whole people is unable to claim those
resources for its sole benefit.
An example of where the issue of sovereignty over resources played
a large role in the denial of a part of a state to exercise self-determination
is the case of Katanga's attempted secession from the (Belgian) Congo.422
A factor in prompting the claim for separate self-determination was pre-
cisely that Katanga had large amounts of natural mineral resources that
the Katanga people wanted to exploit.42 3 This, plus the fact that these
resources were the primary natural resources of the whole Congo, were
the very factors that operated to deny the Katanga people an entitlement
to secede and take the resources with them.424 It is because of the
Katanga example that scholars attempting to develop theories of seces-
sion give as a factor going against a right of secession in a particular
instance, any resulting economic non-viability of the remaining part of
the state.425 Further, where it is the intent of the resource-rich part of
the state to benefit from the exploitation of those resources and to de-
prive the rest of the state of such benefits (rather than it just being a
consequential result), there is even more reason to deny a right of seces-
sion to the part.426
In conclusion, in stemming from the principle of territorial integrity,
the barriers posed by the territorial definition of a people and by their
420 See International Covenants, supra note 61, art. 1(2).
421 Id.
422 For discussion of this case, see e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 141-53. See also CRAW-
FORD YOUNG, POLITICS IN THE CONGO: DECOLONIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE (1965); JULES
GERARD-LIBOIS, KATANGA SECESSION (Rebecca Young trans., 1966); CRAWFORD, supra note
168, at 263-65, and authorities cited therein.
423 See, e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 152.
424 Id.
425 See section infra entitled Secession.
426 Id.
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sovereignty over the resources of that territory can be regarded as part of
the overall barrier that the concept of sovereignty poses to the self-deter-
mination of indigenous peoples currently situated within states and other
accepted political units.
4. Conclusion on the Law of Self-Determination
While self-determination may be considered the fundamental basis
for all other human rights,427 it does not actually mean that all peoples
are entitled to a form of government of their choice where that is differ-
ent from the form of government of the state in which they live. In the
case of indigenous peoples within states (or other accepted political
units), a right of separate self-determination is not currently recognized
in positive international law because the ultimate goal of self-determina-
tion is independence, and includes the possibility of secession. These
goals are considered to be inappropriate for indigenous peoples, who are
consequently deemed to not fit either of the requisite definitions of "self."
Indigenous peoples are thus considered to be entitled to exercise self-
determination only as part of the state as a whole. Their rights are
trumped by the state's right to territorial integrity and to non-interven-
tion with its internal affairs, and to other attributes of sovereignty such as
sovereignty over natural resources. In conclusion, the international law
of self-determination may be an attempt to achieve human rights for peo-
ples, but only within the existing system of state sovereignty. No right of
self-determination is recognized where it clashes with the rules of the
system.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
Part II deliberately described the more traditional, accepted view of
the laws of sovereignty and self-determination in order to illuminate the
barriers that indigenous peoples face when arguing (particularly with
those who hold this more accepted view) for the recognition of a full
right of self-determination. As the description in Part I shows, the barri-
ers to the recognition of a full right of self-determination for indigenous
peoples are proving to be very difficult to overcome. The issue for those
interested in the human rights of indigenous peoples is what that implies
for the strategy in relation to the drafting of the declaration on the rights
of indigenous peoples currently being prepared by the Working Group.
Part I, section 3, discussed what appear to be the options available, the
primary choices being between insisting on the inclusion of a full right of
self-determination in the draft declaration and settling for a statement
that does not include the right to full independence or secession.
427 See, eg., infra notes 502-505 and accompanying text.
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The argument that self-determination should be redefined so as to
focus on internal more than external aspects has been addressed by other
scholars.428 It is also clearly the less difficult path to follow in terms of
reaching agreement on the draft declaration presently being prepared.
For these reasons, and because indigenous peoples' representatives at the
Working Group still argue that a right of self-determination that in-
cludes the option of independence and secession must be included in the
draft declaration,429 I will instead address the issue of how these barriers
may be overcome. I am not stipulating a preference for choosing this
approach over the other; I am merely identifying issues that must be
addressed if this approach is to be taken. To this end, the remainder of
this paper will focus on the inadequacies for indigenous peoples of the
accepted law and the issues raised by them which need to be addressed if
these barriers are to be overcome.
This Part first comments on aspects of the law of self-determination
described in Part II. It considers issues concerning the definition of
"peoples," colonialism, the basis of the right of self-determination, the
legal requirements in respect of internal self-determination, and seces-
sion. It outlines some approaches of other scholars, including some al-
ternative interpretations of what the present law on self-determination
actually is, and suggests how the situation and claims of indigenous peo-
ples may compel one approach being taken over another. This Part next
comments on the rules of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
states and of territorial integrity, questioning their primacy in interna-
tional law and again suggesting that the situation and claims of indige-
nous peoples indicate that a different status may be appropriate. Finally,
the implications of the various arguments for the principle of sovereignty
are considered.
A. The Law of Self-Determination
The claims by indigenous peoples of self-determination raise a
number of issues relating to all the aspects of the law of self-determina-
428 For example, Hurst Hannum argues for the development of a right of autonomy. HAN-
NUM, supra note 22. James Anaya argues that, despite the prohibition on secession, international
customary law has emerged "from self-determination's jurisprudential core" to recognize a right to
cultural integrity (or cultural self-determination): "indigenous peoples have the right to exist as
distinct cultural communities and develop freely as such in all spheres of life, to live within a gov-
erning institutional order that reflects their specific characteristics, and genuinely to be associated
with all decisions affecting them." Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International
Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1991). See also Anaya, supra note 54 (noting that some
scholars do say that indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination, even if that is not full,
secessionist self-determination). Because the focus in this paper is on the full right of self-determina-
tion, including the option of independence and secession, I am ignoring this other use in order not to
confuse what I mean when I refer to the "right of self-determination."
429 See supra Part I.
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tion discussed above. The primary issue, however, is the focus of the
debate. This section will illustrate how that focus is wrong and will sug-
gest what it should be. The definitions of "peoples" and of "colonialism"
are relevant to who is entitled to the right of self-determination; indige-
nous peoples argue that they satisfy both of these requirements while
states deny it. I suggest that, in respect to both of these aspects, instead
of focusing on definitions, the focus should be on the overriding goals of
the participants, that is, the important interests that the parties want pro-
tected in international law. Only by reference to what we think the law
should protect and provide for can we decide what the law should be.
Following from this, the underlying purpose or basis of the law is
then addressed. The discussion examines the relationship between the
different claimed bases for the right of self-determination, showing that
only after clarifying the purpose of the right can we decide when it has
been fulfilled. Next the substantive elements of the right of self-determi-
nation - both internal and external - are addressed. I propose that
criteria must be devised in order to determine when a people has
achieved their self-determination, and I outline various suggestions made
by other scholars for such criteria.
1. "Peoples"
The issue of the definition of "peoples" is made relevant by two fac-
tors: first, its use in Article 1 of the Covenants and other international
instruments proclaiming that all peoples have the right to self-determina-
tion;430 and, second, the claims made by states that indigenous peoples
are not "peoples" and therefore do not have the right to self-
determination.431
Despite the reference in the Covenants, and other repeated refer-
ences in international law to various different rights of peoples,432 there is
no definition of "peoples" or "people" in international law.433 The rea-
430 See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
431 See supra notes 60-62 & 308-315 and accompanying text.
432 For a discussion of various aspects of the rights of peoples, see THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES
(James Crawford ed., 1988).
433 See, eg., Cristeseu, supra note 221, para. 269. "It will be found that there is no accepted
definition of the word "peoples" and no way of defining it with certainty.... There is no text or
recognized definition from which to determine what is a "people" possessing the right in question."
Id. See also, Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES, supra note 432, at 1. Brownlie does not put it too strongly when he criticizes that "it is
characteristic of the appallingly abstract nature of such exercises that those of us who are engaged in
the practical solution of problems relating to group rights can find no assistance in their provisions.
In particular, no attempt is made to define peoples.... The very problems which stand in need of
careful study are left blandly on one side." Id at 12. See also STAVENHAGEN, supra note 1 (stating
that "there is no legal definition of a people. The United Nations has carefully avoided [trying] to
define "people," even as it has conceded all peoples [have] the right to self-determination.").
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son given is typically that "peoples" is too vague and imprecise and thus
too difficult to define.434
The English language ascribes different meanings to "people" in dif-
ferent contexts.435 Both general and international law similarly ascribe
different meanings to "peoples" in different legal contexts. 36 In the con-
text of self-determination, the ordinary meaning of "people" relates to "a
specific type of human community sharing a common desire to establish
an entity [in order] to ensure a common future. '437 In ordinary usage,
the types of human community that are relevant are thus those that are
"united by a common culture, tradition, or sense of kinship, that typi-
cally have a common language, institutions, and beliefs. '438 This defini-
tion is indeed broad enough to encompass a tribe, race, nation or state.439
Scholarly approaches to the definition of "peoples" stress that two
types of requirements must be met before a group of individuals may be
considered a "people" in the context of self-determination: objective and
subjective requirements."' The objective requirements encompass such
factors as common language, culture, religion, race or ethnicity, terri-
tory, and history." 1 The subjective requirements concern the collective
state of mind: the way the relevant ethnic and other identities have been
434 See, e.g., ESPIELL, supra note 260, para. 56; Cristescu, supra note 221, paras. 275, 276 &
278. It is for this reason that United Nations bodies have "on various occasions" recommended that
the definition of "peoples" be studied. Id. para. 278. See also Brownlie, supra note 433, at 16.
435 See, e.g., the variety of different meanings given in WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (1983). For additional illustrations of different uses see WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY (1959) (including "the peoples of Europe," "all sorts of people," "the people
of New York," "my people were English.").
436 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1135 (6th ed. 1990) "People" is defined as,
A state; [a]s in the people of the state of New York. A nation in its collective and political
capacity. The aggregate or mass of the individuals who constitute the state.... In a more
restricted sense, and as generally used in constitutional law, the entire body of those citi-
zens of a state or nation who are invested with political power for political purposes. See
also "Citizen" and "Person."
Id. In relation to international law, see, e.g., Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions, in
THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 432, 159-175, at 169-170. "Peoples" is defined differently for
different types of peoples' rights. For example, the right not to be subjected to genocide and the
right not to be deprived of one's existence are "plainly applicable to a very broad category of groups,
considerably more so than the principle of self-determination." Id.
437 ESPIELL, supra note 260, para. 56.
438 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 435.
439 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 435.
440 See, e.g., Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Nationalism and Self-Determination: The Basque Case,
in ISSuES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 317, at 133, 139; Yoram Dinstein, Collective
Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 102, 104 (1976); Secretariat of the
Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, East Pakistan Staff Study, 8 INT'L COMM'N. OF JURISTS REV. 47.
441 Not all of these factors must be present in any one case, nor are they exhaustive. But these
are typically the factors from which individuals construct the identity of their group.
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created,442 consciousness as a distinct people, and a political will to exist
as a distinct people.443 In reality, the subjective and objective elements
are related, as "[p]eople will construct and negotiate their national iden-
tity by drawing on certain elements: language, culture, religion, history,
etc....
Such criteria imply that a people is distinct from a state or other
political entity. Under such criteria, indigenous peoples are indeed peo-
ples445 and would therefore appear to be entitled to the international
legal right of self-determination. However, positive international law has
not accorded that right to indigenous peoples; instead it treats them as
simple minority populations within states." 6 Further, international law
considers that states are peoples for the purposes of self-determination." 7
The important issues for those applying the right of self-determination is
thus how the definition of "peoples" in international law is arrived at and
why it excludes groups that satisfy the ordinary meaning of the word.
As the description in Part I shows, states ostensibly reject the appli-
cation of self-determination to indigenous peoples on two grounds: (i)
that indigenous peoples are not peoples for the purposes of self-determi-
nation, and (ii) that the consequences of application would lead to the
violation of the principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention in
states' domestic affairs. However, these are not two separate reasons be-
cause, as the history of the development of the right to self-determination
described in Part II shows, the argument that indigenous peoples are not
peoples is not a deduction from independent arguments about what a
442 Bengoetxea, supra note 440, at 139.
443 See, e.g., East Pakistan StaffStudy supra note 440, at 47. "[A] people begins to exist only
when it becomes conscious of its own identity and asserts its will to exist." See also Dinstein, supra
note 440, at 104. "It is essential to have a present ethos or state of mind. A people is both entitled
and required to identify itself as such." Id.
444 Bengoetxea, supra note 440, at 139. Further, "[t]he expression of national identity is,
therefore, both a reflection of and a logical outcome of the expression of individual identity." Huw
Thomas, Perestroika in the Western Wing - Nationalism and National Rights Within the European
Community, in IssuES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 317, at 149, 154.
445 By definition, an indigenous people is one whose members share a common culture, history,
ethnic identity and territory, and which remains distinct from the dominant society of the state in
which they live. See supra note 1. Further, indigenous peoples have shown by their claims to self-
determination that they identify as separate peoples and have the necessary political will for self-
government. See, e-g., GRAND COUNCIL OF THE CREES (OF QUEBEC), STATUS AND RIGHTS OF
THE JAMES BAY CREES IN THE CONTEXT OF QUEBEC'S SECESSION FROM CANADA, Submission to
the Commission on Human Rights on its Forty-Eighth Session (Ottawa, February 1992) (unpub-
lished document, on file with author) (qualifying the James Bay Cree as a people under these
criteria).
446 Supra note 317 and accompanying text. Recall also the debate over the use of "peoples" or
"populations," supra notes 15 & 307-315 and accompanying text. "Populations" implies an arbi-
trary collection of individuals. "Peoples" implies an internal cohesiveness to the group.
447 See supra Part II. See also, Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 266. "States in the interna-
tional meaning of the word are obviously 'peoples'." Id.
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"people" is, but it, too, is a conclusion from the consequences of applica-
tion of the right. The drafters of the various international instruments
that refer to the right of peoples to self-determination avoided clarifying
"peoples"," both because it was thought too difficult" 9 and because it
was not needed. 450 However, both of these apparently separate reasons
stem from the same cause: the fear of the consequence of according the
right to self-determination to groups other than those agreed to be peo-
ples for the purposes of the right in international law. The consequence
of adopting a wider interpretation is that it would "turn the right of peo-
ples to self-determination into a weapon for use against the territorial
integrity and political unity of states. '451  Therefore, despite the pro-
fessed "vital importance" of defining "peoples" in order to identify the
holder of the right to self-determination,452 the answer is arrived at com-
pletely independently of any consideration of the meaning of "peoples."
The meaning of "peoples" is, in practice therefore, irrelevant. Instead,
the answer is arrived at in reverse, by excluding those peoples for whom
application of the right to self-determination could entail secession. 3
There is thus in fact only one reason why the right to self-determination
for indigenous peoples is rejected: the consequences of its application,
namely the violation of state sovereignty.
Both the technique used for arriving at this result and the result
itself can be criticized for obscuring the barriers to according a right of
self-determination to indigenous peoples and thus making them difficult
to address and overcome. The technique has been to proclaim a general
right, that "all peoples have the right to self-determination, ' 454 but to
restrict it, not by an explicit, restricted definition of "peoples" or by an
exception clause, but instead by separate documents that prohibit the dis-
ruption of national unity or territorial integrity.4"5 David Makinson, a
logician, describes this as a logical inconsistency or" 'semantic blockage'
- a situation where it is logically impossible to give any meanings to the
448 See, e.g., Cristescu, supra note 221, paras. 260-63. See generally supra Part II.
449 See supra note 434 and accompanying text.
450 See, e.g., David Makinson, Rights of Peoples: Point of View of a Logician, in THE RIGHTS
OF PEOPLES, supra note 432, 69, at 74 (referring to Article 1(1) of the International Covenants: "The
political needs of the time did not require such clarification. All that was needed was a tacit agree-
ment that inhabitants included within the borders of European colonies in Africa and other regions
of the world did constitute peoples"). See also, description of the drafting of the Charter and the
International Covenant in Part II, supra.
451 Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 275.
452 Id. para. 260.
453 In addition to the authorities cited in Part II, supra, see e.g., Cristescu, supra note 221,
paras. 268 & 275.
454 International Covenant, supra note 61, art. 1(1).
455 These separate documents include the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 258, and the U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations,
supra note 278.
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operative terms involved that at one and the same time leave the texts
mutually consistent and still have some resemblance to ordinary
usage.
4 56
A further criticism of the technique can be made of the states' argu-
ments used to justify the result. While they do explicitly state that there
can be no self-determination where it will violate the sovereignty of
states, they focus as often on "peoples," denying that this concept ex-
tends to indigenous "populations. '45 7 This implies that they have ar-
rived at an objective definition of "peoples," applied the relevant criteria,
and thereby come to the conclusion that indigenous peoples do not have
the right of self-determination. In fact, the conclusion is reached first
and the definition constructed accordingly. Indigenous peoples are thus
deemed to not be under colonial or foreign occupation and to have
achieved self-determination through the state in which they live. By
their semantics, states have avoided debate on these issues and thus on
the real barriers.
The result obscures the barriers to a right of self-determination for
indigenous peoples by the creation and use of a legal fiction. This fiction
is best described by Falk, an international legal scholar, who describes
the result as "an affirmation of the rights of peoples, but as qualified by
the fiction that a state and a people are virtually interchangeable
ideas."' 458 This fiction is a "statist view of self-determination" 459 that, in
perpetuating a statist conception of the international legal and political
system, has made the promises of self-determination largely irrelevant to
indigenous peoples.' 0 In conclusion, this fiction is a "semantic confu-
sion that.., has been used to avoid confronting... the various lamenta-
ble situations of indigenous peoples.' 461
This discussion makes it clear that, in arguing for recognition of a
positive legal right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, there are
two primary issues that must addressed. The first concerns the barrier
that states currently uphold: why national unity and territorial integrity
456 Makinson, supra note 450, at 75-76.
457 Supra notes 60-62 & 308-314.
458 Richard A. Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS
OF PEOPLES, supra note 432, 17, at 26. As Makinson notes, "[tihis is a category mistake; the two
concepts are different kinds of abstraction. A people is a kind of collectivity, or group of human
beings; a State is a kind of governing and administering apparatus. Even when a State serves as a
representative or spokesman for a people, the two are never identical." Makinson, supra note 450, at
73.
459 Falk, supra note 458.
460 Id. at 27. This is because it assumes that self-determination of the state achieves self-deter-
mination for all the people(s) within it; it does not assess it critically for each, culturally (etc.)
defined people. For discussion of problems with treating the whole state as one self-determining
unit, see infra section entitled Representative Self-Government.
461 Id.
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are absolute rights that cannot be violated. The second is why a right of
self-determination should be recognized.
In addressing the ultimate barrier to expansion of the right of self-
determination, the focus needs to be on its justification: why the over-
arching principle of state sovereignty exists in present international law
and why it should continue to exist as an inviolable, absolute right.
While the various state interests in upholding sovereignty are presently
assumed, and others that come into conflict with them are summarily
rejected, this needs re-evaluation. Argument needs to focus on the situa-
tions in which these interests should be upheld over the interests of indig-
enous peoples in their self-determination. This will in turn require a
deliberate focus on the actual interests of indigenous peoples in the con-
text of self-determination, a focus that has been avoided by the rhetoric
to date.
The issue why indigenous peoples should have a right of self-deter-
mination in international law cannot be addressed without first focusing
on what the nature of the right of self-determination is and what it is
designed to achieve. There have been two propositions put forward
about the nature of the right of self-determination: that it is an inherent
right of peoples and that it is an instrumental right designed to secure the
attainment of other human rights.462 Under the first proposition, that it
is an inherent right of peoples, the primary focus would be on peoples
and what a right of self-determination is thought to entail for a people.
The definition of "peoples" in this case, while it would clearly be depen-
dent on the context of the right of self-determination as opposed to other
rights of people, would be more likely to accord with the ordinary mean-
ing and less likely to be a constructed legal term of art. The content of
the right would be assessed by consideration of inherent aspects of such
peoples; for example, what recognition of the dignity of the human per-
son might entail, and what is necessary in order to ensure that the people
are able to determine their own future. While such considerations would
be subject to evaluation against competing considerations in the applica-
tion of a right of self-determination, the definition of the holders of the
right would necessarily be prior to such evaluations.
If an instrumental view of the right of self-determination is taken -
that self-determination is recognized solely in order to achieve other rec-
ognized, fundamental human rights of individuals and peoples - then
the primary focus would be on situations where human rights are being
abused. One would then work backwards from there and determine
what is necessary to achieve the recognition and attainment of the rele-
vant human rights and whether self-determination is applicable in any
given situation. The category of holders of the right would follow from
462 See, e.g., supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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this determination. The resulting definition of "peoples" would depend
less on ordinary meaning and more on the meaning necessary for the
legal purpose it would be designed to achieve. As an instrumental con-
struction, it would be a legal term of art.
The issue whether the right of self-determination is conceived of as
an inherent right of peoples or an instrumental right is addressed be-
low." 3 The previous discussion is merely meant to identify the proper
focus of discussions on the recognition of a right to self-determination for
any particular group. In fact it is clear that indigenous peoples have at-
tempted to focus on such issues"4 but that the rhetoric employed by
states in defending the present law has drawn attention away from them.
This section has shown that the present rhetoric must be changed if the
barriers to the recognition of a right of self-determination for indigenous
peoples in international law are to be overcome. These barriers must be
overcome in order to properly address what rights should be recognized
in a draft declaration of the rights of indigenous peoples.
2. Colonialism and Foreign Subjugation
The treatment of the issues of colonialism and foreign subjugation
has been similar to that of the definition of "peoples." Because the inter-
national law of self-determination uses definitions of colonialism and for-
eign subjugation for the purposes of deciding which peoples are entitled
to self-determination, these definitions have been used to claim that in-
digenous peoples are not colonized or subjugated within the definition
and are therefore not entitled to self-determination. While I will concen-
trate in this section on the category of colonialism, the following com-
ments apply similarly to foreign subjugation.
The definition of colonialism in international law restricts the cate-
gory of colonies, or non-self-governing territories, to those under alien
subjugation which are also politically and geographically separate from,
ethnically or culturally distinct from, and arbitrarily subordinated by the
state in question.46 States which are not colonial powers are entitled to
have their territorial integrity respected. 4 " There are two types of criti-
cism that may be made of this definition. The first is that it is not being
applied consistently by states - there are some indigenous peoples that
presently satisfy these requirements. The second is that this definition is
too restrictive to solve the problems that it was said to be designed to
solve. Both types of criticism give rise to the criticism that state interests
463 See section supra, entitled "Nature of the Right of Self-Determination."
464 See the description supra notes 49-55 and analysis supra Part I(B) of the claims of indige-
nous peoples to self-determination.
465 See supra, notes 262, 264 and accompanying text.
466 See, eg., supra, note 279 and accompanying text.
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are trumping those of indigenous peoples without any direct evaluation
of the interests involved.
The first criticism argues that, even taking narrow interpretations of
the requirements, there are some indigenous peoples currently within
present states that satisfy the definition in Resolution 1541 of a "non-self-
governing" territory.467 That is, these indigenous peoples are geographi-
cally separate from the rest of the state, they are culturally and ethnically
distinct, and are arbitrarily subordinated within that state. As a non-self-
governing territory, the state in question is not entitled to its territorial
integrity if that is taken to include the indigenous peoples' territory. In-
stead, the non-self-governing territory must be excluded from the origi-
nal state's boundaries and given the option of achieving its separateindependence. 46s1
An example of where this argument has been made is in respect of
the Dene and Inuit peoples of the Canadian Northwest Territories. Ian
Brownlie, a respected professor of international law whose views on in-
ternational law are widely accepted, expressly considered this example
and came to the conclusion that the Dene and Inuit people living in the
Northwestern Territories were non-self-governing within the terms of
Resolution 1541 and were thus a "unit of self-determination" within in-
ternational law.469 In response to the traditional argument that it only
applies in cases of "salt-water" colonialism,47 Brownlie makes three
arguments:
In the first place, as a matter of interpretation, the phrase "geo-
graphically separate" in Resolution 1541 (XV) may readily include ar-
eas such as N.W.T., or Lappland, which are in a real sense
geographically distinct from other neighbouring areas. Such areas are
distinct in character and are separate. It is to be remembered that the
discussion is about geographically separate peoples, in opposition to
scattered groups, lacking a land focus: for example, Ukranians or Jews
within the Canadian population in general.
Secondly, the application of the principle of self-determination in
the practice of the organs of the United Nations has not been pre-
vented by the claim by the colonial power that the territory concerned
was a part of France, Portugal or Spain. The status of Algeria as a
part of France made no difference to the general assessment of Algeria
as a unit of self-determination.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the wording of the key resolution,
467 See supra, note 264 and accompanying text.
468 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
469 Opinion of Professor Ian Brownie, D.C.L., November 3, 1977 (unpublished legal opinion,
on file with author) [hereinafter Opinion].
470 See supra note 264. This theory posited that only overseas colonies, distant from the met-
ropolitan colonizer, could become units of self-determination.
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General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 [the Declaration on
Colonialism], the normative and legal source of self-determination in
modem international law, by no means restricts the principle to over-
seas possessions. The Declaration... refers to "all peoples" (writers
emphasis), and the preambular part (second considerandum) also re-
fers to "all peoples." Paragraph 5 of the Declaration refers to "Trust
and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have
not yet attained independence" (writer's emphasis).471
As further support, Brownlie notes that United Nations practice
since 1965 has involved "the clear application of self-determination
outside the colonial agenda"472 - i.e., in situations of exclusionary, ra-
cist regimes.473 He concludes:
The conclusion which is inescapable is that the practice of States
(the source of customary international law) subsequent to Resolution
1514 of 1960 serves to confirm the view that the Resolution, and the
principle which it embodies, is not limited to the self-determination of
overseas possessions, i.e., extra-regional domination.4 74
Brownlie's opinion was written in 1977. While states have consist-
ently denied that such peoples are self-determination units, which can be
seen in itself as evidence of state practice and thus customary law, it is
arguable that the later cases of Namibia and Yugoslavia support his ar-
guments.475 Brownlie's opinion thus shows how the law actually devised
by states could be used to enable the self-determination of at least some
indigenous peoples, ostensibly without challenging the territorial integ-
rity of states. That is, international law is applicable; it is just a matter
of the states concerned having the will to apply it in these situations.
The reason given why states have not applied the law in these situa-
tions is the inviolability of territorial integrity. This, however, is not a
sufficient reason in itself because claimed territorial integrity is not pro-
tected in situations where part of the claimed state contains a non-self-
governing territory. There are thus other reasons behind why states
claim and protect territorial integrity in the first place.4 76 These reasons,
471 Opinion, supra note 469, paras. 16-18 (emphasis in original).
472 Id. para. 19.
473 Id. paras. 19-21. In support, he cites the U.N. resolutions made in such cases as (then)
Rhodesia, Palestine, and Bangladesh. Id. para. 20.
474 Id. para. 21. Note that all of Brownlie's arguments are based on international law. For
additional, policy reasons why his conclusion should be reached, see infra remainder of this section.
475 The case of Namibia, while slightly different, is arguably relevant nonetheless. Its relevance
lies in its retention of its entitlement to separate self-determination despite neighbouring South Af-
rica's claims to the contrary. For a detailed description and analysis of the claims involved, see
BERAT, supra note 260. For different possible interpretations of the case of Yugoslavia see supra
note 325.
476 Barsh, in arguing that the denial of self-determination to indigenous peoples "is a form of
racism and discrimination" in itself, implies that one such reason is simple racism. Russel L. Barsh,
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however, are not brought into the discussion to justify the application (or
rejection) of the right of self-determination and/or of territorial integrity
in the different circumstances. I suggest that, because it is these reasons
or interests that are overriding the reasons and interests of indigenous
peoples in application of the law, these reasons and interests must be
directly evaluated. With such an evaluation it may turn out to be possi-
ble to satisfy more of the interests concerned rather than satisfying all of
one and none of the other. That is, at present it is treated as a zero-sum
game, when in fact, if it were approached differently, it may turn out to
enable a positive-sum outcome.
The second criticism is more far-reaching than the first as it argues
for an even wider scope of application of the laws on colonialism and
non-self-governing territories. This criticism starts from the premise that
the definition of colonial (and racist) subjugation is derived from the con-
clusion of a set of arguments concerning the appropriate treatment of
peoples. As the Preamble of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples477 shows, the impetus for
the recognition of a right to self-determination for colonized peoples was
that it denied the colonized peoples their freedom and independence, it
exploited them and their resources, denied them equal human rights, and
impeded their social, economic and cultural development.478 Further,
these denials and impediments created conflicts and threats to the inter-
national peace.47 9 Finally, the Declaration stresses that the General As-
sembly is "Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to
complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of
their national territory."480 It was the effects of colonialism that were the
key to its prohibition. It is therefore these characteristics that should be
used to determine whether or not any other practices, whether currently
labelled colonialism or not, should also be prohibited. If the effects are
equally heinous then there should at least be a presumption that the
causes be treated equally. This presumption should be outweighed only
by other interests that are held, after open comparison, to be clearly more
important.
The situations of indigenous peoples today should be re-evaluated in
the light of such characteristics and such a comparison should be under-
taken here. Moreover, the interests of indigenous peoples should not be
automatically outweighed by the (to date, implied) interests of states, and
indigenous peoples should be accorded the same legal status as colonized
Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Self-Determination in International Law, in, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ABORIGINAL HUMAN RiGHrs 73 (Barbara Hocking ed., 1988).
477 Supra note 258.
478 Id. third, fourth, seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs.
479 Id. fourth and seventh preambular paragraphs.
480 Id. eleventh preambular paragraph.
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peoples presently enjoy. The reasons for this are that indigenous peoples
have actually been colonized and subjugated by foreign peoples, both in
the traditional sense (externally) as well as in a not-so-traditional sense
(internally).4 81
Most indigenous peoples have been subjected to the traditional form
of external, alien colonization.482 They are in their present position be-
cause of colonialism of exactly the sort that the right to self-determina-
tion is designed to remedy. For example, the indigenous peoples of the
Americas and various parts of the Pacific were colonized in this way.48 3
Today we would regard such colonialism as contrary to notions of
human dignity and to international law because of the breach of funda-
mental human rights that it entails.484 Further, it is arguable that the
abuses of human rights and even the taking of land that occurred at the
earlier time of colonization were considered contrary to international law
at that time.485 Yet we also consider that, if it happened much before the
present right was declared, the relevant indigenous peoples who never
had such a right should not be granted one now (nor should they be
compensated for practices that would not be tolerated today). While the
characteristics of the various colonial practices are the same, and while
those characteristics continue today, in many instances, the mere fact
that one set of practices occurred prior to an arbitrarily-defined date is
considered (by states) reason enough to ignore the realities and the
causes of the present situations of indigenous peoples. It is a case of
might, by passage of time, being made right. Past colonialism and the
suffering that it has created is not considered worthy of a remedy.
This issue is not properly addressed in that a remedy is not even
considered. The rights of present states to their territorial integrity and
481 See material cited supra note 2.
482 IdL
483 Id. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 7.
484 Recall President Wilson's comments on self-government: "Every people has a right to
choose the sovereignty under which they shall live." 53 U.S. CONG. REC. pt. 9, at 8854, cited in
WAMBAUGH, supra note 184, at 4; POMERANCE, supra note 192, at 1. It is Wilson's conception of
self-determination that supposedly forms the basis of the international law of self-determination to-
day, yet this is clearly not being applied to indigenous peoples, who have been forced to live under
foreign sovereignties. See supra, note 192.
485 See, eg., WILLIAMS, supra note 7 (describing the natural law position taken by the legal
scholars of the time, such as Vitoria, Grotius and Pufendort). For a shorter summary of these
positions, see Maureen Davies, Aspects of Aboriginal Rights in International Law in ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES AND THE LAW 16, 19-24 (Bradford W. Morse ed., 1989). While both Vitoria and Grotius
believed that the Spaniards were entitled to travel and reside among the American Indians, "It]he
Hispanic peoples did not carry with them.., any right to take possession of the lands to which they
sailed." Id. at 23. Pufendorf went further and criticized them "for failing to recognize that indige-
nous nations might not be obligated to accept the visiting Spaniards." According to Pufendorf, "no
nation is required to admit visiting foreign peoples." Id. at 22-23.
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non-intervention in their domestic affairs are held to trump any other
interests that might jeopardize the states' assumed interests.
In addition to being externally colonized and subjugated in the
traditional sense, by overseas, European powers ("salt-water" colonial-
ism), indigenous peoples have also been subject to external colonialism
by neighboring states. While this has not been considered to warrant the
same remedy, I suggest that it should.
The independent, unified State, whose territorial integrity is so jeal-
ously guarded by this restrictive approach to self-determination, may
itself be the result of historical, military, and diplomatic fortuities quite
unrelated to any cohesive desire of groups making up its population.
International law is thus asked to perceive a distinction between the
historical subjugation of an alien population living in a different part of
the globe and the historical subjugation of an alien population living on
a piece of land abutting that of its oppressors. The former can appar-
ently never be legitimated by the mere passage of time, whereas the
latter is eventually transformed into a protected status quo.486
This inconsistency should not exist for two reasons. First, coloniza-
tion results in oppression at the time, no matter whether the colonizer is
a neighboring state or is from another continent; any distinctions in law
based on the difference in the sources of oppression are thus artificial.
Second, the present oppression faced by peoples that have been colonized
in the past by neighboring states do as much damage to the oppressed
peoples as that presently faced by peoples once colonized by an overseas
state.487 As I suggest that the one should be afforded a remedy, there
should at least be a presumption that the other should be afforded a simi-
lar remedy. Any reasons for treating the latter differently must be de-
bated and explicitly weighed against the reasons for recognizing a
remedy. This debate does not take place for the same reasons that it does
not in the situations of historical colonialism: the assumed interests of
states in territorial integrity and non-intervention automatically trump
those of indigenous peoples.
The third type of colonialism that indigenous peoples have been sub-
ject to is what is referred to as "internal colonialism. '488 The theory of
486 BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 18. Note that his statement that the former can never be
legitimated by the passage of time must be qualified because the experience of indigenous peoples
shows that external, overseas colonization can be legitimated by the passage of time; the qualifica-
tion is that it appears to be legitimate where the relevant colony is populated by the colonizers and
later becomes an independent state. Id.
487 As Jose Cobo and the other authors cited supra note 2, have described, the present posi-
tions of all indigenous peoples need remedying; how their subjugation arose has made little discern-
able difference in the oppression that they face today.
488 This concept is best described by Michael Hechter, in MICHAEL HECHTER, INTERNAL
COLONIALISM (1975). In this book Hechter outlines the theory of internal colonialism and applies it
to many different cultures, describing the indigenous population as being subject to such colonialism.
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internal colonialism points out that the characteristics of the more-typi-
cal external colonialism also exist within independent states, even states
that have not been subject to such external colonialism.4 9 While the
concept is admittedly controversial, it has been referred to as internal
colonialism because the features and methods of exploitation are so simi-
lar to those of external colonialism.
The basic features and elements of this model are that the more-
developed core of a country dominates the periphery politically and ex-
ploits it materially. 9 0 This process of domination condemns the peoples
of the periphery "to an instrumental role," which is maintained by force,
"to maintain political stability," and by "a complex of racial or cultural
stereotypes, to legitimate metropolitan superordination."491 Michael
Hechter, the primary architect of the theory, describes a number of fea-
tures of such cultures, including the cultural division of labor, with the
high-status occupations being reserved for the metropolitan colonizers,
and the consequent lower material standard of living for the periphery.492
Particularly in the case of indigenous peoples that were once externally
colonized, such people are often forced further into the periphery by be-
ing forced onto less productive lands and exploited further.4 93
Internal colonialism, as another form of colonialism, should be re-
jected just as external colonialism is now rejected. This is linked to the
argument that we should try to remedy the injustices done by past exter-
nal colonialism, because the internal colonialism that currently exists is
often one of the injustices identical to these that have arisen from the past
external colonialism. In the particular case of indigenous peoples, exter-
nal and internal colonialism tend to merge, as the original source of the
The theory is described at 15-43. See also Maureen Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humani-
tarian Intervention, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45 (1981). For works of other scholars that have
used this concept in relation to North American situations, see works cited id. at 46 n.5.
489 Hechter, supra note 488.
490 Id. at 9.
491 Id. The internal colonialism model accordingly rejects the traditional theories of political
development and modernization that suggest that, upon industrialization, the core and peripheral
regions of a country will culturally, economically and politically converge. Internal colonialism
denies that such processes of national development occur "except under exceptional circumstances."
Id. "National development" is defined as:
[A] process which may be said to occur when the separate cultural identities of regions
begin to lose social significance, and become blurred. In this process, the several local and
regional cultures are gradually replaced by the establishment of one national culture which
cuts across the previous distinctions. The core and peripheral cultures must ultimately
merge into one all-encompassing cultural system to which all members of the society have
primary identification and loyalty.
Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
492 Id. at 9, 30 & 39. Other features include economic dependence of the periphery on the core
and "national discrimination on the basis of language, religion or other cultural forms." Id at 33.
493 Id. at 32.
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present, internal domination of many indigenous peoples was external.49 4
Internal colonialism, however, is also different from external coloni-
alism, because those objecting to internal colonialism object to it no mat-
ter how it resulted: whether it resulted from exogenous forces, such as a
foreign invasion, or from forces endogenous to the society in question.49
Indigenous peoples who were not clearly externally colonized (that is,
whose colonizers do not fit the accepted international law definition) typ-
ically still suffer from internal colonialism.496 For them, the lack of his-
torical external colonization does not make any lighter the oppression
they suffer today. Indeed, even though it may not fit as neatly into the
definition of external colonialism, internal colonialism can be seen as a
form of foreign subjugation, because the group dominating the indige-
nous peoples are of a culture alien or foreign to the indigenous peoples
and the domination is based on racism.497 As a form of racist subjuga-
tion, the present law of self-determination should be applicable in these
situations. While the present law would not entitle all such subjugated
peoples to secession or independence,498 it would entitle them to other
modes of self-determination, which is more than states appear willing to
recognize in the draft declaration. As with the first argument, it is the
lack of will of states to consistently apply the law that they devised which
keeps them from recognizing internal colonialism as a form of alien
subjugation.
If we take the claims that internal colonialism has resulted in ex-
ploitation, suffering, and violations of human rights, particularly viola-
tion of the claimed, inherent right of self-determination through self-
government, of indigenous peoples; the question must again be posed:
why is such exploitation and suffering that is presently being imposed by
present internal colonization not afforded a remedy in international law?
More specifically, why is the self-determination accorded to externally
colonized peoples considered not applicable in this case?4 99 As with the
answer suggested above in relation to the first criticism, the answer given
to these questions by states have been simply that it violates the princi-
ples of territorial integrity of present states and non-intervention in do-
mestic affairs. This answer is insufficient, given the interests of
494 Hechter comments that a typical source of present-day internal colonialism is the original
colonization and "domination by a 'racially' and culturally different foreign conquering group, im-
posed in the name of a dogmatically asserted racial, ethnic, or cultural superiority, on a materially
inferior indigenous people." Id. at 30.
495 See authorities cited supra note 2.
496 Id. See also STAVENHAGEN, supra note 1, at 86 & 118.
497 See supra notes 262 & 264 and accompanying text; HECHTER, supra note 488, at 39-42.
498 See supra notes 266-267, 279 & 281 and accompanying text.
499 Sornarajah similarly argues that the limitation of the right of self-determination to situa-
tions of external colonialism is "artificial when the broad objective of the principle is to end the
dominance of one group by another." Sornarajah, supra note 488, at 52.
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indigenous peoples that are at stake, and illustrates, again, that the focus
of the debate is wrong. Debate on the inclusion in the draft declaration
of a full right of self-determination for indigenous peoples must focus on
the various competing principles and directly compare the interests that
they protect. Only such a debate can produce a remedy to the present
situations of indigenous peoples and only through such a debate can any
positive-sum outcome be devised, both of which should be the goals of all
parties to the present so-called debate.
3. Basis of the Right of Self-Determination
The debate in the Working Group suggests that there are two possi-
ble bases for the right of self-determination without suggesting whether,
or how, they might be linked. The basis first stressed by indigenous peo-
ples was instrumental: that the (group) right of self-determination was
necessary in order to achieve other fundamental (individual) human
rights. This justification was made through the linkage of the present
denial of human rights to indigenous peoples and their lack of self-gov-
ernment, and therefore of their freedom from oppression and their self-
determination."° As the debate progressed, the arguments began to also
stress an apparently separate justification: that it was an inherent right of
all peoples that could not be taken away.501
This second justification can be conceived in three ways. First, it
can be thought of as being inherent purely because its function is to guar-
antee inherent and inalienable individual rights. This conception makes
the justification of inherency dependent on that of instrumentality. Sec-
ond, self-determination can be seen as being directly derived from the
inherent dignity of the human person - i.e., not dependent on the in-
strumental justification. Third, the right of self-determination can be
seen to be related to the claims that sovereignty is inherent in the group
and thus cannot be denied. It is not specified whether this third concep-
tion of an inherent group right is also linked with the instrumental pro-
tection of inherent individual rights, or whether it is a wholly
independent ground. It is also not clear whether this is separate from the
500 For example, this is perhaps most directly put in the statement: "[That self-determination
was of great importance to indigenous peoples because it was the denial of this right which had led to
their present living conditions." Seventh Report of the WGIP, supra note 39, para. 28. And:
Some of [the observers from indigenous peoples organizations] stated that the lack of self-
determination was the cause of a tragic gap between the economic, social and cultural
situation of the other sectors of the population and that of the indigenous populations who
lived within the territory of those countries.
The Study of Discrimination, supra note 51. As a further example, it was commented that there is
an "inevitable link between self-determination and ownership of land, including natural resources."
Sixth Report of the WGIP, supra note 49, at 22-23, para. 84. See also supra notes 50-51 and accom-
panying text.
501 Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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second conception; that is, it may be that the right of sovereignty of the
people is thought to be inherent because it derives from the inherent dig-
nity of the person. I suggest that these different conceptions are linked
and that a clarification of the way in which they are linked will in turn
clarify the requirements of the right of self-determination.
The view of states is clearly that there is a relationship between the
respect for self-determination and for other fundamental rights and free-
doms.10 2 This view has been taken since the adoption of the U.N. Char-
ter, which is illustrated by the provisions of the Charter itself."3
Precisely what is the relationship referred to in the Charter, however, is
not explicit. Subsequent discussion of the right of self-determination in
the General Assembly shows that it has been regarded as instrumental -
as a necessary prerequisite for the enjoyment of fundamental individual
human rights."° A good expression of this view is that:
the effective exercise of a people's right to self-determination is an es-
sential condition or prerequisite, although not necessarily excluding
other conditions, for the genuine existence of other human rights and
freedoms. Only when self-determination has been achieved can a peo-
ple take the measures necessary to ensure human dignity, the full en-
joyment of all rights, and the political, economic, social and cultural
progress of all human beings, without any form of discrimination.
Consequently, human rights and fundamental freedoms can only exist
truly and fully when self-determination also exists.505
502 For example, Article 55 of the U.N. Charter, reads:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote ... universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all....
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 173, at 1045-1046.
503 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 173.
504 For example, this instrumental basis is stated in G.A. Res. 637 (VII), supra note 257. The
first paragraph of the Preamble reads: "Whereas the right of peoples and nations to self-determina-
tion is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights." The Human Rights
Committee has also adopted this view. The Committee has commented that "[t]he right to self-
determination is of particular importance because its realization is an essential condition for the
effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights." Thornberry, supra note 199, at 883
(quoting the Committee); Thornberry, however, does not cite any references for it. Thorberry also
comments that the Human Rights Committee solely considers minority rights matters in relation to
indigenous peoples (i.e., under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 61, rather than under Article 1). The implication of this is that the Committee
considers that, when such human rights have been fulfilled, self-determination has thereby been
achieved. Id. Since then, the General Assembly has adopted various resolutions that make this link
between self-determination and human rights. See, e.g., resolutions 2649 (XXV) of 30 Nov. 1970,
2787 (XXVI) of 6 Dec. 1971, 3382, of 10 Nov. 1975, and 31/34 of 3 Nov. 1976; See also the discus-
sion and other resolutions cited in Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 229; ESPIELL, supra note 260,
paras. 2, 3, 10, 11, 16, & 51-55.
505 ESPIELL, supra note 260, para. 59.
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It is because the states drafting the two International Covenants had
this instrumental view5"6 that the right of self-determination appears as
the primary group right in the Covenants concerning individual rights.
The Special Rapporteur on the Problem of Discrimination Against In-
digenous Peoples also adopted this instrumental view specifically in rela-
tion to indigenous peoples. 50 7
None of these statements that the right of self-determination is in-
strumental suggest that it is also inherent. That it is either not so inher-
ent or is only inherent because its function is to achieve respect for
(other) guaranteed inherent, inalienable rights, is an arguable position.
This can be argued on the basis of the strong emphasis on the instrumen-
tal value of self-determination made in the various international instru-
ments described, coupled with the general language of the instruments
that are not particularly clear one way or the other. For example, the
first preambular paragraph of the 1960 Declaration 08 notes the "faith in
fundamental human rights [and] in the dignity and worth of the human
person;" and the seventh preambular paragraph notes that the denial of
self-determination prevents economic, cultural and social development of
peoples and militates against peace.50 9 In addition, the first operative dec-
laration provides that the denial of self-determination "constitutes a de-
nial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace
and co-operation."'5 10 These statements do not necessarily entail the rec-
ognition of self-determination as an inherent right in itself.
Despite these arguments, the conclusion that self-determination is
seen by the international community as an inherent right of individuals
may be deduced from the frequent links made between the human dig-
5o6 Cassese describes the comments made in the preparatory work on the Covenant. Com-
ments made were that: self-determination was the "source" of all other human rights (Poland, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.3 10, para. 33 (1950)); self-determination is the "prerequisite for the enjoyment of all
other human rights" (Ukraine, id., para. 47; Syria, SR.311, para. 4; Byelorussia, SR.359, para. 21
(1951)); "only when that right [of self-determination] has been assured would it be possible to hope
for the effective implementation of all the other rights guaranteed in the Covenant (India, id., para.
15 (1950)); "[flreedom of the individual was a snare and a delusion as long as the nation of which he
was a part was not free." U.N. Dec. E/CN.4/SR.255, 6 (1952). All comments quoted in Cassese,
supra note 248, at 101. Cristescu comments that, during the debate on the drafting of the Covenants
in the Third Committee of the General Assembly, "[ilt was maintained that the right to self-determi-
nation stood above all other rights and formed the corner-stone of the whole edifice of human
rights." Cristescu, supra note 221, para. 32.
507 The Special Rapporteur recommends that self-determination "must be recognized as the
basic precondition for the enjoyment by indigenous peoples of their fundamental rights and the
determination of their own future." Daes, supra note 116, at 42. See also id, at 20.
508 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra
note 258.
509 Id.
510 Id
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nity inherent in the person and both self-determination and other human
rights.51 This link is best made in the second preambular paragraph of
the two International Covenants on human rights, which reads: "Recog-
nizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person.''512 The reference to "these rights" necessarily includes self-de-
termination as it is the primary right declared in Article 1 of both Cove-
nants. That self-determination is viewed as an inherent right of peoples
as well as of individuals (the third way that it could be considered inher-
ent) can be derived from the comments of participants in the process of
drafting Article 1 of the Covenants. For example, the view was ex-
pressed that self-determination is "a corollary of the democratic principle
of consent of the governed." '13 This suggests that the right of self-deter-
mination stems from the concept of popular sovereignty and is an inher-
ent right of peoples on the basis that sovereignty inherently resides with
the people.
Most scholars appear to adopt the second and third views of the
inherent nature of the right of self-determination, although with different
emphases. For example, a common introduction to the concept of self-
determination includes a description of its origin. While there are many
different accounts of when the term or concept first appeared,514 most
agree that the modern concept grew out of, and now embodies, the con-
cept of popular sovereignty espoused in the American and French revo-
lutions.51 On the other hand, when discussing whether a particular
people has achieved self-determination, the upholding of human rights of
the individuals of the relevant group is typically 16 taken to be the appro-
priate standard.5 17 Further, the statements of the U.N. Charter and In-
511 Espiell stresses that the right of self-determination is an individual right as well as one of
peoples. ESPIELL, supra note 260, para. 58.
512 Supra note 61.
513 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.647, para. 1 (1955), quoted in Cassese, supra note 248, at 102.
514 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
515 See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
516 I say "typically" because there are scholars who argue that a right of secession should exist
even when there have not been deprivations of individual human rights. See infra section entitled
Secession I. Note that whether a people has been deprived of their self-determination is a different
issue from determining the appropriate means to achieve self-determination. While the aim will still
be the achievement of respect for human rights, the choice of method will depend on other relevant
factors.
517 As described below in relation to secession, different scholars place different importance on
the various factors that affect a choice of the method of self-determination. However, all agree that
the aim is to achieve respect for human rights as well as world harmony. See, eg., Ved P. Nanda,
Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, RE-
GIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 193 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980).
Nanda stresses that "[tlhe only reliable test for determining the reasonableness of self-determination
has to be the nature and extent of the deprivation of human rights of the subgroup claiming the
right." Id. at 204.
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ternational Covenants, and the myriad of statements in human rights
instruments tying human rights to the inherent dignity of the human per-
son are widely accepted. I suggest that, in fact, the right of peoples to
self-determination is considered to embody all of these views. Paust, an
international legal scholar, illustrates this mix of views best when he con-
cludes that "there is no question that self-determination and human dig-
nity are intricately interconnected with human rights as well as the only
legitimate measure of authority - the 'will of the people'."
' 18
If the right of self-determination is regarded solely as an instrumen-
tal right then self-determination is only applicable insofar as it can
achieve respect for human rights. Even if these human rights are re-
garded as inherent and fundamental, this does not mean that the right of
self-determination is thereby inherent and fundamental. This is because
the instrumental approach implies that the achievement of human rights
by other means would thereby render the right of self-determination re-
dundant. This approach could be taken in individual situations or as a
general argument against the need for a right of self-determination in
today's world. For example, the latter, general argument could conceiva-
bly be made on the basis that there was a need for the protection offered
by the right of self-determination when it arose because there was no
well-developed human rights regime in international law. Since that
time, however, international law has become increasingly concerned with
human rights issues and contains many standards for state behavior and
treatment of individuals in a wide range of fields. 519 The issue is thus
518 Jordan J. Paust, Self-Determination:. A Definitional Focus, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NA-
TIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 517, at 13 (emphasis added). Harold S.
Johnson & Baijit Singh similarly comment that "[s]elf-[d]etermination is itself becoming the basis for
the international system.... At the root of this concept of world order is the broader issue of human
rights. World order will come to mean the granting of equal opportunity, with no group or individ-
ual more equal than another." Harold S. Johnson & Baljit Singh, Self-Determination and World
Order, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note
517, at 349, 359.
519 Some of the relevant major international instruments adopted since 1960 (in addition to
those already mentioned in Part II, supra) include the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 350; International
Covenants on Human Rights, supra note 61, International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., Supp. No.
30, at 74, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974); Convention on the Elimina-
tion of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 180 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp.
No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), reprinted in, 19 I.L.M.
33 (1980); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/36/55 (1981), reprinted in, 21 I.L.M. 205 (1982), Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, opened for signature February 4, 1985, 23 I.L.M. 1027,
changes noted in 24 I.L.M. 535, 25 I.L.M. 500 (entered into force June 26, 1987). Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448
(1989). In addition to these global instruments, various regional human rights instruments have also
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whether the existence of a right of self-determination is necessary for the
protection of human rights - that is, whether it adds anything to the
existing regime - or whether it has been supplanted by the more specific
provisions in international law. While human rights are not fully pro-
tected in today's world, despite the existence of the various mechanisms
for protecting human rights in international law, this argument would
propose that a lack of protection only indicates that such mechanisms
have not been used; it does not show that only the application of the
right of self-determination will guarantee these rights. Both the particu-
lar and general approaches thus indicate that an inherent right of self-
determination cannot be derived merely from the protection of inherent
individual rights - an instrumental right cannot be made inherent and
inalienable if it is not applicable where there are other means of achieving
its end.
The corollary of regarding the right of self-determination solely as
an instrument for the achievement of human rights is that self-determi-
nation is only considered to be denied when fundamental human rights
are being denied. As the discussion on secession shows, there are those
who argue that human rights violations should not be necessary to enable
a people to claim self-determination.520 For example, this argument
holds that a people should have a right of self-determination where they
merely wish to preserve group identity and control the group's own polit-
ical destiny.521 This argument denies that self-determination is merely
an instrumental right and argues that it is an inherent right of groups.52 2
It is therefore incompatible with the purely instrumental view of self-
determination.
These implications of taking a purely instrumental view show that
the weakest view of the inherent nature of self-determination cannot be
what is envisaged by indigenous peoples when they refer to the inherent
nature of the right of self-determination. While the abuse of human
been adopted, such as the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, its Additional Protocol, P.A.U.T.S. 69 (1988) and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 299. And, as Harris notes, there are "over 100 International Labour
Conventions in force." Harris, supra note 295, at 600-01.
520 See, e.g., infra notes 614 & 633-640 and accompanying text.
521 Buchheit refers to this as 'parochial' self-determination. BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at
223-24. See also infra notes 614 & 633-640 and accompanying text.
522 Note that none of the proponents of a right of secession argue that there should be an
unlimited right of parochial secession. Those who argue for recognition of parochial secession, ar-
gue that all the relevant factors and interests involved should be balanced before any determination
is made whether the claim to secession is legitimate one. While such a balancing exercise may result
in approval of a purely parochial claim, it may not on account of other "disruption factors."
BUCHHErr, supra note 194, at 231-38. Abuses of human rights of the group would thus always be
relevant to any determination of a legitimate claim of secessionist self-determination, even if not
always necessary.
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rights of indigenous peoples has been a primary argument in justifying
the application of self-determination to their situations,123 this is not
their only argument. Indigenous peoples have also argued for the right
of self-determination as an inherent right of peoples to control their own
destiny.524 This latter argument has been based more on the concept of
inherent sovereignty (including sovereignty over their lands), their polit-
ical organization and ways of life, and the fact that the political organiza-
tion of the states in which they live is alien to their culture and has been
imposed on them in violation of their inherent right of sovereignty. 525
This rejects the simplest view of an inherent right of sovereignty on the
basis that it is insufficient to satisfy their needs or desires, or what they
claim are their inherent rights. It thus compels the adoption of what
appears to be a mixture of the second and third views of the inherent
nature of self-determination.
One implication of viewing self-determination as a right that is in-
herent in individuals as well as peoples, and is necessary for the achieve-
ment of fundamental human rights, relates to the perceived basis of the
international legal system. It encourages adoption of the natural law po-
sition that a right does not have to be recognized in positive international
law for it to exist. Instead, it exists because of the nature of peoples and
individuals. This position compels the recognition of the right of self-
determination in positive international law such as the draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
A second implication of viewing self-determination as a right that is
both inherent and instrumental stems from the conception of self-deter-
mination as being derived from the concept of sovereignty. This implica-
tion relates to the requirements of internal self-determination. I suggest
that, because they are so fundamental to self-determination, the combi-
nation of the notions of popular sovereignty and respect for human rights
provide definitive standards for the achievement of internal self-determi-
nation. Cassese, an international legal scholar, gives one possible such
standard:
Internal political self-determination is the right to choose one's
government freely and to have a government that, once chosen, is not
oppressive or authoritarian. It can be achieved only if the state fully
respects and guarantees those civil and political rights of individuals
523 See, eg., STATUS AND RIGHTS OF THE JAMES BAY CREES, supra note 445.
524 See the statements cited supra note 52 and accompanying text. See also the statement
made by the Indigenous Peoples' Preparatory Meeting to the Working Group on Indigenous Peo-
ples, Threat of Quebec Secession from Canada (1991): "[T]hat Canada and Quebec be urged to
clearly recognize the inalienable right of indigenous peoples to self-determination . . .That any
referendum on Quebec independence ... recognize and respect the right of indigenous peoples to
determine their own future.
525 Id.
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whose exercise enables the people to establish and express its will freely
and continually. 52
6
The difficulty with such a standard of internal self-determination
clearly rests with the judgment that would have to be made about how
well any government satisfied it. Such a judgment runs into problems
such as who decides, what biases they bring, and objections about inter-
ference in domestic affairs. However, such a standard would be an im-
provement on the present state of affairs, where there is no agreement
even on what the concept of representative government entails.5 27 Such
an agreement is a prerequisite to enforcement.
Yet, it is not clear that such a standard is sufficient for the purposes
of indigenous peoples. The most obvious shortcoming of the linking of
the respect for human rights with popular sovereignty is illustrated by
Cassese's definition of internal self-determination.5 28 The problem is the
focus on solely civil and political rights. These are not the only funda-
mental rights recognized in international law; economic, cultural and
social rights are also considered to be fundamental. 29 Indigenous peo-
ples place great emphasis on these additional rights, arguing that a peo-
ple has a right, not merely to the protection of their culture, but also for
the cultural group to choose their own political structure.5 3 Therefore,
in addition to not being oppressive or authoritarian, a government must
uphold positive rights of peoples to the preservation of their cultural
identity. Further, there should exist a right of a people to form their own
political structure, distinct from that of the existing state. This right
should exist both where the relevant culture cannot be protected within a
particular state and where it may be minimally protected, but would be
nurtured and could develop under a different structure. This is linked to
the claims that a right of self-determination should be recognized in situ-
ations where it is necessary for the preservation of a culture as an inher-
ent right as well as situations where a people seek to exercise their
inherent right to form their own political associations. The focus is on
both individual human rights and rights to protect interests of the group;
it is both instrumental and inherent - a means to an end and an end in
itself.
4. Internal Self-Government
As discussed above, the requirement that a state have a representa-
526 Cassese, supra note 248, at 102.
527 See supra Part II(B)(2)(a)(ii) entitled "Internal Status."
528 See supra text accompanying note 526.
529 See, e.g., the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
61.
530 This is the essence of the claims to self-determination as described in Part I, supra.
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tive government in order to be entitled to self-determination of the state
as a whole, and thus the protection of their territorial integrity, is not
assessed critically.531 This lack of attention is due primarily to the lack
of clarity in the definition of "representative government" itself. While
this may presently be the case, there are indications that this is changing
and that an international standard for legitimate, representative govern-
ment is emerging.5 32 A good exposition of this view is given by interna-
tional legal scholar, Thomas Franck. 33 As Franck describes, there are
many factors that have contributed to its emergence.5 31 In addition, I
suggest that the recent proclaimed desires for, and movements toward,
democratic forms of government in the former USSR will promote this
trend.535 This is because the primary reason why there was a stalemate
at the times of previous consideration of the standard of internal self-
determination is that there was tension between the strongly differing
views of adherents to Western-style democracy and adherents to the So-
viet classless society.53 6 The breakdown of these divisions can only pro-
mote agreement. Therefore, while the norm of liberal democracy may
not yet have emerged as binding international law, it appears to be mov-
ing in this direction. This movement must therefore be evaluated from
the indigenous peoples' standpoint. Any government, in order to be con-
sidered representative of indigenous peoples as well as other people
within the state, must secure the respect for human rights and cultural
distinctiveness of indigenous peoples and enable them to determine their
own future.
The standards that Franck argues are emerging are those of a West-
ern-style, liberal democracy.5 37 As described above, the primary compo-
nents of such a democracy are free speech and what are termed free and
fair elections.5 38 These elements are expressed in Article 21 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and in Article 25 of the U.N. Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.5 39 Additional implied elements are a
commitment to liberal individualism and to the rule of law.5" While
these elements all have a substantive component, the legitimacy of a gov-
ernment is achieved through the use of a particular process: "by subject-
531 See supra Part II(B)(2)(a)(ii) entitled "Internal Status."
532 Supra notes 362-367 and accompanying text.
533 Franck, supra note 362.
534 The fact that "government cannot govern by force alone [is a] sociological truism." Id. at
48.
535 Assuming these events occurred after Franck wrote the article since they are not referred to
in Franck's article while the August 1991 coup is. Id. at 46.
536 See supra notes 356-361 and accompanying text.
537 See supra notes 363-366 and accompanying text.
538 Supra notes 364-365 and accompanying text.
539 See supra notes 352-353.
540 Franck, supra note 362.
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ing the political process to rules." '541 The issue for indigenous peoples is
whether such a commitment to Western, liberal democratic rules as the
standard for legitimate government, and thus for internal self-determina-
tion for the people(s) of a state, is satisfactory. Indications that it is not
are that, first, indigenous peoples within Western democracies are still
oppressed and denied fundamental human rights. 42 Democracy alone is
clearly not enough.543 Second, this standard still assumes that the people
of a state as a whole will achieve self-determination in this manner. This
denies indigenous peoples the right to choose a separate form of govern-
ment in order to determine their own destiny.
The primary problem for indigenous peoples of traditional, individ-
ual-centred democracies that rely on majority rule and minority protec-
tion is simply that the interests of the minority too often are overridden
by the interests of the majority, without sufficient protection being pro-
vided. Two related reasons can be identified as causes. One is the focus
on individualism. Even where provisions exist that are designed to pro-
tect the minority from abuse by the majority, these provisions are
designed to protect the minority individual rather than the group. Fur-
ther, these provisions are not designed to offer electoral participation
other than on an individual, one-person-one-vote basis. This does not
ensure participation by the minority group as such. This focus denies the
existence of group rights or interests, and fails to recognize that some
human rights can only be protected by recognizing such interests and
according such rights to the group."
The second problem occurs where the cultural values of the minor-
ity are so different from the majority that there is no "consensus on the
fundamental principles of nationhood," '45 and the values of the minority
consistently are overruled by the majority. This problem is well de-
scribed by Francis Deng, an international legal scholar:
Liberal democracy presupposes a framework characterized by a
broad consensus on the fundamental principles of nationhood, the
structure of government, and the shaping and sharing of power,
wealth, and other national resources. Where consensus on these fun-
damentals is lacking, and peoples lack even a shared sense of belonging
541 Id. at 50.
542 See authorities cited supra note 2.
543 See, e.g., the Cobo Report conclusions discussed infra note 561 and his recommendations
infra notes 560-565 and accompanying text.
544 Van Dyke, a political scientist, identifies cultural survival and group distinctiveness as such
rights. VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETHNICITY, AND DISCRIMINATION (1985). The
protection of individual human rights and interests is not the only justification for group rights. See,
e.g., Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities 66 No-
TRE DAME L.REV. 1219, 1234-39 & 1244-65 (1991).
545 Francis M. Deng, Myth and Reality in Sudanese Identity, in THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND
UNITY IN THE SUDAN 61, 69 (Deng & Gifford eds., 1987).
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to the nation, even the concepts of majority and minority cannot apply.
Parliamentary democracy under those circumstances becomes a rule of
the numerical majority imposed on an alienated minority, whether nu-
merically determined or otherwise marginalized. Such a structure can-
not enjoy legitimacy or stability. This means that we must address the
pending fundamental issues of nationhood before we can legitimately
invoke majority votes as justification for imposing any decisions on the
minority.5 4 6
This comment suggests that the lack of a shared sense of nation ex-
plains why democracy hasn't worked and why the indigenous peoples
consider that they are not presently exercising self-determination. 47 In-
digenous peoples are challenging the concept of the nation-state and the
suggestion that a state, once independent, is exercising self-determination
through representative self-government. While the state may be doing
so, the peoples or nations within may be being denied such independence.
The suggestion is that nationhood and democracy have been imposed on
indigenous peoples when they do not fit. 4 ' This has entailed the rule of
the dominant "nation" over the oppressed indigenous "nation".549
While Deng does not provide a solution that could be used as the
basis for a definition of representative government which could achieve
the self-determination of indigenous peoples, it is clear that he believes
that a traditional, individualist, majority rule, unitary democracy will not
be appropriate in situations such as the one he describes. Where a solu-
tion involves accommodating different peoples or "nations" within a
state, it should have a constitutional framework that is devised specifi-
cally to achieve the self-determination of all separate peoples within the
state, rather than aggregating them and assuming that they will achieve
self-determination as an amorphous whole.
The problem of achieving self-determination for the peoples of a
state such that one group does not oppress another group by virtue of the
state's constitutional arrangements has been addressed by advocates of
consociational democracies.550 The theory of consociationalism recom-
546 Id.
547 This comment clearly refers to very complex matters concerning political theory, nation-
state identity, and discrimination which could easily be the topic of an entirely separate essay. Thus,
the substance or validity of the claim made in the quote will not be addressed.
548 This is related to internal colonialism. See supra section entitled Colonialism and Foreign
Subjugation.
549 Id.
550 While Max Weber earlier described the formation of group identification as a process of
consociation, the best exposition of its application to democratic theory is provided by Lijphart. See
AREND LuPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977)
[hereinafter LuPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES]. See also AREND LuPHART, DEMOC-
RACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIANISM AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE
COUNTRIES (1984).
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mends that a government be a "coalition of the political leaders of all
significant segments of the plural society,"55' with special provisions
built in to protect minority groups.55 2 Such provisions should include
proportional representation, a veto power in special circumstances (such
as for constitutional amendments) and, where appropriate, self-govern-
ment through the autonomy of the various groups within the state.5 53
Criteria have been suggested for determining which groups should have
such rights, 54 as well as types of arrangements that will be appropriate
in different circumstances. 55 5 The most striking aspect of consociational-
ism in terms of American democratic theory is that it considers that such
separate treatment of groups is not only in accordance with the demands
of justice, equality, and self-determination, but is required by them.556
Such consociational arrangements based on group identity and
group rights appear to be the only democratic arrangements that could
achieve the self-determination of indigenous peoples within the states in
which they live and, further, achieve it in their own independent
states.557 Because the appropriate arrangements will differ according to
the situation that indigenous peoples are in within their present states, it
is not possible to say what constitutional and institutional structures will
551 VAN DYKE, supra note 544, at 203-04 (quoting Arend Lijphart's conception of consocia-
tionalism). See LuPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 550, at 25.
552 VAN DYKE, supra note 544, at 203-04.
553 Id.
554 For example, Van Dyke proposes nine considerations: (1) A group self-consciousness - a
'we-they' relationship with other groups; (2) Cleavages between the group and others (how enduring,
deep, etc.); (3) A size that enables it to preserve itself; (4) Significance in the lives of its members
(e.g., individuals define themselves by membership); (5) The importance of the right sought to the
interests of the members; (6) Clarity of conditions of membership; (7) Effective organization of the
group i.e., (the ability to press claims and undertake responsibilities); (8) Tradition of treating the
group as a group (e.g., historical discrimination); and (9) The rights claimed are compatible with
equality - the exercise of such a right would not thereby obstruct other groups from achieving self-
determination. Van Dyke argues that mere interest groups and social classes would not satisfy these
criteria, while indigenous peoples would. Id. at 213-15.
555 Van Dyke describes the various types of arrangements that have been used in different
countries in order to respond to problems caused by different types of group identities (for example,
language, race, or religion). He assesses the advantages and disadvantages of the various arrange-
ments and makes recommendations. Id. at chs. 2-7.
556 Van Dyke argues that Americans should recognize the limits inherent in individualism;
that, the deeper the cleavages between ethnic groups, the more individual rights need to be supple-
mented with group rights; and that the "meaning of equal and non-discriminatory treatment must be
adjusted accordingly." Id. at 167.
557 The appropriate form of government for a state comprised of an indigenous people will
clearly depend to an extent on the culture of the indigenous peoples themselves. However, what the
choice of a definition of 'representative government' is attempting to do is provide general principles
that will be appropriate for all states, whether composed of primarily indigenous peoples or only
minimally. The contribution of consociationalism is in identifying principles that would work better
where there are strong group identities within a state - that is, better than the individualist princi-
ples that are more commonly upheld as the ideal.
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be most appropriate to indigenous peoples in general. However, despite
this possible range of types of situations, the one that has received the
most attention in relation to the situations of indigenous peoples has been
the creation of autonomous regions within states, where the indigenous
peoples essentially exercise local government, subject to only minimal in-
terference by the overarching state."' 8 Because of the attention given to
autonomy as a preferred option, I will discuss it in more detail. 559
a. Autonomy
The creation of consociational democracies and a right of autonomy
for indigenous peoples was suggested by the U.N. Special Rapporteur,
Jose R. Martinez Cobo, in his Study of the Problem of Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations."° His recommendations for consocia-
tional arrangements include the setting aside of a certain number of (cen-
tral) parliamentary and other governmental seats for indigenous
candidates. 61 At a more general level he argues that,
measures taken to achieve participation must respect and support the
internal organizational structures of such populations. Accordingly,
Governments must abandon their policies of intervening in the organi-
zation and development of indigenous peoples and must grant them
autonomy, together with the capacity for managing the relevant eco-
nomic processes in the manner which they themselves deem appropri-
ate to their interests and needs.562
558 See supra Part I.
559 The concept of autonomy within existing states is important for the further reason that
recognition of a right of autonomy has been suggested as an alternative to the recognition of a full
(external) right of self-determination for indigenous peoples precisely because of the clash with the
principle and practices of state sovereignty. See, e.g., supra notes 84-85, 112-113 & 116-117 and
accompanying text. There are advantages and disadvantages to autonomy regimes in relation to
ethnic minorities. See, eg., Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Auton-
omy Regimes for Ethnic Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1539 (1991) (although he deliberately
does not address application to the situations of indigenous peoples).
560 Cobo Report, supra, note 1 (discussing the situation of indigenous peoples and recom-
mending remedies needed to overcome their oppression).
561 Id. at 42, para. 576. Such measures were recommended as necessary in order to exercise
their legally recognized civil and political rights and "to ensure that their representation in public
office is genuine and just." Id. at 20, para. 261. The Special Rapporteur considered that the devel-
opment of political rights was thwarted by the de facto state of affairs within which indigenous
peoples had to exercise them. Id. at 20, para. 257. An example given of such state of affairs is of the
need to be able to read and write in order to vote, which is not justified today "in view of the various
procedures which have been established to enable people who cannot read or write to vote." Id.
para. 258. Another example is that of manipulative practices in relation to "the demarcation of
electoral districts and the location of ballot boxes." Id. para. 259. The Special Rapporteur com-
mented further that "the representation of indigenous peoples remains inadequate and is sometimes
purely symbolic." Id. para. 261.
562 Id. para. 268.
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Cobo uses "autonomous" "in the sense of possessing a separate and
distinct administrative structure and judicial system, determined by and
intrinsic to that people or group. 5 63
The primary requirement of any arrangement is that it ensures that
all human rights of indigenous peoples are protected. That is, the focus
will not be solely on political rights but will include all the other catego-
ries of rights identified by indigenous peoples as essential to their sur-
vival.' 64 These include the protection of their language and culture, a
right to education in a manner consistent with local tradition, rights to
other social services and rights to land. 6 These rights are in addition to
political rights such as access to government service and the adoption of
a representative local and national government. However, it is the adop-
tion of representative local government that is the cornerstone of such a
right to autonomy because, through relative independence, the other
rights are more easily protected from abuse by the national government.
Hurst Hannum, an international legal scholar, takes this general de-
scription of autonomy further and suggests in more detail what an auton-
omous territory might look like.5 66  Hannum focuses on the fully
563 Id. para. 273.
564 While a number of these rights already exist in international law, and few formal provisions
today discriminate against indigenous peoples, the practice of implementation of such rights fares
differently (despite the assumption that a democracy ensures that the fundamental rights of all citi-
zens are protected). For examples of the rights that are currently protected: rights to personal
security are recognized in the right to life, liberty and security of the person in the Universal Decla-
ration on Human Rights, supra note 241, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, and in the prohibitions against torture in
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 241; Articles 6 and 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 61. Cultural rights of minorities
are recognized in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
61. Religious rights are recognized in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 61, and of the Universal Declaration, supra note 241, (although the U.N. Decla-
ration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 51, at 171, provides the most comprehensive
protection). Both International Covenants prohibit discrimination on race, colour, or national or
social origin (e.g. art. 2), as does the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 212. The definition of "racial discrimination" in Article 1(1) of
the Convention on Racial Discrimination includes discrimination against indigenous peoples:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
Id. at 216. In respect of the implementation of political rights, see supra note 561, for a description
of the Special Rapporteur's findings.
565 See supra Part I.
566 HANNUM, supra note 22. Hannum actually argues for the creation of a right of autonomy
in place of the more general right of self-determination (i.e., self-determination including a right of
secession). His primary reasons are that it would be easier for states to agree to it, so that it would be
recognized in international law much more quickly than a right of self-determination would be; and
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autonomous territory within a Western-style democracy based on the
separation of powers and devises a list of the powers that such a fully
autonomous territory might be expected to possess.567 While this list of
powers is general and intended to be applicable to a broad range of
groups within states, he specifically recognizes that indigenous societies
within states may have their own governmental structures that are differ-
ent from the separation of powers model. In this situation, Hannum rec-
ognizes that "the preservation of such traditional structures may be the
best means of guaranteeing effective autonomy. So long as members of
indigenous communities desire to maintain their form of government,
those structures should normally be immune from the intervention of an
outside authority." '568 This is not to say that autonomous regions should
expect to be immune from "the overall framework of the fundamental
norms of the state," '5 69 because "[a]utonomy is not equivalent to indepen-
dence."5 70 However, as Hannum stresses, "the state must adopt a flexi-
ble attitude which will enable the autonomous region to exercise real
power, precisely when that exercise of power runs counter to the state's
inherent preference for centralization and uniformity." '571
Hannum only addresses in detail the (local) governmental arrange-
ments for the autonomous territory. While he does not address neces-
sary provisions for central government in such detail, it is clear that the
more general suggestions of the Special Rapporteur and the suggestions
made by consociationalists relating to special representation for the
group - in this case, the autonomous entity - would be required in
order to ensure that there was effective representation of the locality in
relation to decisions of the central government that affected them. Only
such an arrangement could satisfy Hannum's concern that the central
government not override the local in every clash of interest.
One situation that territorial autonomy does not address is where
indigenous peoples are not presently territorially defined but are dis-
persed throughout a state, regardless of whether this dispersal is volun-
it would achieve the respect of nearly all the relevant human rights of indigenous peoples, so it would
thus achieve substantially the same result as the application of a right to self-determination but much
more easily. See, e.g., id. at 454, 468-69 & 473-74. 1 am not adopting this position, but merely using
his description of his suggested right to autonomy as an illustration of how a right of internal self-
determination might be made more specific.
567 This list addresses the powers of a locally elected legislative body, a locally selected chief
executive, an independent local judiciary, and areas of joint concern, including the handling of dis-
putes concerning the extent of local authority. Id. at 467-68. Hannum devises this list from a survey
of various different autonomous arrangements that have been devised in response to "geographic,
political, ethnic, linguistic, or other differences within a single sovereignty." Id. at 333.
568 Id. at 468.
569 Id.
570 Id.
571 Id.
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tary, the result of oppressive policies of governments, historical accident,
or a mixture of all three. 72 One option would be to create territorial
areas of autonomy. Another would be to adopt more group rights within
the central government according to consociationalist principles; this
would create greater power-sharing among the groups with less emphasis
on the formal equality of individuals that are characteristic of most pres-
ent democracies. The choice (within these ideas) of method and particu-
lar governmental and institutional structures will clearly depend entirely
on the situation of the indigenous people(s) and the state in question.
In the context of the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous
peoples currently being developed by the Working Group, the ap-
proaches and considerations described in this section should be used in
order to measure the utility of the provisions of the present draft declara-
tion. 3 The development of these principles should be undertaken with
representatives of peoples themselves, not just with the governments of
states in which such peoples live. The standards that indigenous peoples
themselves consider are necessary in order to achieve self-determination
could thus be properly addressed.
The general principles devised are likely to be based on consocia-
tionalist principles: an emphasis on the group rather than just on the
individual. It will clearly not be appropriate to provide what the appro-
priate self-government arrangement is for all indigenous peoples, because
different types of self-government arrangements, and thus different prin-
ciples and provisions, will be appropriate for different peoples and states.
But it is appropriate to specify general guidelines for different types of
arrangements, while leaving the details to be devised separately, perhaps
in agreements between particular states and indigenous peoples. For ex-
ample, while autonomy should clearly not be required, guidelines for its
delineation should be included for those situations in which it is appro-
priate. Such guidelines could include Hannum's points about the preser-
vation of traditional indigenous structures and about the appropriate
balance of power between local and central governments. 74 Such guide-
lines would not pre-determine the specific appropriate relationship be-
tween indigenous peoples and states, nor provide limits on the forms of
government that indigenous peoples could agree to, but would instead
provide protections that indigenous peoples could insist on in negotia-
tions with states in individual cases.
In addition to these general substantive provisions, the draft decla-
572 One example is the Maori of Aotearoa/New Zealand.
573 1 do not propose to examine whether the draft declaration fulfills the criteria suggested by
either Cobo or Hannum. This is partly because the relevant provisions on political rights have not
been discussed as extensively as the other provisions in the draft declaration, but more because it is a
large, detailed project in its own right.
574 See supra notes 567-571 and accompanying text.
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ration should provide for the process of negotiation between states and
indigenous peoples on these matters.575 Such a provision, in focusing on
the process of negotiation, would stress both the need for different ar-
rangements for different indigenous peoples and the fact that the situa-
tion of any particular people changes over time with the changing
relationship between them and the state. A prescribed on-going process
of negotiation would enable such changes over time to also be
accommodated.
In conclusion, the initial problem with the international law of inter-
nal self-determination, or representative self-government, is that there
are no standards for assessing when it is achieved. The lack of agreement
causes states to fall back on the achievement of external self-determina-
tion, except in extreme circumstances, and provides a barrier to the sepa-
rate self-determination of indigenous peoples within states. While the
lack of standards appears to be in the process being resolved by the
emerging norm of democratic governance, a new problem arises with it:
the emerging standards themselves are not able to satisfy the concerns
and interests of indigenous peoples. These standards do not properly ad-
dress the criticism that the state should not be considered as an amor-
phous whole for the purposes of self-determination and they thus ignore
issues of nationhood and institutionalized oppression that may exist
within that state. The unfortunate result of ignoring such issues is that
peoples within the so-called nation-state may be denied their (internal)
self-determination. The alternative approaches that I have outlined do
address such issues. Whatever actual solution is chosen, it is clear that
appropriate standards and processes will not be dependent on the tradi-
tional conception of a western-style, individualistic, majority rule democ-
racy. Indigenous peoples will not achieve control over their destiny if
such conceptions provide the only standard for its achievement.
5. Secession
The reasons given by states for the inability of indigenous peoples to
secede from their present states are varied, but can be categorized as be-
ing of two types. The first type relates to the definition of a state. As
described above, international law recognizes four criteria for sovereign,
independent statehood.5 76 States typically claim that indigenous peoples
do not fulfill these criteria, yet there is no real analysis of whether or not
this is the case. Some indigenous peoples and scholars have argued that
575 Maivn Clech Lm suggests that such processes should be "internationally-mediated." Lm,
supra note 109, at 62.
576 The four criteria are: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government;
and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States, supra note 179, art. 1.
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they do indeed fulfill these requirements.- 77 Further, at different times in
history, indigenous peoples have been considered sovereign nations.178
Whether or not indigenous peoples actually fulfill these criteria, or have
ever been considered to fulfill these criteria, appears to be considered
irrelevant in some situations. For example, even if North American In-
dian nations presently satisfy the criteria, states still deny that there is a
right of secession under present international law.579  This denial is
caused by the second type of objection to secession.
The second type of objection is that based on policy grounds,
namely policy concerning the consequences of the existence of a right of
secession. Of these consequences, there are two types. The first is prag-
matic, which includes: that the (mere) existence of a right of secession
will entail the infinite divisibility of states; that too many small or "mini"
states will be created; and that any group will be able to hold the electo-
ral system to ransom in order to get its way by threatening to secede.
The second type of policy argument based on consequences concerns the
violation of basic principles of international law. The view of states is
that secession would violate the territorial integrity of states and that any
determination of claims or assistance to claimant groups would violate
the principle of non-intervention in states' domestic affairs, both of these
being fundamental premises of the present system of states and state sov-
ereignty. 8 It is this argument from basic principles that forms the pri-
mary objection to secession by indigenous peoples from the states in
which they live.
Whether there is or could be a right to secession is subject to debate
577 John H. Clinebell & Jim Thompson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of
Native Americans Under International Law, 27 BUFF. L.R. 669, 673-679 (1978).
578 Vitoria, Vattel, Gentili and Grotius attributed sovereignty to indigenous peoples at the time
of contact with Western European powers; numerous other scholars continued this position into the
nineteenth century. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 7; Clinebell, supra note 577, at 679-83. It can
be argued that the making of treaties with the indigenous peoples in 'discovered' lands is evidence
that the indigenous peoples were considered to have sovereignty over the territory in question. The
U.S. Supreme Court (the Marshall court of the 1830's) has recognized that some Indian nations
constituted a state because of their treatment as a state by the U.S. government. See, e.g., The
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). This treatment was explicitly altered by U.S. legislation in 1871 (Act of March 3, 1871, 16
Stat. 544) which the U.S. Supreme Court has held meant that "the tribes were no longer regarded as
sovereign nations." DeCoteau v. District County Court for the Tenth Judicial District Court, 420
U.S. 425, 432 (1975).
579 Further, in addition to the non-recognition of nations that fulfill the criteria for statehood,
formally and substantively, it has been argued that some African states and other mini-states have
been recognized that do not substantially fulfill these requirements. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note
179 (examining African states not substantially fulfilling requirements of statehood). On the require-
ments of statehood, see CRAWFORD, supra note 168.
580 See supra Part II. See also infra note 597 (Buchheit's description of the fears of states).
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in the international sphere.5"' As described in Part II, the more tradi-
tional view of secession is that exemplified in the comment made by a
Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant: "So far as the ques-
tion of secession of a particular section of a Member State is concerned,
the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not
believe will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member
State."58 2 Despite this being the more traditional view, some secessionist
claimants and some scholars insist that there is a right of secessionist self-
determination in international law. I suggest that part of the disagree-
ment over whether there is such a right is due to the rhetoric and termi-
nology used. This section will describe the various approaches that have
been taken in response to the position as exemplified by U Thant's state-
ment58 3 and suggest how there is actually more agreement on what in-
ternational law provides than at first appears. The focus is on the future
recognition of such a right in the draft declaration and the barriers to
that positive recognition. Because of this, and because the negotiation on
the draft declaration is being undertaken with states who take a positive
view of international law, the following description will adopt the frame-
work of positivism. 584 This will more easily indicate how the argument
for recognition of a right in the draft declaration could be approached.
Under the positive view of international law, there are four possible
approaches to the issue of secession. One is to deny that what is at issue
is secession. Another is to argue that such a right is already recognized
for (at least some) indigenous peoples. A third is to argue that, even if it
has not yet been recognized, such a right could be recognized and still be
consistent with international law. The fourth is to argue that it should be
so recognized, and then address what the content of such a right may be.
All four approaches have been taken in relation to indigenous peoples,
the fourth argument typically being coupled with the third.
581 See supra Part I.
582 Transcript of Press Conference of January 9, 1970, at Dakar, Senegal, 7 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRON. 34, at 36 (Feb. 1970). This comment was made in response to the claims to secede made by
Biafra. For a discussion of the Biafran situation, see, e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 162-176.
583 Transcript of Press Conference, supra note 582.
584 Positive lawyers argue that no right exists until its recognition by states in international
law. Natural law theorists, on the other hand, say that a right can exist even when it has not been
recognized by states in positive international law. However, the adoption of the positivist framework
in this section will not greatly affect the outcome of the arguments made because even natural law-
yers have not argued for an unlimited right of secession and have, moreover, argued for a qualified
right only in a few cases. See, eg., BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 55-56 (concluding that natural
rights theory and terminology does not provide much support for modern separatist movements).
The positivist framework makes a distinction between what is current positive law - i.e., what states
have recognized as law - and what might be law in the future. Thus, while a right may not have
been recognized in the past, that does not mean that it will not be in the future. It is the arguments
for the explicit recognition of a qualified right of secessionist self-determination that is the primary
focus of this section.
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The first approach in response to states' objections that there is no
right of secession in international law is that made by Brownlie, de-
scribed above."' This approach is to deny that what many indigenous
peoples are claiming is secession. The justification for this position is
that those indigenous peoples who can be considered as being colonized
under Brownlie's interpretation of that concept, are entitled to self-deter-
mination under positive international law and do not need to argue for a
right of secession. That is because the states within which they are cur-
rently located are not entitled to the territorial integrity of their pres-
ently-asserted boundaries, so it is not a simple case of secession. 86
This approach, however, does not dispose of the issue of the recogni-
tion of a right of secession, for two reasons. The first reason is that the
international boundaries of many states with indigenous peoples within
their borders have been accepted for so long that an exercise in semantics
- saying that indigenous peoples' independence is not really secession -
is not enough to get over the hurdle of the impression that this is a real
case of the possible break-up of an established state. These boundaries
are more established than, for example, those of the European colonists
who claimed that the colonies were part of the actual larger state.587 So
the impression that this is an issue of real secession provides a barrier to
the acceptance of Brownlie's arguments.
The second reason is that there are many indigenous peoples who
would not benefit from the application of even Brownlie's (arguably ex-
tended) concept of colonialism. This is because they are not so properly
territorially separate from the larger state (whatever the cause of that
diminished separation may be). Because of the insistence that the right
of self-determination includes the option of complete independence and
thus possibly secession, approaches to recognizing a right to secession
therefore must therefore be addressed.
In relation to the second approach, there have been no arguments
that there is an unqualified right of secession in international law - that
a people can secede merely on a whim - nor any that there should be.
There have been a few arguments that there is a qualified right of seces-
sion already recognized in international law but they are either not par-
ticularly sound588 or are really arguments in favor of recognition of a
585 See supra notes 469-474 and accompanying text.
586 See R.S. Bhalla, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in IssuEs OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 91 (William Twining ed., 1991). This approach is also taken by Igor Grazin in his
discussion of the case of the Baltic States. Grazin, supra note 325. Grazin argues that the Baltic
states were entitled to secede from the Soviet Union under the Soviet law on secession on the basis
that they were under alien occupation and never consented to join the Soviet Union. Id. at 1413-16.
587 See supra note 269.
588 For example, Clinebell and Thompson imply that there is currently a right of secession
when they argue that the prohibition on secession "applies only to people who have originally made
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right of secession.58 9 Accordingly, I will not address them further here.
By far the most common approaches taken in relation to secession are
the third and fourth approaches that I have defined.
The third approach is based on the argument that international law,
even if it has not recognized a positive right to secession, and even if it
rejects an unlimited right, has not completely rejected future recognition
of a limited right of secession. Moreover, such a limited right of seces-
sion would be consistent with existing international law.
Examples of scholars who argue that international law does not pro-
hibit "all secessions under all circumstances"'5 9  are Umozurike, 591 Ca-
rey, 92 Nawaz, 93 and Buchheit.594 While I will not repeat their
arguments here, they also argue that there is room for future recognition
a choice to be included in a state." Clinebell, supra note 577, at 709. As authority for this proposi-
tion they cite Thomas C. Carey, Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era: The Case of Quebec, 1
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 47 (1977). Clinebell, supra note 577, at 709. Carey, on the other hand, makes
no such argument. While Carey argues that this should be the case, he expressly acknowledges that
a right of secession has not been uniformly recognized in international law. Id. at 51-55 & 70-71.
Nor is there any requirement that "the consent of a people is necessary to bind them inexorably into
a nation-state." Id. at 60. Instead, Carey concludes that "[i]f international law does come to recog-
nize the right of a people to secede, it will probably do so for peoples subject to extreme forms of neo-
colonialism." Id. at 71. I thus suggest that Clinebell and Thompson's argument, despite its appeal,
rests on a false premise and cannot be taken as a statement of what international law actually recog-
nizes.
Buchheit also describes some arguments made by scholars that there is a limited right of seces-
sion in international law. BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 133-37. These scholars, however, include
two who wrote during the League of Nations period. While their recommended content of a right to
self-determination is similar to that recommended today, I suggest that the justifications for their
positions can no longer be used as precedent in such a different international climate. Other jurists
cited include two from the "communist bloc." Id. at 135. However, as Buchheit himself acknowl-
edges, the communist theoretical position on self-determination is not matched by its practice. Id. at
121-27. Charles Rousseau is cited, Id. at 135. But his view is that secession is only legitimate when
it is accepted by the State in question. Id. at 135. I suggest that this is not an argument that there is
a right of secession in the sense that secessionists argue. Finally, Umozurike is cited, id. at 134.
However, I suggest that Umozurike is not arguing that there currently exists a right of secession but
that there is room for such recognition in the future.
589 For example, Brownlie's approach could be categorized as an argument for secession if you
label as secession what indigenous peoples such as the Dene and Inuit would be doing under the
guise of self-determination (even though Brownlie disagrees that this is what it is). See supra notes
469-474 and accompanying text.
590 UMOZURIKE, supra note 188, at 199.
59 1There is no rule of international law that condemns all secessions under all circum-
stances. The principle of fundamental human rights is as important, or perhaps more so,
as than of territorial integrity. Neither a majority nor minority has the legal right to se-
cede, without more, since secession may jeopardise the legitimate interests of the other
part .... [A] majority or minority accorded its normal democratic rights cannot legally
request the international community to help it to secede.
Id.
592 Carey, supra note 588, at 65-67. Carey cites Umozurike for support. Id. at 66.
593 Nawaz, supra note 184, at 91.
594 BUCHHEr, supra note 194, at 134-135 (citing Umozurike for support).
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of a limited right of self-determination - i.e., that it could be made con-
sistent with existing international law."'5 I note that all of these ap-
proaches entail the primacy of fundamental human rights over the
principle of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. 96 As the descrip-
tion of the present law shows, however, these barriers will not be easily
overcome. But if any approach will be able to do it, it will be one that
directly balances the factors that the various proponents of the fourth
approach propose.
There are clearly various arguments against secession in any partic-
ular case.597 These arguments, however, do not justify a blanket refusal
of the existence of a right of secession. Because there are reasons both
for and against secession in any particular case, the fourth approach ar-
gues instead for the development of a framework whereby the advantages
and disadvantages can be directly compared and balanced before a deci-
sion is made on the legitimacy of a claim to secede. This would open the
door to claims, but avoid the "slippery slope" by defining in advance
what types of claims are considered legitimate. This would enable a right
of secession to be recognized in international law, but only as a qualified
right.
While the various proponents of this approach place different em-
phases on the factors to be considered, and devise different tests for the
legitimacy of secessionist claims, the most significant feature of this ap-
proach is that they have in common a rejection of the automatic priority
of territorial integrity and non-intervention. The differences among the
proponents of this approach appear to be due to the readiness with which
they accord other principles priority over these principles of state sover-
eignty. The proposals for a qualified right to secession range from those
that would only override the principles of territorial integrity and non-
intervention in extreme cases of oppression and abuse, to those that argue
595 See, e.g., Carey, supra note 588, at 65-67. There are those who argue that there is no
prohibition on secession, but do not make any arguments relating to the future recognition of any
right. For example, Akehurst simply takes the position that "[t]here is no rule of international law
which forbids secession from an existing State; nor is there any rule that prohibits the motherstate to
crush the secessionary movement, if it can. Whatever the outcome of the struggle, it will be accepted
in the eyes of international law." MICHAEL B. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1970) at 72, cited in BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 132.
596 See, e.g., Umozurike, supra note 188, at 199 & 268-70.
597 Buchheit identifies six "fundamental apprehensions" which stem from "political and emo-
tional fears expressed in response to suggestions of secessionist self-determination." BUCHHEIT,
supra note 194, at 27. Some of these apprehensions are: indefinite indivisibility; "Balkanization;" the
danger of economic non-viability of the seceding entity as a state; where the seceding state is richer
than the remaining state; the non-viability of the remaining state; minorities trapped within the
seceding state having their human rights abused. Id. at 28-3 1. In sum, the fear of states appears to
be that secessionist self-determination "would constitute an unmanageable threat to intra-State har-
mony and consequently have an adverse effect upon the stability of the international system." Id. at
19. Buchheit also discusses the case against secession more generally. Id. at 20-27.
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that the right of secession should be allowed even where there is no abuse
of human rights.5 98
Nanda, an international legal scholar, for example, argues that the
present international system of states and state sovereignty is at least rel-
atively stable; 99 the maintenance of world order thus requires upholding
as much of the system as is consistent with the respect for human rights
(otherwise, chaos would ensue, with the possibility of worse deprivations
of human rights).' The result is that secession may only be resorted to
when all other methods of achieving respect for human rights have
failed. The effect of this approach is that severe deprivations of human
rights must be shown before recourse may be had to such a drastic rem-
edy as secession. 6°1
Those that would allow secession more readily do so for various
reasons. A common sentiment is that it is ridiculous to wait for some
arbitrary amount of suffering to be endured before a right to secession is
recognized. 60 2 Some proponents of this alternative approach are Reis-
man, Suzuki, Buchheit, Chen, Brilmayer (all international legal schol-
ars), Beitz (an international relations scholar), and Buchanan (a
philosopher), all of which are described and commented upon below.63
Reisman comments that "International law expresses guarded pref-
erences for the avoidance of territorial division but accepts them when
order and justice are more likely to be served."'  The primary reason
against territorial division is the need to create a viable state. This re-
quires the creation of "communities with sufficient internal stability and
vigor to stand against outside force and to prevent the introduction of
extra regional forces."6 °" The undesirability of creating a landlocked
state would militate against division.61 6 While Reisman's focus on order
and justice includes a focus on human rights, and implies that secession
is only accepted when this cannot be achieved by other means, his view
does not appear to be as strict as Nanda's. This arises from Reisman's
598 Heraclides labels the continuum as going from those that take a "strict" approach to those
that take a more "lenient" approach. ALEXIS V.A. HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF
MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL PoLrIcs 29-30 (1991).
599 See Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Se-
cede, 13 CASE W. R.ns. J. INT'L L. 257, 264-65 (1981).
600 See id. at 276.
601 Id.
602 See, eg., BUCHHEIT, supra note 194, at 213.
603 There are other proponents of this alternative approach, such as Umozurike, described
supra note 188 and accompanying text, but the scholars described here supply the range of views
held.
604 W. Michael Reisman, Somali Self-Determination in the Horn, in NATIONALISM AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 151, 169 (I.M. Lewis ed., 1983).
605 Id. at 168.
606 Id. at 169.
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belief that "[b]oundaries should be designed to be instrumental to the
achievement of major social goals. In particular, they should facilitate
rather than impede social contact between group members." 7 Thus,
while Nanda expresses a preference for upholding the present world sys-
tem for the sake of stability, Reisman appears to see the present world
system as less inherently desirable and, instead, only desirable in as far as
it serves the social goals of peoples."°
Suzuki subscribes to similar views as Reisman, but places less stress
on the negative aspects of secession, and thus appears more open to terri-
torial division. 9 Suzuki more openly utilizes the "New Haven School"
of international law610 by expressly taking as his goal optimum world
public order (including the recognition of human dignity for all) while
maintaining minimum public order (minimizing the negative effects of
striving to achieve the goal).611 As a result, Suzuki holds that the princi-
ples of territorial integrity and "domestic jurisdiction" are not "absolute
or sacred. '612 Instead, "both principles must be subservient to the over-
riding concern for human dignity. ' 613 Further, "consistency in improv-
ing the quality of public order, rather than consistency in supporting
change or stability, should be the goal.",614 In determining the legitimacy
of a claim to secede, "the test of reasonableness is the determining fac-
tor .... The total context of such a claim must be considered: the poten-
tial effects of the grant or denial of self-determination on the sub-group,
the incumbent group, neighboring regions, and the world commu-
nity., 615  Ultimately, however, the overriding concern in the choice be-
tween the territorial integrity of a state and its disintegration is that of
human rights: any choice "should be made in such a way as to establish a
607 Id. at 168-69.
608 1 note that Heraclides categorizes Reisman as strictly as he does Nanda, citing the views
that I have quoted. HERACLIDES, supra note 598, at 30. For the reasons I have outlined, I disagree
with Heraclides' characterization.
609 Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order Community Response to Terri-
torial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976).
610 So called because its originators, Harold Lasswell, Myers MacDougal, and Michael Reis-
man, were all based at Yale University, in New Haven, Connecticut. For an extensive description of
the School's philosophy see Myres S. McDougal, et. al. Theories About International Law: A Pro-
logue to a Configurative Jurisprudence 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968), reprinted in MYERS S. MC-
DOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 43 (1981). For an extensive
exposition of the School's philosophy in the field of human rights, see MRYES S. McDOUGAL,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
611 Suzuki, supra note 609, at 792.
612 Id. at 848.
613 Id.
614 Id. at 785.
615 Id. at 784.
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fundamental basis for the enjoyment of all human rights., 6 16
Buchheit's approach is similar to Suzuki's in that the legitimacy of a
claim to secede results from a balancing of all the various factors con-
cerned.617 Buchheit, however, can be said to have a more lenient test for
legitimacy as his model accommodates not only claims for remedial se-
cession (for oppression and abuses of human rights) but also what he
terms parochial secession, where the claim is based simply on the preser-
vation of group identity and control of the group's own political destiny
rather than solely on the denial of human rights.618
This more generous view of the legitimacy of secession appears to be
also shared by Chen, an international legal scholar who utilizes the New
Haven School approach.6 19 Chen argues that the international law of
self-determination should be developed beyond colonialism on the basis
that "the consent of the governed is an essential element of human
dignity. '" 620
Deeply rooted in the ultimate goal of human dignity, self-determi-
nation would continue to serve as a ringing doctrine and symbol for
group formation and identification, a symbol for the perpetual search
of the collective self. Groups would be allowed to break away from
established nation-states when it would help promote abundant pro-
duction and wide sharing of values for the group directly concerned,
without causing undue hardship to the remaining community of which
it was a part and without its having a serious disruptive impact on the
public order both regionally and globally.621
While Chen's focus is similar to Suzuki's, in that it includes human
rights and undertakes a balancing of the various interests in any situa-
tion, Chen's emphasis on the sharing of values and on group formation
616 Id. at 862.
617 BUCHHErr, supra note 194. Buchheit argues that legitimacy "must result from the balanc-
ing of the internal merits of the claimants' case against the justifiable concerns of the international
community expressed in its calculation of the disruptive consequences of the situation." Id. at 238.
The "internal merits" referred to are the nature of the group (the existence of a genuine 'self'; see
e.g., id. at 228) and its situation within the governing state (the extent of oppression and the range of
remedies available). Id. at 235-38. The external merits, or "justifiable concerns", are the prospects
for the independent existence of the state (economic viability, political structure, and future cohe-
siveness) and the effect of the separation on the world and on the remaining community. Id. at 232.
Buchheit articulates a mathematical relationship whereby the higher the internal merits of the claim,
the higher the disruption factor must be in order to outweigh the merits. Id. at 238-245.
618 Note, however, that it is not the most lenient; Buchheit sees himself as accommodating the
claims of the strict remedialists and the loose parochialists by the use of the sliding scale introduced
by the mathematical relationship. Id at 224-35.
619 Chen, supra note 206.
620 Id at 241.
621 Id.
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and identification is wider than what is typically encompassed by a refer-
ence to the protection of human rights.
Charles Beitz takes the view that "[s]elf-determination is a means to
the end of social justice. '6 22 This is wider than Suzuki's approach in that
Beitz seems to envisage that social justice encompasses more than what is
typically encompassed by references to human rights, with each case de-
pending "on the contents of the principles of social justice appropriate to
particular groups." '623 Yet it is also narrower than Buchheit's approach,
because Beitz holds that a right of secession can only be extended to all
groups "when it can be shown that independent statehood is a necessary
political means for the satisfaction of appropriate principles of jus-
tice."'6 24 Further, Beitz considers that in many cases, injustice would be
a "deep and relatively fixed [feature] of the social and political life of the
group." '6 25 This requirement precludes the parochial self-determination
that Buchheit envisages as being possible if not outweighed by the disrup-
tive consequences.626 Beitz does not argue for the inclusion of this
situation.
Brilmayer emphasizes a different aspect, arguing that human rights
abuses are not enough in themselves to justify a right to secession, but
instead a claim to secession must include a justification to take the terri-
tory that is also being claimed. 627 Thus, in order for a claim to secede to
be legitimate, it must articulate a theory of sovereignty over territory
presently within the state.628 Once that is established, other criteria will
be weighed, such as the extent of the fault of the current majority group
in any grievance, any other grievances such as human rights abuses, and
the disruption to the present state if secession is granted.629 Perhaps the
most radical element of Brilmayer's thesis is her claim that the present
rhetoric that pits the satisfaction of human rights through secession
against the territorial integrity of states is wrong.6a° Instead, she argues,
territorial integrity can accommodate self-determination if we regard
622 CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 104 (1979).
See also, id. at 112, (extending his comments to groups other than those subject to colonialism).
623 Id. at 104. With respect to the principles of social justice, Beitz posits an exercise whereby
principles of justice would be chosen by rational members of the group; these principles could cover
"exploitation and distributive inequality" in addition to "the more conventional interpretation [con-
cerning] ... an absence of representative institutions." Id. at 98-99.
624 Id. at 112.
625 Id. at 115.
626 See supra notes 617 & 618 and accompanying text.
627 Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J.
INT'L L. 177 (1991). As a comparison, Brilmayer posits the alternative situation of refugees, who
may leave for reasons of abuse, but who do not have a valid territorial claim. Id. at 187-189.
628 Id. at 199 (positing that this claim will typically be based on an historical grievance).
629 Id. at 199-201.
630 Id. at 178-79, 192-97 & 201-202.
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claimants as simply making competing claims to territorial integrity;
that is, to their territorial integrity rather than the state's. 31
The most recent contribution to the debate on the legitimacy of se-
cession is that of Buchanan.632 Buchanan considers that the most sound
ground for establishing the legitimacy of secession is that the group has
been treated unjustly, such injustice encompassing more than typical
considerations of human rights.633 While injustice is the "[c]hief and
least controversial" '634 of the sound moral justifications for secession,
Buchanan goes further, arguing that self-defense, cultural preservation
and the goals of political association may also justify secession.635
Buchanan does not place an absolute limit on these grounds by requiring
that secession be a last resort, but the less reliant the claim is on serious
injustices, the more that other alternatives must be sought first. 36
A more radical approach is taken in a 1980 Yale Law Journal Note,
which argues that a prima facie right to secede is established when there
is an associational desire on the part of the majority of a separate group,
and that group has a viable, identifiable land base.637 The proposed se-
cession is then balanced against any negative consequences to the existing
state, and violence on the part of either side is considered .63  The Note
argues that "the individual's right to choose the community he regards as
optimal for his development is a fundamental social value" '639 and that
"the institutions of civil government [should be adjusted] to evolving
concepts of group identity."'  It implies that the goal of self-determina-
tion, and thus secession, should be to achieve such choice and group
identity, with a minimum of disruption. Perhaps the most instructive
guiding principle is "the fallacy of simply equating territorial integrity
with stability, and self-determination with disruptive change." 641 In-
stead, in some cases, "adherence to territorial integrity has promoted dis-
order whereas a right of secession could well occasion future stability and
631 Id.
632 ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT
SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991).
633 Examples given are when: "Its territorial sovereignty has been violated; it has suffered
discriminatory redistribution; its members have been denied equality of opportunity; or their individ-
ual or states' rights have been violated." IdL at 132.
634 Id.
635 Buchanan succinctly summarizes his right to secede and the competing factors. Id. at 152-
53.
636 Id.
637 Debra A. Valentine, Note, The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 802 (1980).
638 Id. at 815.820.
639 Id. at 802.
640 Id. at 803.
641 Id. at 824.
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peace." 2
Not all indigenous peoples presently argue for the right to secede., 3
In fact, as was shown in the debates in the Working Group, many specifi-
cally stress that they are not looking for the right to secede for them-
selves, only alternative forms of government that protect their interests
and are more appropriate to the structure of indigenous societies.' 4
Where a claim to secede has been made, it has typically been presented
on the basis of geographical separateness and historical colonialism. 'S
Such claims have been based on the criteria that currently exist in inter-
national law, extended to the arguably similar situations of many indige-
nous peoples. 6 Very few have been made on the simple basis, for
example, of an inherent right of self-determination and an inherent attri-
bute of sovereignty over their lands that requires the restoration of own-
ership. I suggest, however, that the existence of the present legal
categories and international rules of self-determination have defined the
debate and the claims made within it. For example, indigenous peoples
in fact have traditional views of land that typically do not envisage
human sovereignty over it. Instead, people belong to the land.' 7 Per-
haps the most that can be said of an indigenous human right to land is
the customary right of use of particular areas. Today, such a right of use
has often been translated into a right of ownership simply in order to
preserve the land for the use of the respective indigenous peoples. While
this does not affect a territorial claim or right to secede, it illustrates the
way the rhetoric and even legal concepts are adapted to fit the prevailing
world view. The same could perhaps be said of the claims for secession.
If the international law of secession were changed in line with the
proposals of the various scholars described above, I suggest that the dis-
course used by indigenous peoples would correspondingly change. As
the right to secession under the different theories proposed depends en-
642 Id. The Note argues that the Ogaden was then such a case.
643 See, e.g., the submissions by the National Indian Youth Council contained in Analytical
Compilation of Observations and Comments supra note 40, at 13-15.
644 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
645 For example, the Dene and Inuit of the Canadian Northwestern Territories make this
claim. See supra notes 469-474 and accompanying text.
646 Id.
647 On the importance of land to indigenous peoples see, e.g., the statements made in the con-
text of the Working Group. The Study of Discrimination, supra note 51, at 7, para. 27; Review of
Developments - Consideration of the Evolution of Standards - Information Received From Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations, supra note 51, at 11; Analytical Compilation of Observations and Com-
ments, supra note 40, Add. 1, at 26-27; Analytical Commentary on the Draft Principles Contained in
the First Revised Text of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36) Elaborated on by the Chairman/Rapporteur of the WGIP, at 10-15, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/39 (1990); Ninth Report of the WGIP, supra note 28, para. 51. See also Cobo
Report, supra note 1, at 16, paras. 196-97; STAVENHAGEN, supra note 1, at 100-105.
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tirely on factors specific to the situation in question, it is impossible here
to give a general assessment as to the likely results under the different
theories. I will suggest, however, that the more lenient approaches are
the most suitable for accommodating all of the concerns of indigenous
peoples.
Indigenous peoples have been subjected to historical injustices. All
are still subject to varying degrees of injustice today. As noted in the
description of the discussion of the draft declaration in the Working
Group, the point stressed most often is the violation of the human rights
of indigenous peoples." 8 Such points are not made solely in the context
of claims for self-determination or secession; they are also elaborated on
in the discussion under the agenda item Review of Developments.r 9 It is
clear that some indigenous peoples can be described as suffering severe
human rights deprivations and may thus satisfy the criteria for a right of
self-determination even under strict tests such as those posed by
Nanda.650 Any theory that legitimizes a right of secession even solely on
the strict basis of severe deprivations of human rights would be likely to
enable more indigenous peoples to achieve full self-determination.
Despite the fact that some indigenous peoples may satisfy even the
strict approach, such an approach would not necessarily accord with the
indigenous peoples' view that self-determination and self-government are
inherent rights of peoples; nor does it accord with their view that their
culture is incompatible with the prevailing cultures imposed on them by
the states in which they live, and that, in order to preserve their culture,
indigenous peoples need to operate their own, separate systems of gov-
ernment and laws. In order to accommodate such views, the stricter ap-
proaches would not be enough; instead, the more lenient approaches
would be necessary, such as those of Buchheit, Chen, Buchanan, and of
the Yale Law Journal Note.
Brilmayer's requirement of a claim to territory does not pose any
648 See, eg., supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
649 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
650 For example, the Jumma, indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh,
could be candidates for such a right of secession if the present recommendations for autonomy are
not implemented and/or prove to be insufficient to end the violations of their human rights. On the
human rights deprivations suffered by these peoples, see CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS COMMISSION,
REPORT: 'LIFE IS NOT OURS' - LAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS,
BANGLADESH (May 1991). For a summary of findings and recommendations of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts Commission (an independent international body established to investigate the allegations of
human rights violations in 1990-1991), see Review of Developments Pertaining to the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/5 (1991). See also Submission by the Jumma delegation to the WGIP, Ge-
neva, 29 July - 2 August 1991, Written Submission to the WGIP by the Chittagong Hill Tracts Com-
mission, Geneva, August 1 1991, and Oral Statement by Leif Dunfleld (member of the Chittagong
Hill Tracts Commission) to the WGIP, July 1991 (all documents on file with author).
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particular problems for indigenous peoples because their historical ties to
the land are typically not in question. I would even go so far as to say
that it is clear that indigenous peoples have historical grievances in rela-
tion to the lands they claim and can articulate theories of sovereignty in
relation to them. Where I differ from Brilmayer is in her description
that, because we can regard claimants to territory as making competing
claims to territorial integrity, we can say that the human rights claims do
not really clash with territorial integrity and that, therefore, territorial
integrity does not pose a real barrier to the achievement of self-determi-
nation. As the description of the debate in the international sphere on
self-determination shows, it is the territorial integrity of present states
that is a fundamental norm of the present world system of states and
state sovereignty.651 The concept of territorial integrity poses a barrier to
secession as long as it is conceived of as protecting the present boundaries
of states. Brilmayer is quite correct in arguing that this should not be the
case, because everyone is really appealing to territorial integrity.6 52
However, a simple appeal to the concept of territorial integrity is not the
barrier in question; the real barrier is the assumption that protection of
the present boundaries of states is so necessary that no derogations will
be permitted unless the state concerned agrees to them.653 With the pres-
ent rules of state sovereignty, the achievement of respect for human
rights via secession does indeed run hard up against the principle of the
territorial integrity of present states.
In conclusion, the various proponents of a qualified right of self-
determination all attack the states' argument that any right of secession
would be unmanageable. Further, the proponents al argue that a quali-
fied right of secession would be more in accord with principles of justice
(including respect for human rights) and thus with world peace (includ-
ing the maintenance of stability and world order). The primary require-
ment for implementing such a qualified right is that the factors described
be openly debated and balanced in the determination of a claim to se-
cede. If such a right is to be recognized in the draft declaration, this
debate must be undertaken for negotiation of the appropriate wording of
the recognized right. This kind of debate is not undertaken at present, so
it will clearly entail the adoption of a new rhetoric in the international
sphere.
Whether such a new rhetoric is able to be adopted depends at least
651 See supra Part II.
652 See supra notes 630-631 and accompanying text.
653 It is this element of agreement that distinguishes the breakup of the U.S.S.R. from the
claims of indigenous peoples and minorities to self-determination through secession. See supra note
325 for possible interpretations of how the secession of the various states of the U.S.S.R. and of
Yugoslavia could change the international law on secession such that it makes any difference to the
justification of secession by indigenous peoples.
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partly on the barriers to the recognition of the right itself. The only real
barrier to the adoption of a qualified right of secession is the present
principle of state sovereignty. The states' position appears to be that,
even if such a right would accord with the principles of justice, world
peace can only be achieved if the principles of territorial integrity and
non-intervention are adhered to.6" 4 The result is that, if indigenous peo-
ples are to be accorded even a qualified right of secession in order to
achieve self-determination, then the present strict adherence to the prin-
ciples of territorial integrity, and thus non-intervention, will have to be
relaxed. While this will not necessarily entail the elimination or altera-
tion of the general concept of state sovereignty over territory, it does
mean at least that the present distributions of land will be modified. This
will require an alternative way of conceiving the world system and the
use of appropriate rhetoric in order to debate it properly in the interna-
tional realm. It remains to be seen whether this can be achieved within
the present world system of state sovereignty or whether an alternative
theory of sovereignty needs to be developed.655
B. Territorial Entitlement
As the previous section argues, if a right of secessionist self-determi-
nation is to be recognized in international law then, among other things,
alternative theories of entitlement to land need to be developed, along
with the means necessary to debate entitlements in the international
sphere.656 At present territorial entitlement is justified by a range of in-
ternational legal principles.657 The disputes over territory that are de-
bated in the international realm use these principles to argue for an
entitlement to territory. These particular principles are not static and in
fact have evolved to meet changing circumstances and changing atti-
tudes.658 While there is not clear, overarching metatheory used to guide
the development of these principles, there are two general types of rea-
654 As Lea Brilmayer has argued, the simple concept of territorial integrity and having sover-
eignty over land is not a real barrier. See supra notes 627-631 and accompanying text. However,
even if this is the case, this is not the only issue; the primary issue is who has the right to the
territory in question. States have decided that, as a general rule, claims to land made by secessionist
groups, even those based on historical grievance, are overridden by the right of present states to their
present borders. The assumed justification is that the stability of the world system depends on this.
While Brilmayer makes the distinction between the general concept and its application in her book
(infra note 660, at 52-78), it also needs to be made explicitly in her article.
655 See infra section entitled Sovereignty (discussing the possibility that a different conception
of sovereignty may be required).
656 The previous section also shows that there is a need to debate the general pros and cons of
secession in any particular case, but this is not in issue in this section. For discussion of one aspect of
this, see infra section entitled Non-Intervention with States' Domestic Affairs.
657 See, eg., BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 133-171 (identifying over twenty such principles).
658 See, eg., BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 146 (commenting on the doctrine of discovery).
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sons that are used to justify laws, including international law: principle
and pragmatism. The principled reason for an international legal right to
states' territory would be that it creates a property system in the interests
of justice of all states, and thus all peoples, and thereby creates a moral
right to territory. The pragmatic reason is that, while there may or may
not be any principled, moral right to territory held today, respect for the
principle of territorial integrity is a practical solution. It is in the inter-
ests of states and peoples to respect territorial integrity because to hold
otherwise would lead to too much conflict, violence, and international
warfare. I suggest that both of these reasons should be scrutinized to see
if they do justify present holdings to territory or the territorial integrity
of present states.659
The development of any theory of territorial entitlement is clearly a
large and difficult task,6 ° so the following discussion is not intended to
be an extensive discussion of the moral or pragmatic justifications of
states' rights to territory. But it is intended to show that any purported
justification must be addressed and identified directly.
The issue whether individuals within states can have moral rights to
territory has been addressed extensively by various philosophers, many
of whom have answered "yes., 661 The issue whether nations can have a
moral right to their territory, however, has been addressed by relatively
few. In the "real, real world" of state relations, it is clearly assumed by
states that the legal right to presently-held territory is in the interests of
all states and peoples. It is not clear, however, what their reasons for this
assumption are. States may think that it is a matter of moral principle,
or justice, perhaps on the basis of extension of the principled reasoning
justifying property systems giving territorial rights to individuals within
states. Alternatively, they may merely think that it is a pragmatic solu-
tion in a world of different and competing peoples and ideologies; pro-
tection of present property holdings is required in the interests of
stability and peace.
International relations theorists who have considered this issue gen-
erally conclude that states cannot have any moral rights to their present
territories. For example, Charles Beitz argues that the existing distribu-
tion of territory and resources is completely morally arbitrary. 662 Lea
Brilmayer comments that Beitz is only one of the international relations
theorists who "have made this argument many times. '663 Brilmayer her-
659 Recall that we are not concerned with the simple idea of keeping borders intact, but with
the present borders. See supra notes 651-653 and accompanying text.
660 See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS 52-78 (1989).
661 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY
STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
662 BEITZ, supra note 622, at 136-143.
663 BRILMAYER, supra note 660, at 76.
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self adopts this view."'
It appears that few philosophers have attempted to justify nations'
or states' rights to territory on moral grounds.6  Two contemporary
philosophers who have addressed this issue have concluded that there
cannot be any moral rights to present territories. Jeffrey Reiman consid-
ers the arguments used by Locke, Nozick and Rawls to justify individual
rights to property and examines whether they can be extrapolated to jus-
tify the present holdings of land by states.666 He argues, first, that, as
nations are groups of individuals, and individuals are all considered mor-
ally equal, some nations cannot be arbitrarily entitled to more property,
resources or territory than others.667 Therefore, nations cannot be the
units of moral calculus; only individuals can.6 Second, in order to jus-
tify any system of property entitlements, the system must be in the inter-
ests of justice for all.669 This can be satisfied within states because a
government can ensure that the system will not worsen the prospects of
all, including those that do not own property. 670 In the international
sphere, however, Reiman notes that there is no such government, so
there can be no similar justification of the property system.67 Thus, af-
ter considering the justifications put forward by Locke, Nozick and
Rawls, Reiman concludes that the arguments used to justify the rights of
individuals to land cannot be extrapolated to justify the present holdings
of land by states.
Richard Winfield similarly rejects the extension of individual rights
to relations between states.672 He argues that the only justification of
territory holdings are instrumental, in that territory is necessary in order
to exercise political life, self-government and thus self-determination. I
suggest that this does not justify the present holdings of territory and
thus does not justify the present rule of territorial integrity.
The pragmatic reason for upholding the present rule of territorial
integrity can be scrutinized similarly. If the reason for upholding the
rule is that it is in the interests of states, namely for peace and security,
that can be objectively assessed. Questions to ask include: What is the
rule actually protecting? Does it really serve the interests of peace and
security? What should the purpose of territorial rights be?
664 Id. at 76-77.
665 See id. at 77 n.32 (exemplifying those philosophers).
666 Jeffrey Reiman, Can Nations Have a Moral Right to Territory? in THE TERRITORIAL
RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND PEOPLES 163 (John R. Jacobson ed., 1989).
667 Id.
668 Id. at 174.
669 Id. at 175-76.
670 Id.
671 Id. at 176.
672 Richard Dien Winfield, Territorial Rights in THE TERRITORIAL RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND
PEOPLES 187 (John R. Jacobson ed., 1989).
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The rule is clearly protecting rights to use of the land and resources
currently within a state's borders. It protects - at least in theory - the
right of the people in the state to have and enjoy their chosen form of
government, and thus protects their right of self-determination. Further,
in holding that violations of the rule will not be permitted, it protects -
again, in theory - a state from constant attempts by other people or
states to acquire the property of the first state by violence. All of these
justifications can be examined to see if they are legitimate purposes of the
rule of territorial integrity and to see if the rule actually furthers them.
Specifically, even if these interests are furthered in the abstract, they
must be justified in relation to the present holdings of states, as that is
what the rule of territorial integrity protects.
Winfield argues, for example, that there is only one legitimate justifi-
cation for the protection of territorial rights, which is that it enables peo-
ples to achieve self-determination by enabling them to create a space in
which to exercise political self-government.673 However, just because
there is a justification for property rights in the abstract does not entail
that rights to the present distribution of property is justified. They may
only be justified, for example, if they actually serve the interest of self-
determination. Thus, vast disparities in the different property holdings
of different states would need to be justified by reference to the needs of
self-determination rather than, for example, a simple rule of "finder's,
keeper's" or maintenance of the status quo.
A similar process could be undertaken with respect to the reason of
peace and security. While this may justify a system of property holdings,
in the abstract, that does not mean that any particular system and distri-
bution of property is justified. It may not be justified if the system chosen
is so repugnant to the demands of justice that it leads to aggression on
the part of states that hold too little property to achieve the other goals of
a property-holdings system (such as of achieving self-determination)
against states who hold more than is so necessary.
It is at least arguable that there are no principled, moral justifica-
tions of the international rule of upholding the territorial integrity of
present states. This means that the alternative justification of the rule -
that of upholding it for pragmatic considerations - may be the only
justification. If this is the case, not only should it be directly identified,
but it should be critically evaluated, to see if it does in fact serve the
purpose that it is said to serve. I have not answered the questions that I
posed regarding the pragmatic justification of a state property-holdings
system, but I have indicated the kind of discussion that must be openly
undertaken. This discussion must involve the identification and explicit
673 Id. at 205.
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balancing of the various interests involved, particularly where the princi-
ple is not justifiable by reference to the interests of distributive justice.
The arguments made by indigenous peoples are relevant precisely
because many indigenous peoples challenge the legal justification for the
rights of present states to the land and resources that they have acquired
through the conquest of indigenous peoples. International law has made
might right; therefore, the issue that should be addressed is whether this
is justified. If it is concluded that it is not, then the appropriate remedy
for the injustices done to indigenous peoples must be considered, which
must include discussion of such issues as the application of self-determi-
nation and whether the territorial integrity of present states should be
upheld today. Such discussion will necessarily entail debate on the inter-
ests being protected by the principle of territorial integrity and how the
various interests involved, including the human rights of indigenous peo-
ples, should be balanced. I suggest that one of the primary factors in-
cluded in the discussion must be the justification of all territorial
entitlements.
C. Non-Intervention in States' Domestic Affairs
The principle of non-intervention in a state's domestic affairs is a
constitutive principle of the present world system of nation-states. It is,
however, not as inviolable as the territorial integrity of present states.
The principle of non-intervention is enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations in Article 2(7), the only stated exception being enforce-
ment measures taken to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity.674 Very few such measures have been taken.675 However, this
has not stopped United Nations organs from taking action676 on matters
concerning the relations between a government and the people of a state
under Chapters IX and X of the Charter,677 most notably in respect to
human rights matters.678 The result is that the United Nations has in-
674 Article 2(7) provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall re-
quire the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall nor prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. Chapter VII provides for enforcement measures to maintain interna-
tional peace and security in situations of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression. Id. art. 39.
675 This is commonly attributed to the difficulty that the Security Council had in acting during
the cold war.
676 The type of action commonly thought not to be inhibited by Article 2(7) ranges from dis-
cussion as an agenda item, to recommendation, and even to resolutions addressed to particular
states. BROVNLIE, supra note 171, at 294.
677 U.N. CHARTER chs. IX & X (concerning economic and social co-operation).
678 Such interventions are made under Articles 55 and 56, concerning the promotion of respect
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creasingly treated a widening range of affairs between a government and
the people of a state as not essentially domestic concerns, intervening
other than on the basis of Chapter VII, and thereby eroding domestic
jurisdiction.679
The justification for such intervention has at least three elements.
One is that Article 2(7) cannot be taken to override other conflicting
provisions of the Charter (for example, Articles 55 and 56).68 0 Another
is that Article 2(7) cannot protect activities that have an impact beyond
the state in question; for example, civil strife due to human rights abuses
that threatens to affect neighboring states.68' A third is that there may
be some things so contrary to public policy that they cannot be counte-
nanced. In the case of human rights, such public policy has focused on
the protection of human dignity (intervention in cases of genocide and
torture are common examples). In the case of the environment, public
policy concerns have been based on the future of humanity as a whole.
Both of these in turn illustrate the concept that there are some things
that simply cannot be regarded as the "property" of a state.
The primary objection presently raised against the increasing inter-
ference on the basis of human rights is that the relations between a gov-
ernment and people of a state are regulated by cultural norms.68 2 Such
cultural norms, it is argued, make it inappropriate for states with differ-
ent norms to be telling such countries (governments and people) how to
order their relationships. 6 3  Possible justifications of this are that the
people of the state being "interfered" with actually agree with the powers
and actions of the government because of their cultural beliefs; and that,
even if they disagree, they prefer to solve their own problems themselves,
without interference from others. Another justification other often is
that they do not share the Western concept of rights and therefore do not
welcome solutions based on such a concept.
From an indigenous perspective the tension between human rights
universality and cultural relativity is problematic. On the one hand, in-
digenous peoples disagree that states should have the powers that they
claim over the people within them and argue for a recognition of univer-
for human rights. An increasing category of interventions is matters relating to the protection of the
environment.
679 Brownlie comments that the use of Article 2(7) has "resulted in the erosion of the reserva-
tion of domestic jurisdiction, although its drafters intended its reinforcement." BROWNLIE, supra
note 171, at 294.
680 Id.
681 This is because Article 2(7) does not prevent measures taken to maintain international
peace and security. See supra note 674.
682 For a discussion of cultural relativism see JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 109-160 (1989). See infra note 687 for a description of Donnelly's
suggested reconciliation of universalist and relativist positions.
683 DONNELLY, supra note 682, at 109.
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sal fundamental human rights. To this end, indigenous peoples endorse
the international human rights standard-setting approach, endorsing the
concept of human rights protection. 84 On the other hand, their com-
plaints are directed more at the present states, with their present compo-
sition and boundaries, having such powers rather than a wholesale attack
on the concept of non-interference. They do believe that there are genu-
ine cultural differences between themselves and other peoples and, on the
basis of cultural relativity, reject interference by others in matters that
may be expressions of culture. 8 Their problem thus appears to be not
so much with the fact of intervention, but with the purposes for interven-
tion, and situations in which it is undertaken.
This approach supports the view that the principle of non-interven-
tion with states' domestic affairs is not an absolute principle, but one that
is subject to override by factors other than just those of Chapter VII.
This in turn supports the development of a theory of intervention, includ-
ing who may decide to undertake interventions and upon what criteria
they may be undertaken. I will not attempt such a theory here, but it is
clear that an assessment of the value of the principle of sovereignty must
be made as well as the value of the other rights that it is presently said to
supersede. In relation to indigenous peoples, this must assess what inter-
ests are being protected by the states' insistences on the principle of non-
interference and what interests of indigenous peoples may be violated by
such adherence. It is clear that states consider sovereignty to be impor-
tant because they consider it to be the only guarantee of the self-determi-
nation of the state as a whole.68 6 But the issue should be whether it is so
684 For example, their endorsement of the development of the draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.
685 See, e-g., the indigenous representatives' proposals for provisions on the protection of their
culture to be included in the draft declaration. Supra note 53. Operative paragraphs 5-12 of the
most recent draft of the declaration protect cultural rights of indigenous peoples. This includes:
5. Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintian and develop
their distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics and identities, including the right to
self-identification.
6. Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to be protected form cul-
tural genocide, including the prevention of and redress for:
(a) any act which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct
societies, or of their cultural or ethnic characteristics or identities;
(b) any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(c) dispossession of their lands, territories or resources;
(d) imposition of other cultures or ways of life; and
(e) any propaganda directed against them.
Even I.L.O. Convention No. 169 recognizes "the aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise con-
trol over their own institutions, ways of life ... and to maintain and develop their identities, lan-
guages and religions." I.L.O. Convention, supra note 8, preambular para. 5.
686 For example, see the concerns expressed in the 1960 Declaration, supra note 258, Annex I
and the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 278, Annex III.
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important that it should supersede claims of individuals to have their
basic human rights respected, including a right to exercise self-determi-
nation as a group smaller than that of the state as a whole.6" 7
D. Sovereignty
The practice and concept of state sovereignty has been brought into
focus at several different stages throughout the discussion of indigenous
peoples' claims to recognition of a right of self-determination. At a basic
level, the nature of the concept of sovereignty is raised by issues such as
whether sovereignty is an inherent right of peoples or whether a people's
sovereignty can be taken from them. The view of states seems to be that
the sovereignty once enjoyed by indigenous peoples has either been ceded
by treaties or lost via conquest. Indigenous peoples do not appear to
argue that a genuine treaty of cession cannot alter the exercise of the
right of sovereignty. They deny that there are any proper treaties of ces-
sion that have not been violated by force; instead, they argue that their
exercise of sovereignty has been prevented by force. Their view of sover-
eignty is that it is an inherent right that cannot be taken by conquest.
Instead, conquest and subsequent subjugation merely suppresses their
right to enjoy the practices of sovereignty. According to indigenous peo-
ples, the recognition of their rights to self-determination would thus be
merely a reinstatement of their ability to exercise the rights of sover-
eignty that they would be entitled to in the absence of violation by states.
I will not delve into the nature or definition of sovereignty here, as it is
much too large a subject. What I want to stress, however, is that this
fundamental, large and complicated subject is relevant to a proper dis-
cussion of the claims of indigenous peoples to self-determination.
At another level, the concept of sovereignty has been brought into
focus by the discussion of the principles of non-intervention in the do-
mestic affairs of states and respect for the territorial integrity of states.
While these two principles have been discussed in separate sections, and
687 One approach has been to use the concept of universal human rights. For example, Don-
nelly argues that the best compromise between cultural relativism and universalism appears to be the
endorsement of a "weak cultural relativist position that permits deviations from universal human
rights standards primarily at the level of form." DONNELLY, supra note 682, at 110 (footnote omit-
ted). Note that the primary proponents of cultural relativism have been leaders of Third World
nations decrying the inappropriate imposition of First World values. See Donnelly's description and
criticisms of some of these appeals to cultural relativism. Id. at 118-121. However, while such
arguments are relevant to a general theory of non-interference, they are not of primary concern here.
This is because indigenous peoples live in many different states, both from the First and Third
World, and have joined together to draft joint proposals for the draft declaration. See proposals
cited supra note 53. The development of rights of indigenous peoples can therefore less easily be
regarded as the imposition of one world's set of values upon the other. Moreover, I note that many
states from the First and Third Worlds find themselves in alliance opposing the claims of indigenous
peoples to self-determination. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
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appear to be separate principles of international law, they are both inter-
twined as "practices of state sovereignty."6 8  It is these practices that
are reified by "the formalization of state sovereignty as the primary con-
stitutive principle of modem political life." '689 The principles that I have
discussed are therefore only part of a wider principle underlying the pres-
ent world system of states: that of state sovereignty.
In my discussion of the two principles, I have suggested that they
need to be addressed in more detail in any discussion of the indigenous
peoples' claims to self-determination. They need to be questioned and
the interests that lie behind their expression need to be directly evaluated.
Because they are only expressions of the principle of sovereignty, any
attempts to question or contest these principles must thus be seen as an
attempt to contest the overarching principle of state sovereignty. As
with the principles of non-intervention and territorial integrity, the dis-
cussion to date on indigenous peoples' claims to self-determination has
merely assumed that state sovereignty is the ultimately important princi-
ple; it does not argue why this should be so. Further, it does not address
arguments why that might not be so or why it might be overridden by
other important principles and competing interests. 690 The primary
problem with this approach is that, in obscuring the true interests in-
volved, it prevents the resolution of the problem in the best interests of
all of those concerned. In the interests of obtaining a proper resolution
of the claims, including a proper consideration of the arguments used to
reject them, the interests behind the world system of state sovereignty
must also be evaluated.
In addition, the discussion of both the international law of self-de-
688 R.B.J. Walker, Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contempo-
rary Political Practice in CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES 159, 160 (R.B.J. Walker & Saul H. Men-
dlovitz eds., 1990) [hereinafter Sovereignty, Identity, Community]. Walker argues that these can be
seen merely as aspects of the overarching principle because they are both different ways of conceiv-
ing of the state. That is, the state can be understood "as territory, as geography, as extension across
the physical surface of the earth." Id. at 173. The state can also be understood "less in terms of the
lines of spatial extension than of the fixed point from which spatial extension is measured." Id
That is, this point is "a fixed point of power and legitimacy." Id. The state is understood as "the
sovereign center around which society, polity, culture, economy, and territory may be circum-
scribed." Id Thus, "[tihe claim to power and authority at the center may be treated as more or less
coextensive with the claim to control a piece of territory." Id.
689 Id. at 159-160.
690 For example, the interests involved in situations of colonialism serve as an illustration of
what questions are avoided by the use of state sovereignty as a trump principle. Note that this
approach is not limited to colonialism and can be used to analyze other elements of self-determina-
tion. For example, in discussing why is there no agreement on what constitutes representative gov-
ernment, one must look at the real interests involved. In this example, the principle of non-
interference is posed as the most important principle to uphold. This, however, puts up barriers to
discussion because it does not even address, let alone evaluate, the usefulness of the principle to the
interests at issue.
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termination and the debate on the indigenous peoples' claims has shown
that the principle of sovereignty and its practices comprise the barriers
raised to the claims by indigenous peoples for self-determination.69 I
therefore suggest that any satisfaction of the claims of indigenous peoples
to self-determination necessarily challenges these principles and prac-
tices. Not only must the various interests be evaluated, but it appears
that some of the interests presently protected by the adherence to the
principle of sovereignty will need to be overridden if all indigenous peo-
ples are to achieve their self-determination.
The difficulty with this challenge to the concept of sovereignty is
that it is not clear how much is able to be undertaken within the present
paradigm of international law and relations. Sovereignty is part of the
definition of the system. It may thus be that sovereignty cannot be con-
tested in the present state system but must instead be done within an-
other paradigm. Alternatively, it is possible to question its value to the
present state system without suggesting that the foundation of the pres-
ent system be altered, merely their application. The challenge to territo-
rial integrity illustrates the different possible approaches: the challenge
can be directed at the whole concept of a territorially-defined state, or at
the present definitions of territory enjoyed by states - a challenge to the
principle or to its application. Yet, even if it is only a question of appli-
cation, it is still unclear how this can be challenged within a system that
does not permit challenges to the application of the principle of territo-
rial integrity - i.e., challenges to the territorial integrity of present
states. The issue is thus how fundamental any resulting change must be:
can we tinker with the present system and achieve self-determination for
all peoples while upholding the concept of sovereignty (if not its present
application), or must we re-conceptualize our present system and/or sov-
ereignty in order to achieve our goals?
The following section discusses two alternative theories of interna-
tional law and relations - constructivism and normative theory
which illustrate an attempt to develop another paradigm. Both of these
theories refuse to treat sovereignty as a given and instead argue for its
justification. While I do not evaluate the desirability of using such theo-
ries as new bases for international law and relations, I do suggest that
only theories such as those will be able to properly resolve indigenous
peoples' claims to self-determination.
E. Contesting Sovereignty
The rationalist and realist theories of international law and relations
are presently the dominant theories held by academics. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, they also constitute the dominant mode of discourse and
691 See supra Parts I and II.
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behavior of states. Realist theory holds that international politics is a
struggle between power-maximizing states in an environment of interna-
tional anarchy. Rationalist theory, adopting the realist view of interna-
tional relations, addresses what is rational behavior of states given certain
interests (power-maximization) and given both the game and states as
players in that game. Both theories treat states and state sovereignty as
givens in the international system. Territory and boundaries are thus
also givens, and only the internal state can agree to cede some of its sov-
ereignty. Security and other interests are exogenous to the state system;
they cannot be changed because they are part of the system that is taken
for granted by this view.
The contribution of rationalism and realism is limited to solving
problems within the status quo.692 These theories do not, however, chal-
lenge the concept of sovereignty, its practices, or application because
these are taken for granted. 93 Nor do they explain the concept of state
interests; the fact that states have interests is also assumed. Neither ra-
tionalism nor realism, therefore, can challenge or even address the inter-
ests that sovereignty protects, or evaluate their importance in any
particular situation. Because such interests need to be debated in order
for many of the issues raised in this paper to be properly addressed, it
appears that the claims by indigenous peoples can be neither fully ad-
dressed nor resolved within the paradigm created by these present theo-
ries. It thus appears that, even if we are only concerned with contesting
the application and not the concept of sovereignty, it cannot be done
within the present paradigm.
Constructivist theory has been devised to address these questions of
state interest and the construction of states as actors in the international
sphere. While rationalism and realism depend on the ideological concept
of a state as a territorial entity and locus of power, constructivists argue
that this definition is socially constructed. The constructivist view poses
that states themselves and their interests are socially defined and that the
present rationalist and realist views do not provide the only possible con-
ception of states and sovereignty.
The constructivist view allows sovereignty to be contested by en-
abling it to be questioned and redefined; it does not assume that states or
the state system have to remain as they presently are. The constructivist
view of sovereignty is that the sovereign state was a historically-specific
"resolution of questions about the character and location of political
community as these were articulated in early-modern Europe."6 94 The
692 For example, rationalism attempts to explain cooperation by states on the basis of states
having interests.
693 For example, both the present concept of territorial integrity and the integrity of present
territorial boundaries are taken as givens in this system.
694 Sovereignty, Identity, Community, supra note 688, at 169.
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practices of sovereignty serve to empower states as sovereign actors in
the international sphere and to reinforce the principle of sovereignty. As
Alexander Wendt, a constructivist international relations scholar, puts it,
"the reproduction of sovereign states is an ongoing accomplishment of
knowledgeable practice, not a natural, exogenously given fact of interna-
tional life." '6 95 Wendt thus comments that sovereignty is "both practice
and institution"6 96 and that the reproduction of this institution is "cen-
tral to [the states'] identity as subjects of contemporary international
life."'6 97 While this identification of sovereignty as socially constructed
does not view sovereignty as a problem or suggest that it should be
changed, it permits this to be done by opening up to investigation what
was previously considered to be like the closed black box of a flight
recorder.698
Related to this description of the construction and reproduction of
sovereignty is the view that the boundaries of states are also socially con-
structed. This view of boundaries leads to the view that the idea of the
state itself as the locus of moral community is also socially constructed.
If this view of moral community can be redefined then it leaves room for
the operation of international human rights norms to form part of a
world-wide moral community. Such a redefinition would also help to
contest both the application and concept of state sovereignty.
A third way that the constructivist view could help contest and pos-
sibly redefine sovereignty, and help indigenous peoples achieve their
human rights, is in its emphasis that there should be a theory of state
interests. The suggestion is that such a theory should address how actors
in the international sphere have and develop interests. Such a theory
would enable those interests to be criticized and thus enable questions,
such as the ones I have posed in relation to non-intervention and territo-
rial integrity, to be directly addressed.699
All of these aspects of the constructivist view, by showing how the
concept of state sovereignty is not a given, opens the subject up and calls
for justification and possibly change. It is precisely this kind of approach
that would enable the interests of indigenous peoples to be evaluated
against those of states in relation to claims of self-determination.
Normative theories of international law also challenge the principle
of sovereignty. The normative view directly addresses the moral and ethi-
cal obligations of states and other actors in the international sphere. This
695 Alexander Wendt, Sovereignty and the Social Construction of Power Politics 24 (1990) (un-
published manuscript). Wendt refers to Richard Ashley, Untying the Sovereign State: A Double
Reading of the Anarchy Problematique 17 MILLENIUM 227 (1988).
696 Id.
697 Id.
698 Perhaps, a Pandora's flight recorder.
699 See earlier sections in this Part.
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is in contrast with the rationalist and realist views of international law
which disagree that moral thinking is relevant to international law and
relations." 0 Within normative thinking, there are different strands, each
with different views of where such moral obligations originate; that is,
whether they originate from people, states, or both. Different theorists
thus have different views on the relevance of sovereignty.
The cosmopolitan view considers that people are the source of moral
values. 0 1 This view considers that human rights principles, as derived
from ethics, should govern all behavior in the international sphere, in-
cluding that of states. This view leads to a direct confrontation with the
principles of state sovereignty where it conflicts with moral principles of
behavior, such as the respect for human rights. It thus directly chal-
lenges and contests both the principle and practices of state sovereignty.
It accordingly helps the claims to self-determination in two ways; first,
in questioning the value of sovereignty and, second, in affirming the up-
holding of human rights. It is important to note that the cosmopolitan
view doesn't necessarily reject the principle of sovereignty per se, but it
stresses that it cannot be a premise of any theory about international law
or relations. It could instead, for example, be a conclusion from princi-
pled arguments. The value of this view is that it stresses that such princi-
ples require justification; i.e. we cannot assume that the interests that a
principle such as sovereignty protects are morally legitimate.
Other normative theorists take the view that both states and people
ought to inform international morality. Lea Brilmayer calls this the
"vertical" view, in that the sources of norms are not ethics - which
takes a "horizontal" approach - but political theory.70" This is "verti-
cal" because it integrates both individuals and states, which are typically
considered to be in a vertical hierarchy. 03 Brilmayer suggests that she
and Charles Beitz fall into this category. The usefulness of this view is
that it accommodates international issues such as those concerning
human rights, when views that focus solely on either states or individuals
cannot.
Charles Beitz directly addresses sovereignty as a concept and con-
siders that it should be problematic."° He argues that, where sover-
eignty comes into conflict with another principle, it should not
automatically overrule the other principle. A protest that sovereignty
would be violated "must point toward some sort of harm, or... evil, that
would be brought about by the violation of the state's sovereignty, the
prospect of which is sufficient to overrule whatever are the reasons in
700 See BEITZ, supra note 622, at 15-27.
701 This view is taken by Lichtenburg, for example.
702 BRILMAYER, supra note 660, at 56.
703 Id.
704 BErrz, supra note 622, at 69.
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favour of the threatened course of action. '705 Beitz suggests that a the-
ory of sovereignty should be developed by examining the political con-
texts in which conflicts between sovereignty and other principles such as
706 eaimorality occur. By examining how sovereignty is invoked, we may be
able to identify the best justification for sovereignty and thus how conflict
between it and other principles might be resolved. He suggests "the prin-
cipled basis of appeals to sovereignty, as well as the weight we should
attach to it when it comes into conflict with other concerns, will depend
on specific features of the setting in which the appeals are made." '
Beitz suggests that, through such an analysis, a normative theory of sov-
ereignty can be developed.
Beitz's view is similar to the position taken on sovereignty by those
holding the cosmopolitan view in that both hold that sovereignty should
be viewed as problematic rather than taken as a given. It thus similarly
supports a better examination of the claims of self-determination by in-
digenous peoples and their conflict with the principle and practices of
sovereignty. While it also does not assume that sovereignty will be dis-
carded, it urges an examination of its justification in this setting as well as
others. It is thus open to the possibility that, even if it is not discarded, it
can be modified such that it does not provide a blanket barrier to such
claims. Instead, the value of sovereignty will be weighed against the
value of the conflicting principle, allowing for the result that best accords
with the interests concerned.
None of the alternative theories outlined above have suggested what
the solution will be when conflicts occur between the principles and prac-
tices of sovereignty (such as those of non-intervention and territorial in-
tegrity) and other important principles (such as the maintenance of
human rights). For example, none have suggested that all possible
human rights should always be upheld whenever they come into conflict
with these two aspects of sovereignty.708 What they do suggest, con-
structivist and normative theories alike, is that the answer will vary and
that it is at least possible that it will be thought much more important to
uphold the rights being violated instead of upholding an interest of a
state in either being left to treat its citizens as it sees appropriate or an
interest in keeping intact the territory over which it has control. Thus,
while the concept of sovereignty itself may not need to be renounced in
705 Id.
706 Charles R. Beitz, Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs, in POLITICAL THEORY
TODAY 236, 254 (David Held ed., 1991).
707 Id.
708 1 note that, while many states presently profess that fundamental human rights are always
important and should always be upheld, their actions in ignoring abuses, or defining them away (for
example, by saying that a particular group is not entitled to a particular right), speak louder than
their words.
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order for people to be free, our attachment to it will be.7"
This sort of solution is the minimum required in order to address
the actual concerns of indigenous peoples. As this sort of exercise is not
envisaged as appropriate under the presently-held rationalist or realist
approaches to international law and relations, these approaches are
therefore seen as inadequate for the resolution of such problems as those
posed by claims of self-determination by indigenous peoples.71°
CONCLUSION
"Self-determination" is used to refer to a people's control of their
own destiny. As such it is used to refer to the protection of a wide range
of rights, including: the right to use one's language; to develop one's own
culture, to use and ownership of lands and resources; and to achieve
political autonomy, self-government and ultimate independence, even
where that may entail secession from an existing state. The use of "self-
709 See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 165 (1969). "If men wish to be free, it is
precisely sovereignty they must renounce." Id.
710 What these theories do not address is how one might go further than this - for example, to
suggest how the principle of sovereignty might be more fundamentally altered. One constructivist
who has taken the contesting of sovereignty further than describing its social construction is R.B.J.
Walker. In addition to allowing for the evaluation of sovereignty in any given situation (as in con-
flicts with other principles such as human rights), Walker criticizes the conception and argues that
we need an alternative principle by which to organize the world political community. See, e.g.,
R.B.J. WALKER, ONE WORLD, MANY WORLDS: STRUGGLES FOR A JUST WORLD PEACE (1988);
Sovereignty, Identity, Community, supra note 688, at 159. Walker argues that any critical evalua-
tion of sovereignty is much more difficult than it at first appears because "the problematic identified
by the principle of state sovereignty is an effect of a more encompassing problem of sovereign iden-
tity." Id. at 175. Therefore, in order to understand and address sovereignty, and to consider what
kind of sovereignty we want, we must "come to terms with deeply entrenched philosophical princi-
ples, of which sovereignty is only one expression." Id. These principles are the philosophical bases
of sovereign identity and political community. This means that, if we are to challenge the principle
and practices of sovereignty, we must first address the way that we understand human identity and
political community as organized around sovereign states. The fate of the principle and practices of
sovereignty will thus depend on the extent to which these fundamental philosophical principles are
challenged.
While Walker describes what changes in views of sovereignty fundamentally challenge its philo-
sophical bases, he does not prescribe a strategy for undertaking such a challenge. The primary
relevance of his work to the achievement of self-determination for indigenous peoples is thus in his
identification of the principles of state sovereignty as part of the wider set of philosophical beliefs
entrenched in the definition of the present world community. This means that indigenous peoples
may in the future find that, as a result of any changes in the conception of sovereignty that occur in
response to their achievement of self-determination, their views on sovereignty may change further
such that they find themselves on the path to a fundamentally different conception of political com-
munity. At present, however, it is arguable that their conception of political community is not
fundamentally different from that which underlies the present system. For example, the use of
boundaries does not challenge "the spatial articulations of political life that place the boundaries
where they are." Id. at 179. For this reason, I do not pursue Walker's analysis here, but I do
identify it as likely to be relevant in the future.
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determination" in the Working Group setting is no exception. Both
states and indigenous peoples envisage that it includes this broad range of
rights, including the option of ultimate secession. Indigenous peoples ar-
gue that they have the natural law right to self-determination; while
some go further, arguing that they have a positive international legal
right of self-determination. Whatever the reason, they argue that such a
right must be included in the draft Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples. States have denied that indigenous peoples have such a
right of self-determination and are only prepared to recognize in the draft
declaration rights other than rights to independence or secession. States
maintain that indigenous peoples do not have the international legal
right of self-determination. As this paper has shown, the barrier to the
inclusion of such a right is the feared violation of the constitutive princi-
ples of modem (statist) international law and relations: territorial integ-
rity, non-intervention and thus state sovereignty.
Despite such fears, the focus of the debate is wrong. One cannot
deny a claim to what should be merely by reference to what is. Instead
the reasons behind the adoption and continuation of the present system
must be explicitly addressed, evaluated and even, in this case, challenged.
It is not clear that states' fears should outweigh those of indigenous peo-
ples. It is clear that the interests of states in keeping the status quo
should not have automatic priority over those of indigenous peoples in
achieving self-determination. While the rhetoric employed has obscured
at least the assumed interests of states, this should not be allowed to
continue.
In Part III, I criticized the non-application of the international legal
right of self-determination to indigenous peoples. I suggested how the
law of self-determination should be applied and how, in any such appli-
cation, the competing interests should be identified, directly debated, and
balanced in order to properly resolve the claims of indigenous peoples to
self-determination. I then identified the barriers to such an interpretation
and application of the principle of self-determination and identified the
inconsistencies forced by the assumption of these barriers.711 Finally, in
the section on sovereignty I argued that these barriers can only be over-
come if the present statist, realist and rationalist paradigm of interna-
tional law and relations gives way to one that does not take these barriers
as givens.
At this point, the task ahead for those that argue for the recognition
of indigenous peoples' rights appears daunting. If the inclusion in the
draft declaration of a full right of self-determination for indigenous peo-
ples depends on everyone, including states, changing their view of the
world system, then it may never be achieved. I, however, am not so
711 See, e.g., supra section entitled Colonialism and Foreign Intervention.
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daunted. While it is not an aim of this paper to chronicle the nature of
international law and relations over time and how it has changed, I sug-
gest that the evolution of international law and relations has entailed the
evolution of the concept of sovereignty. The United Nations system, as
well as being one that preserves the concept of sovereignty, is also a sys-
tem designed to limit it in certain respects. The inroads on the basis of
human rights into the principle of non-intervention in states' domestic
affairs can be seen as a slow evolution of the statist paradigm. It may not
take much more to flip this paradigm.712 Unfortunately, until that hap-
pens, we will not know that it is about to do so.
This is where the rhetoric used to debate matters in the international
sphere, particularly human rights matters, becomes relevant. While the
overall world view frames the debate, the debate also helps form the
world view. If the rhetoric is changed, the international legal paradigm
may also change. It is possible that, if all the issues raised in Part III are
forced into the debate, they will be discussed rather than merely brushed
aside. From the indigenous peoples' position, steering the debate is not
an easy task, as they lack the power and authority given to states by the
present paradigm. Despite this disadvantage, however, and although it
has been a long and slow process, it has only been through the pressure
of indigenous peoples that we have got as far as the drafting of a declara-
tion of the rights of indigenous peoples. As Robert Williams has put it,
indigenous peoples have reversed "the controlling assumption that indig-
enous peoples are not proper legal subjects of international concern or
sanction." '713 I suggest that through such continued pressure, particu-
larly on the points that I have identified, indigenous peoples may be able
to trigger that crisis in thought that precedes change.7 14
Such a change would reinstate the human rights component of self-
determination715 and reinstate the belief that the state exists for the bene-
fit of people, rather than the reverse.716 Only through such changes will
712 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFic REVOLUTION 92-96 (1962).
713 Williams, supra note 1, at 669.
714 Crenshaw argues: "Powerless people can sometimes trigger... a crisis by challenging an
institution internally, that is by using its own logic against it. Such a crisis occurs when powerless
people force open and politicize a contradiction between the dominant ideology and their reality."
Williams, supra note 1, at 701.
As Richard Falk points out, several social movements appeared absurd and unobtainable at
their initiation but that an unpredicted convergence of various forces enabled a transformation in
thought and thus the success of the movements. Falk, supra note 162, at 63-67. The approach that I
have suggested could encourage such a convergence and thus transformation and success.
715 After reviewing various interpretations of the right to self-determination expressed in the
International Covenant, Thornberry comments that "perhaps the truth is that self-determination has
little to do with human rights." Thornberry, supra note 199, at 884.
716 As James Anaya puts it, the state should be seen "as an instrument of human society rather
than its master." Anaya, supra note 54, at 225.
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indigenous peoples achieve control of their destiny, or their self-determi-
nation. Any other approach is tantamount to a rejection of a world order
based on principle and an embrace of might as right.
